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This thesis examines the cycling patterns of simultaneity, or phasing, between two or more 
repeating images and identifies this as a visual phenomenon in which reoccurrences over time divide 
between spatial positions. The research that supports this is based upon my studio practice and my 
experience of works from contemporary art practice that foreground durational and spatial concerns. 
I refer to Henri Bergson’s theories of spatialised time to examine the means by which we apprehend 
the spatial presentation of moving images and identify degrees of awareness between the temporal 
and the spatial.  
From my analysis of these I propose that the perception of image phasing results from chance 
configurations between points in time and positions in space, and argue that the experience of such 
simultaneities is twofold, that non-resolving patterns of behaviour extend a viewer’s awareness from 
the moment of apprehension towards possible future configurations. It is the means by which such 
possibility is perceived that I examine in this thesis.   
My contribution to knowledge is offered in a body of studio work, as research into formal and 
perceptual relationships between repetition, extension, slippage and simultaneity. The research 
question underpinning this thesis addresses the means by which we might perceive the phenomena of 
image phasing, and how this might in turn extend opportunities for development within the studio 
practice.  
It is in a combination of analysis of selected studio works and the subsequent text that a 
response to this question is posited that frames a viewer’s perception of possibility in terms that owe 
a debt to Bergsonian thinking about the nature of divided time flow as a series points in space. I argue 
that the experience of image phasing is one of alternating time apportioned as spatial units, and that 
this spatialisation process is predicated upon an accumulated past that is recognised as a pattern for 
possible future configurations. Extrapolating from this I claim that we anticipate the future of multiple 
temporalities in terms of their relative positions in space and that possibility, the potential future 
states of the experience, is therefore perceived as separate positions rather than parallel successions.  
It is at this point that I am able to claim that the studio work and the subsequent text make a 
contribution to knowledge in the form of an art practice that frames image phasing as an experience 
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Douglas Gordon’s 24 Hour Psycho has continued to generate discussion since it was first 
exhibited in 1993. Gordon’s basic premise of projecting Alfred Hitchcock’s 1960 movie Psycho at a 
reduced rate of approximately two frames a second, in a gallery space that the audience can enter and 
exit at will, remains central to the work, but developments in the form of the work’s presentation 
have occasionally been adopted to extend the way it is encountered. In 2017 - 18 the work was 
presented in a dual-screen format in which the slow progression of the film from beginning to end was 
complemented by an adjacent version projected at the same rate but backwards so that once a day 
they formed an inverted correspondence in a brief Rorschach-like mirrored image.1 On different 
occasions Gordon has doubled and inverted the film image with a mirror, but more commonly the film 
is projected onto a translucent screen that allows the audience to witness its frame-by-frame 
progression from either side.  
Whilst 24 Hour Psycho is regularly discussed in terms of its appropriation of Hollywood 
imagery and its reconfiguring of cinematic suspense there are more specific factors within this work 
that are relevant to this research. These include Gordon’s methods of doubling and extending the 
image, both on a formal level and in terms of the processes by which it might be perceived. The 
original film’s temporality may have been lost in favour of a presentation of scenes that can be 
scrutinised separately, but this does not simply leave us with duration that lacks a dynamic. Gordon 
has rendered the original film as a series of separated images that exist as much in space as they do in 
time. It is with such perceptual shifts, afforded by the delaying of temporal flow that this research 
began; from a nominal idea that movement and stasis might be perceived to coexist within a work and 
that attention can be extended between its content and its condition.  
The interminable pace of Gordon’s projection of a familiar and venerated classic suspends us 
in front of the screen, unable to engage with it on its original terms. Instead we replace the absent 
elements of the original version of Psycho with memory or assumption, or perhaps make repeated 
viewings in an attempt to gain something new from events that have been extended beyond the limits 
of our presence in the exhibition space. His ‘delayed’ version requires us to utilise experience and 
imagination in a conscious process of assimilation that separates the content of the original film from 
the means by which it might now be apprehended. Looking at 24 Hour Psycho as a sequence of frames 
we might attempt to orientate ourselves in Hitchcock’s script so as to determine what is about to 
happen on screen. Such a dualised state of awareness resonates with considerations that I will 
examine in this thesis; the intentional dividing, doubling or layering of our means of engaging with a 
work between the immediate experience and our imagination. And in relation to the subject of the 
                                                 
1 Douglas Gordon back and forth and forth and back (Gagosian Gallery, New York. 2017 – 2018) 
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work, alluding to that which might happen in the future, and intentionally giving rise to a viewer’s 
awareness of the ongoing possibility of change in the work.  
 
The research question  
In this thesis I examine the perception of simultaneity between images encountered in space. 
The research project is comprised of a series of studio-based works and a written component that 
both reflects the thinking generated in the process of making and exhibiting these works, and also 
operates as a means of generating further questions and proposing new perspectives that are fed 
back into the development of this body of work. From this I analyse particular studio works that I 
propose encapsulate an experience of image phasing, which I define as the perceived slipping of 
simultaneities between two or more repeating images in two or more positions in space. 
My focus upon what is primarily a perceptual phenomenon is contextualised by my 
experience of a wider array of works by visual artists, musicians, composers, writers and 
choreographers that utilise differing degrees of repetition in adjacent situations. Ultimately the 
selection of visual art works examined in this thesis reflect a studio practice that is largely image-
based, and offer an overview of selected works that I argue describe a nexus within which the 
phenomena of image phasing might be located.2 
I support my analysis of these selected studio works with relevant examples from 
contemporary art practice and I extend my analysis of these with reference to writings by Henri 
Bergson and Gilles Deleuze that address time perception and simultaneity.3 These references are used 
to scrutinise the subjective circumstances in which phasing patterns are perceived, and to ultimately 
consider the nature of what might result from the perception of such phenomena. Thus the research 
can be described as an examination of the perception of visual phasing defined as patterns of 
simultaneity between image alternations in adjacent space. 
The question that this research sets out to address is:  
What might the visual phasing perceived to be operating in the studio practice between 




                                                 
2 The only examples used that I have not experienced first hand are Takahiko Iimura’s Loop Seen as a Line (1972) and 
Peter Kubelka’s Arnuf Rainer (1960), both of which I have instead witnessed in documented form and, in the case of 
Iimura, spent time in conversation with the artist about the work. 
3 Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will (London: Muirhead Library of Philosophy, 1956), Duration and Simultaneity 
(New York: Bobbs- Merrill, 1965), Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement Image (London: Continuum, 2004), 
Cinema 2: The Time Image (London: Continuum, 2005), Bergsonism, (New York: Zone Books, 1994) 
 10 
 
Thesis overview: content  
This thesis is comprised of an accumulation of thoughts and questions that have resulted 
from making, exhibiting and discussing a focussed series of studio works, and the links and contextual 
resonances that I have drawn from these works. Reciprocal processes of making, discussing and 
writing have sustained the development of this research, and in the writing of this text I have 
continued this process of identifying and aligning what I perceive to be the operations of these works 
as I examine them alongside cited examples of works that I have witnessed, and in some cases 
discussed with the artists in question.  
This research began with an approach to making work that hypothesised a condition of 
‘seeing oneself seeing’, and developed out of attempts to engender experiences of actuality and 
reflexivity in my studio practice. This initial focus foregrounded a phenomenological approach to 
visuality in the work in which the viewer’s presence, the body and the process of seeing were intended 
to coexist as subject. A key example of such a work, entitled Duration Reveals Extension (2009) was a 
site-specific video installation in which a line drawing of an interior space hidden behind a large 
projection screen was reduced to its separate components and back-projected at 1:1 scale. My 
intention was that this deconstructed drawing of the space hidden behind the installed screen was 
revealed in sections, over time, so that the viewer might determine a representation of that space out 
of the conscious accumulation and reconfiguration of its separated and sequenced lines and angles. 
Additionally, as the viewing space was semi-dark there was the potential for the projected lines of the 
drawing to form on the retina as layered afterimages and reveal something of the physicality of 
seeing. In developing this piece I was attempting to delay the process of perceiving an image and 
reveal some of the means by which we apprehend visual representations of the world.  
 
    
Steven Scott, Duration Reveals Extension, August Art Gallery, London, 2009 
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An initial focus on reflexivity and visuality has become more implicit in my studio practice to 
accord with what Kate Mondloch describes as a state of spectatorial doubleness.4 Mondloch uses this 
term to describe the condition a viewer of screen-based installations adopts whereby they retain 
awareness of a work’s subject and, at the same time, its material form and/or means of presentation. 
This, she suggests, is a method of concurrent assimilation of what is a spatially privileged experience in 
a manner that owes less to the traditional single-point perspective-based viewpoint of painting and 
more to that of the sculptural experience of moving around an artwork.  
Between 2013 and 2015 I visited multi-screen installations by artists João Maria Gusmão and 
Pedro Paiva, and Chantal Akerman and experienced such an extending of concurrent awareness 
between the filmic content of each installation and the means by which it was presented in the 
exhibition space. In considering this proposed state of dual consciousness in relation to the perception 
of simultaneity of multiple images required by both of the works in question, I turned to Henri 
Bergson’s writings in Duration and Simultaneity on the dividing of subjective durational flow and the 
perception of time as a spatialised dimension.5 An examination of Bergson’s writing on spatialised 
time is used to contextualise the strategies developed as part of my studio practice in which patterns 
of phasing between repeating images result from the doubling, mirroring, or layering of a temporal 
work. The paradigm of dual or concurrent awareness is considered in relation to a viewer’s experience 
of extreme durational works such as Douglas Gordon’s 24 Hour Psycho, and I argue that in such cases a 
viewer must calculate the work’s pace against the limitations of their presence. I propose that such 
durational works are perceived as perpetual and irresolvable and encourage in the viewer an 
awareness of a perceptual shift from their current circumstances towards an array of possible future 
states.   
As might be expected from practice-based research the works examined in this text reflect 
the conceptual development of my studio practice over a number of years, from an initial interest in 
rhythmic repetitions of film and video imagery towards a reduction of pictorial subject and emphasis 
on minimal, durational and spatial concerns. What is also reflected in my selection of artists’ works is 
the subsequent development of the research process itself, taking shape out of the accumulation of 
ideas and the refinement of a hypothesis around the perception of multiple simultaneities. In keeping 
with the nature of this practice I have used examples of a number of works predicated upon the 
moving image that in different ways emphasis form and material as being of equal importance to 
pictorial content. Thus I refer to works by artists associated with structural issues in which the film’s 
                                                 
4 Mondloch describes spectatorial doubleness in relation to ‘certain media installations (that) generate a forceful, 
critical effect that hinges…between illusionist/virtual and materialist/actual spaces.’ Kate Mondloch, Screens: Viewing 
Media Installation Art (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 62 
5 Bergson, Duration and Simultaneity 
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spatio-temporal qualities are of primary concern. This is examined in the positive-negative dual film, 
Loop Seen as a Line (1972) by Takahiko Iimura, the dual image repetitions of Ken Jacob’s Nervous 
System works (1980s onwards), and the live film projections of X Fours Loops (1974), Rings (2012) and 
Quadrants (2016) by Nicky Hamlyn. These have been selected as exemplars of the exploration of real-
time relationships of separate projections, and offer context to my focus upon image simultaneities 
between multiple screens.  
In outlining the focus of this research I begin with multi-screen installations by João Maria 
Gusmão and Pedro Paiva, and Chantal Ackerman, and as I develop my argument I draw upon examples 
by contemporary artists that in different ways combine two components in structural, experiential or 
conceptual dialogue. I use these to underpin my examination of the phasing synchronicities of images 
in my studio practice. It is important to state here that the selection of these works is based not just 
on their relevance to the research as examples that might reveal something about the perception of 
patterns of phasing, but that I have in a majority of cases experienced each first hand, and that they 
have therefore contributed directly to my thinking. These works can be aligned with broad definitions 
of image phasing in that they are each structured in different ways around concurrent temporalities 
and/or adjacent positions in space. As such they are part of a process of personal experience and 
reflection from which a series of studio works has emerged that are intended to challenge and explore 
the perception of the plurality and duration of images.  
In attempting to survey the ground within which such characteristics might be situated I refer 
to Douglas Gordon’s 24 Hour Psycho and focus on examples of the dual projection works, H.M. (2009) 
by Kerry Tribe, ‘Take My Eyes and Through Them See You…’, (2010) by Cerith Wyn Evans, By Faith and 
Industry, (2006) by Lisa Oppenheim, and Win, Place or Show, (1998) by Stan Douglas. The format in 
each case of two films presented in a dialogical relationship is the basis of each of these, and examples 
of such methods of generating meaning out of the form of a work is proposed in relation to that of 
the studio practice. Doubled or mirrored photographic imagery by artists Peter Liversidge, and Ryan 
Gander are also referenced in relation to wider notions of alternating dialogues between dual 
components in the studio practice. I use an examination of Brion Gysin’s Dreamachine (1960) to 
explore the phenomenological experience of phasing patterns of light and I use an analysis of the 
photograph of Duchamp’s Door, 11 rue Larrey (1927) to propose a relationship between the perception 
of possibility in a work and his idea of Infrathin.  
 The various examples of work presented for consideration are drawn from a wider array of 
works, exhibitions, curatorial projects and screenings that I have largely witnessed directly, or in the 
case of Iimura’s Loop Seen as a Line, discussed with the artist. From having witnessed and interrogated 
such exhibitions and screenings I have attempted to form a body of contextual thought that 
underpins the works and ideas generated in my studio practice.  
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To conduct this aspect of the research I have focussed primarily on two key studio works that 
encapsulate issues of simultaneity and alternation between two elements in complementary 
operations. One is predicated upon rhythmic patterns of phasing simultaneities of images repeating 
over time, the other upon visual illusions of movement and extended duration between two 
components that operate below the threshold of immediate perception.6 In both instances moving 
image technologies and processes of spatial presentation are designed to frame the shifting 
synchronisations of visuals displayed either on two screens or as two images.  
 
Relationships between text, context and practice 
From the development of a studio practice and the analysis of artists’ works that foreground 
interrelationships between multiple temporal flows I hypothesise the alternation between two points 
in time and/or positions in space as a method of perceptual enquiry and begin by addressing the 
difference between these as alternating dimensions of movement/stasis. This subsequent method of 
interrogating dual as opposed to multiple states of concurrency developed from my observations of 
alternating movement on adjacent video screens between two looped images and positions of the 
two screens. The phasing of two images resulted from my intention to simplify the work so as to 
isolate and focus upon slipping synchronisations of repeating images on just two screens. My framing 
of this phenomenon in terms of the alternations of repetitions that span the temporal and the spatial 
has in turn enabled me to appraise the perception of visual phasing in terms of Bergsonian ideas of 
simultaneity as divided duration and spatialised time.  
The texts that form the basis for my initial work on this thesis, and those that I’ve used to 
support the claims and arguments that constitute this thesis, are referenced and examined 
throughout. But at this point I want to acknowledge the key writings that enabled me to formulate my 
thoughts and responses to the ideas developing in the studio practice, as well as to reflect upon my 
experiences of repetition, simultaneity and spatialised time in the art works referenced here that have, 
in turn, supported the processes of making and exhibiting the studio works.                
The books that extended my thinking around phenomenology and helped me to examine 
initial ideas of self-reflexivity and embodied visuality were, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness 
of Internal Time by Edmund Husserl,7 and the Phenomenology of Perception and The Visible and the 
                                                 
6 The works in question are titled Edge of Motion (2013) and Occlusion (2016) and are examined in Chapters 3 and 4 
respectively.  
7 Edmund Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917) (Dordrecht: Kulwer 
Academic Publishers, 1991) 
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Invisible by Maurice Merleau-Ponty.8 These two books were particularly useful in extending my 
thinking around visuality, duration and representation. In subsequently expanding my responses to 
the identification of image phasing as a focus of my studio practice I referred to a wider range of texts 
that included The Inordinance of Time by Shaun Gallagher, which offered wider phenomenological 
examinations of temporality and presence, but ultimately did not give me the means by which I could 
form an understanding of how spatial concerns might be fundamental to the perception of phasing. 
The Future of the Image by Jacques Ranciére, and Techniques of the Observer by Jonathan Crary9 
allowed me to consider the means by which I might articulate the context in which I was working with 
moving images. It was not until I began to examine some of the ideas in Deleuze’s Cinema 1. The 
Movement Image, and in particular in Cinema 2. The Time Image, that I could begin to identify a context 
for processes of repetition and simultaneity that were being revealed in my studio work. Additionally I 
began to explore Henri Bergson’s writings on the perception of time as a spatial concern and I found 
Deleuze’s book Bergsonism helpful in his interpretation of Bergson’s theories of spatialised time.10   
In conjunction with the presentation, examination and refinement of the studio works I began 
to develop the means by which I was to approach the phenomena of image phasing as a perceptive 
process rooted in the subjective experience of a spectator. I found Bergson’s examination of 
spatialised time and time consciousness, pure memory and the memory image afforded me a 
framework within which I was able to conceive of phasing as an experience of visual alternations of 
space and time. Although not generally considered in relation to phenomenological thought, 
Bergson’s writings on perception and time incorporate subjectivity and presence. It is from a focus on 
the subjectivity of visuality and the audience that my context shifted from Husserl and Merleau-Ponty 
towards that of Bergson and Deleuze as a means of focusing upon my refined interest in the 
perception of simultaneity as a spatio-temporal phenomenon.  This aspect of my research is therefore 
drawn largely from Bergson’s key works: Simultaneity and Duration, Time and Free Will and Matter and 
Memory, and Deleuze’s responses to these texts in Bergsonism in which he adapts Bergson’s theories 
of movement, image, simultaneity and time.11  
Alongside these key texts I addressed themes and practices in contemporary art in 
publications that included Screens: Viewing Media Installation Art, by Kate Mondloch, and have 
subsequently adopted her notion of spectatorial doubleness as a model of a viewer’s multiple states of 
                                                 
8 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge Classics, 2002), The Visible and the 
Invisible (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968) 
9 Jacques Ranciére, The Future of the Image (New York: Verso, 2007), Shaun Gallagher, The Inordinance of Time 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1998), Jonathan Crary Techniques of the Observer (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1992) 
10 Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement Image, Cinema 2: The Time Image, Difference and Repetition, Bergsonism, 
11 Bergson, Time and Free Will, Duration and Simultaneity, Matter and Memory 
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awareness when engaged with multi-image installations. In her book The Past is the Present; It’s the 
Future Too Christine Ross examines ideas of simultaneity in multi-screen installations that are the 
result of direct experience of selected artworks. John Geiger’s book Chapel of Extreme Experience 
examines the hallucinatory effects of strobe light and flicker films as a context to Brion Gysin’s 
Dreamachine.12  
In responding to the research question stated previously I determine that image phasing is 
most effective when it is seen to be taking place between two or more autonomous temporalities and 
that image synchronisations are perceived to be forming at the point of apprehension. From this I am 
able to extrapolate that such ‘real time’ phasing offers the viewer a tacit awareness of possible future 
conditions of the visual phenomena, and that phasing between two autonomous flows is perceived as 
a perpetual cycle of chance configurations. Having determined the importance of the viewer’s 
perception of what might be called the ‘live’ cycling of simultaneity and difference between moving 
images I examine the experience of phasing between separate presentation systems and propose an  
awareness in the viewer of the perpetual nature of simultaneity in the work. Furthermore, this 
notional concurrent layer of awareness of possible configurations of the works’ visual 
interrelationships alludes, by implication, to a perceptive threshold beyond which such possibilities 
take the form of virtual degrees of difference that, I argue, accords with Bergsonian ideas of 
spatialised time. I refer to this proposed condition as ‘possibility’.   
 
Thesis overview: structure  
In presenting here an overview of the chapters of this text I will outline the structure of my 
argument. This begins with examples of artist’s works proposed as spatialised time, perceptions of 
dual imagery, and the phenomenon of image phasing, and develops to examine phasing in Bergsonian 
terms of simultaneity and repetition, and claim that the perception of phasing of live synchronisations 
of images offers an awareness of possible future states.  
 
Chapter 1: Encounters with spatialised time 
Theme: Multi-screen installations are considered in terms of spatialised time and the 
difference between points in time and positions in space. This chapter begins with phenomenological 
examinations of recent encounters with screen-based installations by artists João Maria Gusmão and 
Pedro Paiva, and Chantal Akerman. Kate Mondloch’s notion of spectatorial doubleness is referenced in 
                                                 
12 Kate Mondloch, Screens, Christine Ross, The Past is the Present; It’s the Future Too (London: Bloomsbury, 2012), 
David Curtis (Ed) Expanded Cinema (London: Tate, 2011), Tanya Leighton (Ed) Art and the Moving Image (London: 
Tate, 2008), John Geiger, Chapel of Extreme Experience. A Short History of Stroboscopic Light and the Dream 
Machine (New York: Soft Skull Press, 2003) 
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relation to these and the proposed doubled awareness of a viewer is considered in relation to 
Bergsonian ideas of spatialised time and simultaneity.  
 
Chapter 2: The doubled image  
Theme: The difference between two components as a creative method. Examinations of dual 
and doubled images in contemporary art and studio practice. The difference between two points in 
time and two positions in space is described as a matrix to frame the studio practice. This is considered 
in relation to repetition and dual image works from contemporary art and in the studio practice. Works 
by Kerry Tribe, Cerith Wyn Evans, Lisa Oppenheim, Stan Douglas, Takahiko Iimura and Nicky Hamlyn 
are used to reflect upon methods of repetition and dual form presentation. Notions of live-ness and 
chance are highlighted in the presentation of studio work, as the perception of visual phasing and 
possibility.  
 
Chapter 3: Phasing as shifting simultaneities 
Theme: Visual phasing as the perception of simultaneities between points in time and 
positions in space. An initial examination of forms of phasing and the perception of patterns of 
synchronisation and slippage is followed by a close analysis of the perception of visual phasing in 
studio work, Edge of Motion in reference to Bergson and Deleuze’s ideas of temporal plurality and 
simultaneity.  I propose that the perception of image phasing reveals a doubling of awareness, 
between the actuality of the work and of its possible future configurations. 
 
Chapter 4: Phasing as alternation and delay 
Theme: Visual phasing as perception of duration and repetition. A close analysis of the studio 
work entitled Occlusion is conducted in relation to spatialisation and duration and the writing of 
Bergson and Deleuze. Examples of contemporary artists’ works are employed to consider ideas of 
delay in terms of patterns of repetition. 
 
Chapter 5: The Dreamachine: a phenomenology of interference patterns 
Theme: Visual phasing as a phenomenological experience of the repetition of patterns. 
Consisting of an examination of Brion Gysin’s Dreamachine in relation to its form and subjective 
effects. This is conducted with reference to flicker film.  
 
Chapter 6: Phasing and possibility 
Theme: The viewer’s awareness of a work’s possible configurations considered in relation to 
Duchamp’s Infrathin.  An analysis of the subjective readings inherent in the photograph of Duchamp’s 
Door, 11 rue Larrey.  Such configurations are considered as possibility and compared to Duchamp’s 
Infrathin as concurrent transition between one and another in the perception of the viewer.  
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Conclusion: Phasing as a phenomenological experience of spatialised time and an awareness of 
possibility.   
The perception of visual phasing results in a state of concurrent awareness of the real time 
simultaneities between two moving image and their futures as a set of probable states that are 
conceived in consciousness in terms of their possible relative positions in space. This perception of 
future configurations is conceived in spatial terms as an array of relative positions.  
 
Contribution to knowledge 
The thesis comprises both a studio practice and a written component that together make a 
contribution to knowledge that frames the presentation and examination of phasing as a visual 
phenomenon. This phasing of repeating imagery is developed out of the studio practice as the 
perception of ongoing difference between two points in time, as repetition, and two points in space, 
as dual images, and is described as the perception of an ongoing slipping of synchronisation of one 
visual component against another.   
Therefore the contribution to knowledge that this thesis claims is in terms of its exploration 
of the significance of the perception of phasing as a first-hand operation; that this perceived phasing 
can occur between adjacent visual elements repeating in space and over time; and how these 
concerns can be materialised, as explored in the accompanying artworks. In the process of answering 
the research question I propose a context in which such phasing is constituted in relation to the 
perception of recorded time distributed in space. It is this context, considered in relation to Bergson’s 
ideas on spatialised time, that enables me to examine the means by which art works I have witnessed 
also offer a sense of incompleteness, of a perpetual state of changing that extends awareness 
between the moment of encounter toward states that the work might yet encompass. Further to this 
I make the claim that the means by which this awareness is perpetuated is imagined as an array of 
relative positions in space as opposed to concurrent flows of time.  
This research has been developed out of a studio practice that is rooted in artist’s moving 
image and the form and space of its encounter. This is an indicator of the field of knowledge in which 
this research resides and therefore the primary beneficiaries of such work are likely to be artists with 
research-driven practices, academics, research students, art world professionals and audiences whose 
interest or areas of research and activity involve expanded moving image installation, expanded fields 
of sculptural or photographic practice, temporal and spatial relationships and philosophically-driven 






Chapter 1:  
This chapter begins with phenomenological examinations of my encounters with two screen-based 
installations. From this the viewer’s engagement in a condition of layered awareness is proposed and examined in 
relation to Bergsonian ideas of spatialised time and simultaneity.  
 
Encounters with spatialised time 
Papagai0: João Maria Gusmão and Pedro Paiva, Venice Biennale 2013, Camden Arts Centre, 2015 
 
A film depicting a car wheel is projected onto a screen suspended above head height in a semi-darkened 
hall. This is one of a number of films being projected in the space. The image of the wheel fills most of the frame as its 
background rotates around its central axis in a blur of colour and light. There is movement but the wheel itself seems 
to remain almost static, and because it cannot be seen to be traversing a surface the film does not seem to progress. 
The wheel is turning at the same rate as our viewpoint, leaving a cyclical, repetitive motion that is a combination of 
abstraction and stasis. The image of the car wheel is replaced by that of a bicycle wheel and the same relative 
movement of the background rotating around the wheel is witnessed again.13  
 
From gallery press releases to critical reviews, descriptions of the film projections in the 
exhibition Papagaio by João Maria Gusmão and Pedro Paiva focus primarily on the emotive qualities of 
their imagery, describing them as ‘magical, mesmerising’, ‘….an imaginative journey into science, 
philosophy and religion’ that reveals ‘…the different qualities within the visible.’14 Such descriptions 
may be representative of the initial impressions one has of the content of Gusmão and Paiva’s silent 
films, but what can be overlooked in describing such visually distracting images as a man balancing 
eggs end to end, cassowaries wandering in front of a painted backdrop or water trickling in an arc 
from an earthenware jug, is the means by which one needs to negotiate the overall form of the work. 
Having visited two versions of this exhibition, in Venice in 2013 and London in 2015, I was able to reflect 
both upon the evocative quality of the films’ content and the means by which these films are designed 
to be apprehended as collections of scenes repeating in space.  
 
Three bright spots appear in the sky under an arch formed by the roof of a cave. Our viewpoint is from 
inside the cave towards the sea. The three spots are iterations of the sun arranged in a diagonal line of ascending 
scale between the silhouetted rock and the horizon line of the sea. The camera moves very slightly revealing these 
suns to be a trick of the light that involves either filming through a layer of glass, or perhaps capturing reflections of 
the sun in the camera’s lens. The shot lasts about a minute and is repeated.    
                                                 
13 This film is comparable to that of Tony Hill’s A Short History of the Wheel (1992) that used a similar technique.  
14 Sies + Höke Galerie website. https://www.sieshoeke.com/exhibitions/joao-maria-gusmao-pedro-paiva-papagaio-
berlin (accessed 12th May 2016) 
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The absence of narrative progression in these films encourages the viewer to explore the 
exhibition space in search of assimilation, and for the pleasure of looking. The novelty of much of the 
imagery maintains a viewer’s attention by neither fully sating nor disrupting their curiosity. Viewed in 
any direction or succession the installed films continue to play out in arrays of intriguing imagery that 
accumulate but remain inconclusive.15  
 
Three films of eggs frying in a black pan are superimposed and projected in slow motion. The multiple eggs 
echo the three iterations of the sun in a film projected nearby, both consisting of triple yellow globes. The images of 
the eggs and the suns begin to suggest biological cells, dividing, repeating and multiplying. Which came first? Which is 















João Maria Gusmão and Pedro Paiva, Papagaio, Camden Arts Centre, London, 2015 
 
To encourage a sense of visual continuity between shots cinematic devices such as editing 
between camera positions or panning to reveal visual information are eschewed in favour of the 
depiction of staged, static demonstrations. Each film loop is separated into a portion of anterior time 
that has been situated in an otherwise empty space. The presence of the projectors on plinths helps 
                                                 
15 The show’s title Papagaio is the Portuguese name for Parrot, a creature that appears in one of the films but offers no 
further reference or metaphoric function. A comparison might be made here to the writings of countryman Fernando 
Pessoa, under his heteronym Alberto Caeiro, and his poetic statements of the literal and the absolute. The personality of 
Caeiro was developed as an anti-poet; one who sees with the eye only and avoids the associative feelings and 
intellectual or metaphysical considerations that would normally constitute the poetic when describing the experience of 
such vast topics as nature, humanity and society. Instead Caeiro used language to transcribe the actual; what is being 
seen, often in the real time of its apprehension, without sentiment, to a point that approaches the concrete. In this regard 
Caeiro stated that; ‘Things have no meaning. They have existence.’ Simon Critchley, ‘Surficiality: Some poems by 
Fernando Pessoa’ http://www.enl.auth.gr/gramma/ gramma06/critchley.pdf  (accessed 22nd February 2016) 
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perpetuate the separateness between the content of the work and the similarity in the means of its 
presentation. The screens ultimately become filmic objects in a minimal theatrical setting, appearing 
to the observer both in succession and simultaneously in space, and allowing each to be linked or 
montaged subjectively.  
 
A camera-obscura image of a bicycle wheel is projected onto a wall from an adjacent space. The wheel is lit 
against a darkened ground and rotating slowly. The soft blurred quality of this image is similar to that of the adjacent 
film projections. It is not immediately obvious that this image is not a film projection but an inverted optical effect. 
Differences between darkness and light, the image and the object itself, are implied.  It exists as if to suggest that the 
illusion of representation and projection, of recording and seeing, might collapse by stepping outside the exhibition 
space and witnessing this visual magic to be no more than circumstance, a trick of the light.  
 
 
João Maria Gusmão and Pedro Paiva, Papagaio, Fondazione HangarBicocca, Milan, 2014 
 
On both of the occasions that I witnessed Papagaio the exhibition consisted of numerous 
16mm film projectors on plinths, film screens of different sizes and a camera obscura, installed 
together in a large darkened space. Moving among these mechanisms made me aware that I was 
building a cognitive map, an overview of the screens’ spatial relationships, whilst assimilating the films 
in concurrent states of exploration and engagement. What became clear as a result of viewing 
Papagaio on more than one occasion was that in order to apprehend this work this dual state of mind 
was necessitated by the films’ separateness in space. My experience reflected the separateness of the 
work’s temporality from its spatial dimensions by requiring that I maintain an awareness of image 
subject and the means by which it was being presented.  
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Kate Mondloch refers to this dual state of engagement as spectatorial doubleness, a term that 
she applies to the process by which screen-based installations require the viewer to ‘...be mindful of 
the material exhibition space (as experienced in “real” time)’ and the ‘…space of the…technological 
media itself’, whilst concurrently engaging with the representational content of the exhibited moving 
image.’16 In making this point Mondloch broadly outlines the means by which viewers engage with 
exhibited works that in different ways incorporate aspects of the cinematic with the traditionally 
sculptural concerns of spatial relationships and material presence.17 She identifies the initial examples 
of such work in the late 1960s, and cites film-maker Malcolm Le Grice’s point that a focus on the 
‘concrete’ dimension of cinema and cinema experience resulted from an increasing employment of 
extended duration and the resultant movement of the viewer in relation to the work as a means of 
refuting the established linearity of the cinematic.18 
Mondloch’s description of the dual awareness of form and content in the experience of multi-
screen installations offers a context for my examination of the perception of such works in relation to 
their temporal and spatial qualities. It is in relation to my experience of these two screen-based 
installations that I outline the thinking behind my studio practice as an encounter with flows of 
recorded time in adjacent space. In this process of situating my thinking I am also laying the ground for 
a subsequent examination of the phenomena of moving image phasing and extended duration. In 
accordance with the series of studio works built around perceived relationships between two parts 
this process begins with my consideration of how dual units of time and space might allude to the 
threshold of a viewer’s perception of degrees of simultaneity. I can draw upon Bergsonian notions of 
spatialised time, as flows of time that in their multiplicity are perceived as occupying separate spatial 
points, and again in relation to his ideas on simultaneity as the perception of space out of durational 
flow, as a means of examining such perceptions of selected studio works considered in relation to 
studies of works by contemporary artists and film makers.19  
                                                 
16 Kate Mondloch writes of the spectatorial doubleness of multi-screen installations. ‘In a curious amalgamation of 
gallery-based spatial experimentation and political aesthetics, this model of spectatorship proposes the viewers be both 
“here” (embodied subjects in the material exhibition space) and “there” (observers looking onto screen spaces) in the 
here and now.’ She emphasises the enhanced role of space and presence of technology that spectators move within, and 
likens such experiences to ‘something closer to minimalist sculpture’ Mondloch, Screens, 62-64 
17 A common strategy adopted by video and film artists was the incorporation of sculptural concerns in which 
cinematic time and its means of presentation were distributed in space. Mondloch cites the ‘locational’ films of Paul 
Sharits that foregrounded the presence of the projectors, screen and viewing space as early examples of this. Mondloch, 
Screens, 5 
18 Ibid, 42 
19 Bergson writes of multiples of objects or events as a form of consciousness of space. ‘Does…this amount to 
recognising that the very idea of the number 2, or, more generally, of any number whatever, involves the idea of 
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Regarding spectatorial doubleness as the coexistence of a viewer’s reading of image content 
and their attendance to its form, we might consider the formal similarities between Gusmão and 
Paivas’ film scenes. Each is conducted as an activity that is staged for the camera or framed and shot 
from a static viewpoint. The films are projected in slow motion so that the resultant temporal 
continuity enables each screen to be viewed in any order or in multiples. The process by which the 
viewer combines and assimilates these films is enhanced by the reverent atmosphere of the darkened 
rooms in which they are presented; as illuminated images in a unifying space.  
It is these layered means by which I assimilated both the films’ content and the form of their 
presentation that I am focussing on at this point, as an initial means of examining the experience of 
temporal flow distributed in space.20 Notions of a dichotomous spectator that maintains a coexistent 
awareness of the image and its physicality predates such artists’ and film makers’ concerns with the 
foregrounding of form over content, but it is once these concerns became the intended subject as 
well as the form of such work that it is possible to identify a means of approaching such methods.21  
In his essay Real Time/Space Malcolm Le Grice outlined an ‘increasing concern with the 
problem of actuality’ in his work and that of other ‘underground’ film makers at the time.22 And in his 
proclaimed challenging of the ‘…history of the commercial cinema…’ with its ‘…aim of creating 
convincing illusionary space/time’, he identified the dual conditions of a viewer’s engagement with his 
work as spanning the film’s content and the real time/space encounter at the event of its projection.23 
                                                                                                                                                 
juxtaposition in space? …We believe that we are adding something to the idea of two or more objects by saying that 
they cannot occupy the same place: as if the idea of the number 2, even the abstract number, were not already that of 
two positions in space!’ Bergson, Time and Free Will, 89 
20 Initially this research foregrounded the role of the viewer by examining the phenomenological means by which 
multi-screen installations might be apprehended. In developing studio works designed to explore the retinal afterimage 
and perception over time I considered how this might accord with Edmund Husserl’s ideas of retention and protention 
as a key to his writing on time consciousness. Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time   
21 This point relates to debates that can be traced back to the mid-twentieth century when highlighted by critic Michael 
Fried in his essay ‘Art and Objecthood’ (Artforum 5, June 1967), 12 in which he decried the durational qualities of the 
experience of looking at minimalist art. He argued that such works had a theatrical ‘incompleteness’ that necessitated 
their being experienced from numerous positions, and as such one could not determine when one has finished looking 
at, or completed, such a work. 
22 Malcolm Le Grice, Experimental Cinema in the Digital Age (London: BFI, 2001), 155 
23 As with much of Le Grice’s own work at the time he contextualises such activities in ideological terms, as film work 
that was challenging what he deemed to be the passive ‘conditioning’ aspects of traditional cinema and its claim to 
meaningful representations of reality. He described his early films as ‘attacking’ what he saw as the oppressive 
qualities of narrative cinema and outlined the methods he and like-minded film-makers such as Peter Gidal adopted in 
this opposition to narrative that were intended to disrupt the audience’s ‘culturally coded’ desire for immersive 
storylines by drawing attention to the separateness of filmed shots. ‘Traditional narrative cinema relies upon giving 
 23 
In a notion that can be compared to that of Mondloch’s spectatorial doubleness Le Grice focussed on 
what he termed the ‘retrospective’ nature of film with its pre-recorded, pre-edited production, and 
contrasted this with his foregrounding of the viewer’s subjective experience of film encountered in 
space. Screening of his films were often intended to heighten a doubled awareness of ‘then and now’ 
with the introduction of performative elements designed to forge relationships between the recorded 
image and the real time, unique experience of its presentation.    
In defining the context in which his films operated, Le Grice’s associate Peter Gidal described 
structuralist /materialist film in terms of subjective experience that is ‘constituted in and of 
consciousness.’24 His point being that the intended subject of such work was the work in its 
apprehension rather than what it depicted on screen. His focus was on all that constitutes the process 
that makes the film a film, becoming present in its being watched; a definition that amounts to a 
reflexive doubling of the viewer’s awareness by attempting to engineer a distinction between one’s 
perceptive processes as separate from that which is depicted on screen.   
While film makers associated with British structural and materialist ideas of the 1960s and 70s, 
such as Le Grice, Peter Gidal, William Raban or Lis Rhodes, emphasised an awareness of difference 
between the immersive cinematic illusion and the presence of the film apparatus, Catherine Elwes 
writes of the various works that have continued to foreground this duality of filmic content and its 
form in contemporary moving image practice.25 She considers recent examples of screen-based 
installations in which a viewer’s awareness is suspended between film content and its means of 
presentation and cites the aforementioned 24 Hour Psycho by Douglas Gordon as an example in which 
the filmic image remains all too present whilst its temporal elements of action, dialogue and suspense 
have been reduced to an indiscernible duration that instead gives the work a monolithic presence in 
the gallery space.26 It is the relationship between the flow of a moving image and its spatial presence 
that interests me in such work as I intend to map out the territory within which I can place the 
perception of image phasing as both a temporal and spatial concern. Having established this ground I 
can then examine the operations of works from my studio practice in terms of a proposed layering of 
awareness in perception on the part of a viewer, from which I will consider Bergsonian ideas of space 
described by such divided duration. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
complete priority to represented time…I sought to reverse this order of priority by making spectator time primary and 
giving it clear priority.’ Malcolm Le Grice, ‘Time and the Spectator in the Experience of Expanded Cinema’ in 
Expanded Cinema: Art, Performance, Film (London: Tate, 2011), 162-163 
24 Peter Gidal, Theory and Definition of Structural/Materialist Film (London: BFI, 1976) 
25 Catherine Elwes, Installation and the Moving Image (London & New York: Wallflower Press, 2015), 146 
26 Ibid, 149 
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D’Est: Chantal Akerman, Ambika P3, London 2015 
 
A camera tracks slowly along a line of people in a street so that two or three appear in frame at a time. 
Some are huddled together talking; others stand or sit alone, some look vaguely towards the camera. They are all 
wearing winter coats, hats and scarves and appear to be waiting for something. It is dark, a light snow is falling. The 
lateral flow of the video image appears multiplied across numerous screens and contrasts with that of scenes on 
adjacent screens in the exhibition space.  
 
From the 1980s until her death in 2015 artist and film maker Chantal Akerman employed 
methods of durational extension and multi-screen presentation of her film and video work. The 
exhibition of seven of her film and video installations at the Ambika P3 exhibition space in London in 
the autumn of 2015 evidenced many of these creative strategies in the form of projections and 
monitors arranged in darkened spaces for an audience to explore.  
Unlike the staged and static scenes of João Maria Gusmão and Pedro Paiva, many of 
Akerman’s installations, particularly such major undertakings as her twenty-four monitor piece D’Est 
(1993), utilise familiar filmic tropes such as camera tracking and panning across real-world subjects. 
D’Est was originally shot as a 16mm single-screen documentary film but later presented as a multi-
monitor video installation. Her slow tracking shots of snowy streets and shoppers queuing in Russia 
and Poland during the fall of communism flow and repeat laterally across the exhibition space.  
 
The height of the plinths makes it possible to see across the rows of TV screens in the darkened space so 
that a scene appears on a number of screens simultaneously. These scenes are interspersed so that the movement on 
one is multiplied, appearing to sweep across the span of the space in unison, whilst a different shot forms a visual 
counterpoint. The impression is of choreographed movement and stasis alternating and repeating through space. The 
images become abstracted through multiple appearances, and minutes pass before I am drawn back to seeing the 




Chantal Akerman, D’Est, 1993 
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When witnessed simultaneously across multiple screens the consistency of Akerman’s long 
camera shots becomes a means by which the documentary imagery is extended and orchestrated 
within the presentation space. The spatialised ebb and flow of the camera’s movement is particularly 
effective when viewed from within the rows of monitors as a continuity of pace and flow of the scenes 
is echoed and repeated intermittently across successive screens. Patterns of movement are forged 
from the exchange of temporalities across the presentation space. Akerman’s attendance to the 
orchestration of multiple screens encourages us to extend our attention between the evocative 
images of wintry post-communist cities and the interplay of on-screen movement by which this 
imagery is being delivered.  
 
Chantal Akerman, D’Est, 1993 
 
Numerous large video monitors depict slow, silent tracking shots from a moving car as it drives through 
snow-covered streets at night. Occasionally pedestrians are seen walking in front of large buildings, between kiosks, 
trees and street signs. The video’s low resolution and colour saturation, combined with the presence of the outdated 
monitors, suggest these scenes are of the recent past. 
 
Whereas Gusmão and Paiva’s films offer few such cinematic devices as script, editing or 
characterisation, relying instead on staged theatricality to achieve consistency, Akerman’s installation 
presents a clearer continuity of real-world subjects with recognisable locations and indications of time; 
in this case the documentation of a socio-political era that is about to be lost. We can see in the 
presence of the deconstructed elements of her original film documentary the mundane activities, the 
dark streets and sparse domestic interiors of East European citizens against an implied backdrop of 
political upheaval.  
 
 26 
Similarity and difference 
In the work of both Gusmão and Paiva, and Akerman, formal considerations such as a 
consistency of image quality, pace or camera movement become a means of forging continuity 
between separate screens. This is enhanced by the associations we might make with certain 
technologies: In combination with the subject of Akerman’s imagery comes a legible provenance of 
redundancy in the form of the obsolete 1980s video monitors. Slow motion shots of low-resolution 
images flow across old TV monitors, their presence enhancing the atmosphere of a passing era.27 
Outdated technology and pictorial information combine to signify Eastern Europe during the Cold 
War, and displaying of such scenes on curved glass screens only enhances this reading. 
In relation to legible technological provenance theorist Laura U. Marks writes of a form of 
aesthetics that is again not just rooted in the representational qualities of an image, be it filmic or 
photographic, but more in the information that it carries from what she determines to be a stage or 
‘interface’ between a ‘Bergsonian universe of images’ – or the imperceptible infinity of images – both 
those that are possible and those that are present.28 This ‘information stage’, as she terms it, encodes 
the image as it ‘unfolds from the infinite’ and she makes the point that the codification of the process 
of interpretation, if determined in terms of information, renders an image – be it filmic, photographic 
or digitally mediated – a carrier of a legible provenance that is inherent in its materiality. Technology 
and its associative historical imprints imbue an image with information about its existence that can 
compete with its representational remit to become the subject of that image. An indeterminate 
image, one that is not immediately legible or specific with regard to its pictorial or contextual remit, 
might instead be interpreted in terms of the watermark of its technological provenance. I suggest that 
the inherent visual quality of the 16mm film projections of Gusmão and Paiva – what Erika Balsom 
refers to as the ‘Analogue aura’ of film – and the film-to-video resolution in Akerman’s D’Est, becomes 
a means by which a viewer’s reading of continuity between the components of the work is aided by 
historical and technological aesthetics.29    
                                                 
27 Nadin Mai, D’Est – Chantal Akerman (1993) http://theartsofslowcinema.com/2015/10/29/dest-chantal-akerman-
1993/ (accessed 27th March 2016) 
28 Laura U Marks ‘Enfolding-Unfolding Aesthetics, or the Unthought at the Heart of the Wood’ in Technology and 
Desire The Transgressive Art of Moving Images, Rania Gaafar and Martin Schulz (Eds) (Bristol: Intellect, 2014), 151 
29 Balsom observes that, in a reversal of Walter Benjamin’s notion that the quotidian and reproducible nature of media 
withers the aura of the unique art object, more recent associations of film lend the medium an aura of preciousness 
‘…the recent employment of celluloid within the gallery reconfigures medium specificity in the light of obsolescence 
to see film as closely linked to disappearance, the historical trace, and the failed utopia from which hope for the future 
might be gleaned.’ Erika Balsom, Exhibiting Cinema in Contemporary Art (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 
2013), 101 
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Regarding Mondloch’s notion of a viewer’s doubled engagement we find that the experience 
of a work’s image content can begin to saturate the space of its presentation so that the real-time 
engagement of the viewer can become imbued with the vagaries of the imagination. And in the 
examples under consideration here the presence of Gusmão and Paiva’s 16mm film projectors and 
Akerman’s 1980’s TVs underpin the intended atmosphere of the works in a manner that facilitates a 
coexistent awareness of subject and its means of apprehension.  
Christine Ross offers a critical view of the experience of certain forms of multi-screen 
simultaneity and subsequent layering of awareness, suggesting that such works require a degree of 
multi-tasking that challenges the audience to something that cannot be achieved. In examining a 
series of works that use computer game-like paradigms of spatialised narrative and consist of multiple 
concurrent recordings of events she suggests that complex simultaneousness is too often presented 
as a problem for the viewer to solve. Furthermore these goal-driven multi-screen works maintain an 
underlying linear structure that can preside in a viewer’s consciousness as perceived degrees of 
success.30 This differs from the emphasis on the experience of actuality and the material space of 
presentation that I argue introduces considerations of sculptural and spatial relationships as a 
counterpoint to narrative compulsion in the works of Gusmão and Paiva and Akerman.  
 
 
Spectatorial doubleness and spatialised time 
Referencing theorists Peter Osbourne and Dominique Paini, Kate Mondloch describes the 
tensions that can result from the different temporalities of a screen-based artwork and that of a 
viewer. She acknowledges a distinction between multi-screen installations that privilege time in their 
rootedness in narrative cinema and ‘media installations’ that tend to emphasis the materiality of 
space. Works that spatialise time can, she suggests, amount to a constructed subjectivity and what 
she calls a ‘temporal polyphony’ on the part of a viewer that mirrors the means by which we negotiate 
the world.31  
Papagaio and D’Est are pertinent examples of works that encourage a reflexive awareness on 
the part of the audience that spans each work’s form in conjunction with its content. The necessity to 
explore the alignments of these repeating loops of slow-moving footage serves to emphasise 
                                                 
30 In discussing Melik Ohanian’s multi-screen video Seven Minutes Before Ross identifies what she calls a ‘Quasi-
Panorama strategy’ that presents every scene as being of equal importance, which causes ‘binding problems’ for the 
spectator. ‘Unable but challenged to perceive a multi-screen installation as a whole…the viewer/listener is invited to 
live productively the failure of all-seeing opticalities while dwelling over historical time.’ Ross, The Past is the 
Present; It’s The Future Too. 
31 ‘The overlapping flows of moving imagery in (such) works…allow viewers to recognise the extent to which they 
always live in many different times simultaneously.’ Mondloch, Screens, 53 
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differences in temporality of the images on the screens from that of one’s own consciousness. In my 
experience of both installations this dichotomy led to a state of engagement in which I attended to 
both the accumulation of the depicted subjects in conjunction with the structural and material means 
by which they were presented in the space. With regard to this state of dualised consciousness 
Mondloch suggests that a viewer might engage with spatially separated time flows by fusing the real-
time process of actively exploring with that of each recording, arguing that ‘out-of-frame time’, or that 
of the space between each screen, ‘…will unavoidable cross pollinate with in-frame time, just as 
perception and memory are always coextensive.’32 This difference in temporality between the 
consciousness of the viewer and the recorded time of the film is acted out in the space between the 
works, requiring alternations between concurrent processes of perception and memory that are 
assimilated as lived experience.  
Extrapolating from this I am compelled to consider how such examples of layered 
temporalities, and Mondloch’s spectatorial doubleness, might accord with Bergson’s ideas of duality in 
his writing about duration and consciousness. Of the experience of accumulated encounters with 
temporalities in space he states that, ‘…there is neither duration nor succession in space, if we give to 
these words the meaning in which consciousness takes them: each of the so-called successive states 
of the external world exist alone; their multiplicity is real only for a consciousness that can first retain 
them and then set them side by side by externalising them in relation to one another.’33 This point 
corresponds with the experience of moving images encountered on separate screens that cannot be 
given or present for the viewer at once, and, as has been suggested by Mondloch in her paraphrasing 
of film theorist Dominique Piani, they are constructed and assimilated in consciousness not just by the 
viewer moving past each screen, but out of their resultant shifts between two degrees of attention.34 
The process of apprehending spatialised screens requires that the viewer’s awareness must span 
temporal flow and spatial adjacency to accumulate difference between each; a process that 
necessitates that they both alternate and maintain their attention between a work’s form and its 
content.35 The multi-screen installations of Gusmão and Paiva and Akerman require this dividing of the 
viewer’s awareness into a condition of doubled consciousness so that attendance to temporal content 
that has both continuity and meaning is maintained concurrent to the physicality of the screens and 
                                                 
32 Ibid, 54 
33 Bergson, Time and Free Will, 120-121 
34 Mondloch, Screens, 54 
35 Considering Mondloch’s spectatorial doubleness in terms of a coexistent awareness of form and content we can 
acknowledge a comparable duality inherent in Malcolm Le Grice’s favouring of the ‘Real time/space’ of the viewer 
over the ‘retrospective’ time of the onscreen image. Le Grice, Experimental Cinema in the Digital Age, 155-163 
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projection systems, the number of images, their scale, brightness and colour, their relationship to each 
other, the presence of other viewers, and so on.  
In outlining his thoughts regarding the means by which we experience the multiple 
temporalities of the real world Bergson uses a cinematographical method to describe simultaneities as 
points in time that are divided so as to accumulate in current memory as the perception of movement, 
which he determines, in their very multiplicity, are spatialised.   
 
Immanent in our measurement of time…is the tendency to empty its content into a space of four 
dimensions in which past, present and future are juxtaposed or superimposed for all eternity. This 
tendency simply expresses our inability mathematically to translate time itself, our need to replace it, in 
order to measure it, by simultaneities which we count. These simultaneities are instantaneities; they do 
not partake of the nature of real time; they do not endure. They are purely mental views that stake out 
conscious duration and real motion with full stops, using for this purpose the mathematical point that 
has been carried over from space to time. 36 
 
In this outline of the subjective means by which our memory functions as the apprehension of 
simultaneous points in time Bergson distinguishes between processes of consciousness that he calls 
pure-memory and memory-image/perception.37 For Bergson pure-memory describes the past that no 
longer exists in consciousness, but remains available to be brought back to consciousness and 
revisited at will. When such pure-memory is returned to consciousness it is capable of producing new 
sensations so that it ‘…ceases to be a memory and passes into the state of present thing, something 
actually lived.’38 Bergson determines pure-memory as virtual in that it remains outside the reality of 
consciousness that may call upon it; until such time that it passes back into the present as actual.  
Utilising his cinematographical model Bergson argues that our perception of the world is a 
process of dividing time in terms of successive ‘facts’ and their impression of difference upon 
consciousness. He describes divisions according to difference in degree rather than that of temporal 
divisions based upon difference in kind, and that a means by which they divide in consciousness is 
reflected in our ability to describe any such difference.39 It follows that such a model of the perception 
of movement, being based upon difference of degree, can be ascribed to the means by which we 
negotiate the arrangement of screens in the defined spaces of both Papgio and D’Est. In such cases 
                                                 
36 Bergson, Duration and Simultaneity, 60 
37 ‘Perception is never a mere contact of the mind with the object present; it is impregnated with memory-images, 
which complete it as they interpret it.’ Bergson, Matter and Memory, 170 
38 Ibid, 179 
39 ‘If, in describing it, we are led to distinguish phases in it, we have several facts instead of one, several divided 
periods instead of a single period….consequently we know a change only when we are able to determine what it is 
about at any one of its moments.’ Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1911), 332 
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similarity as difference of degree, and simultaneity as concurrence of form, enable such works to bind 
in perception as spatialised experiences of temporal repetition.  
The term memory-image is used by Bergson in reference to the present that he describes as 
being in a state of constant fusion with perception so as to make sense of the melding of object and 
space in consciousness. It is out of a process of what he describes as ‘oscillations’ between the 
persisting flow/alternation of memory-images that the process of perception of the external world is 
constructed for consciousness as reality, or the actual.40 It might be deemed that the memory-image is 
the alternation of time and space in a concurrently immediate and adjacent condition. It is such a 
process of perceiving the world in terms of ongoing simultaneities of time flow and relative position 
that signifies continuity and therefore implies potential that Bergson suggests ‘might be defined as 
nascent perception.’41  
Considering Bergson’s notion of the oscillating and accumulating of simultaneities allows us 
to reflect upon examples of art works built around adjacent and repeating moving images and 
acknowledge the questions that arise around their extension of temporal flow across points in space, 
and whether his ideas of time consciousness and simultaneity in space afford any equivalences. If, 
according to Bergson, pure time is that which flows, as opposed to space which consists of points of 
separateness, then would the dividing of temporal flow into distributed portions be perceived, not 
just within space, but as a time-space alternation, as the initial means by which we experience such 
works before we construct successive flow, in hindsight or in memory?  And further to this can the 
experience of temporal flow across separate screens be described as an apprehension of pluralised 
time – as time delayed, and therefore spatialised – and might this in turn amount to a dual awareness 
that spans Bergsonian perception and memory?  
In his essay Time, Bergson and the Cinematographical Mechanism: Henri Bergson on the 
Philosophical Properties of Cinema, theorist Donato Totaro refers to Bergson’s ‘epistemological dualism 
of intellect and intuition’, whereby Bergson wrote of a temporality of the intellect in terms of 
spatialised time, as immobility and of reality as contrasting with the ‘intuitive time’ of the continuous 
and indivisible flow of inner time that is immeasurable and of flux and becoming.42 Totaro refutes 
Bergson’s suggestion that the time taken in assimilating a film is unimportant because ‘A film once 
made is already given’ and its outcome will therefore always be the same, by emphasising the creative 
process of film-making and the creative means by which the presenting of film extends its meaning as 
                                                 
40 ‘Succession exists solely for a conscious spectator who keeps the past in mind and sets the two oscillations or their 
symbols side by side…’ Bergson, Time and Free Will, 108-109 
41 Bergson, Matter and Memory, 170 
42 Donato Totaro, ‘Time, Bergson, and the Cinematographical Mechanism’, Offscreen (Volume 5, Issue 1. January 
2001)  http://offscreen.com/view/bergson1  (accessed 12th December 2017) 
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a processes of encountering, suggesting that Bergson overlooked such factors in his epistemology. 
Totaro’s point raises the importance of the role both of the means by which an artwork is presented 
and the role of the spectator in developing the meaning of an artwork, offering it not as a fixed and 
given construct but, by reminding us that an artwork is an encounter that is a process and resists the 
stasis of effective description, requiring instead the experience brought by the viewer. Thus, what I 
describe as an experience of spatialised time in the works of Gusmão and Paiva and Akerman might 
also be defined as alternating simultaneities and the concurrent accumulation of meaning in the 
consciousness of the viewer. To put it another way the spatialised experience of time as both 
succession and awareness of the means by which that succession is afforded in the construction and 
presentation of the work becomes superimposed as layered awareness in a cohesive experience of 
the work as distinct from the world.   
  In Simultaneity and Delay Jay Lampert conducts an in-depth analysis of Bergson’s ideas of 
duration and simultaneity and his distinguishing between time that is experienced as pure memory 
and the time of perceiving the external world as memory images that oscillate in the present. Lampert 
acknowledges Bergson’s distinction between memory of the past as a virtual consciousness that can 
be made simultaneous with the present, and memory images which he determined to be ongoing 
perception in the present, and puts particular emphasis on the relationship between simultaneity and 
time that is spatialised through its being delayed or separated in space.  
 
The past cycles through the present by functions of ‘oscillation’, ‘generalisation’, and ‘repetition’. 
Bergson’s theory culminates in the latter, where the whole past is virtually available in ever new ways to 
the present. But we have to be able to localise particular memories, and this will create problems of 
delayed simultaneity.43  
 
This localising process is akin to a mapping of temporal experience, a transposing of the 
experience of time into spatial terms. In the case of Akerman’s D’Est in particular what was originally 
shot as a single screen documentary to be watched in pre-edited succession has been extended and 
repeated in space. The effect of this on the process of viewing might be said to transpose Bergsonian 
memory-images from the perception of temporal succession to the movement of the viewer around 
the work and the perception of its simultaneities.44  
A cinematographic model of perception, as employed by Bergson, describes the perception of 
movement in terms of a succession of points. And as with frames of a film, Bergson suggests that we 
                                                 
43 Jay Lampert, Simultaneity and Delay: A Dialectical Theory of Staggered Time (London: Bloomsbury, 2012), 137 
44 Bergson states that in determining order in time we must perceive events as ‘multiple, simultaneous and distinct; in a 
word, we set them side by side, and if we introduce an order into what is successive, the reason is that succession is 
converted into simultaneity and is projected into space.’ Bergson, Time and Free Will, 101 
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do not attend directly to each but ‘average out’ succession to remain aware of flow through space.45 It 
is only at the point that space defines itself as a position that can be determined in terms of difference 
-- from here to there – that time is seen to divide, as it can be labelled as quantifiably different in terms 
of relative position to become a ‘fact’ or an ‘event’. Thus time in Bergson’s model of perception is 
discernible in terms of difference and its subsequent division in space.   
Conversely Bergson believed that the experience of pure time or duration is an indivisible 
flow of consciousness.46 He indicated that once apprehended as multiples we cannot take portions of 
time (such as the separate scenes of Akerman’s installation) and lay them side by side in consciousness 
to compare them directly in the way that we might measure and compare spatial values and content 
directly.47 He described how we compare time flows in terms of external spatial differences such as 
the location in which we encountered an event, and that each such event is lived in consciousness as a 
continuous flow of experience. Thus to consider the presentation and review of film recordings is to 
transpose such experience into events that are alignments both in and of space, linked in memory by 
degrees of significance. Again, according to Bergson, time must become spatialised as events so that 
we can apprehend, or ‘see’ it.48  
Having considered these dual states in relation to two multi-screen moving image installations 
I want to build upon this proposed alternation and layering of a viewer’s awareness and develop a 
hypothesis for the perception of two temporal flows of differing rhythms or resolutions. If the 
                                                 
45 In using the metaphor of a galloping horse seen directly or recorded in successive photographs Bergson states, ‘Of 
the gallop of a horse our eye perceives chiefly a characteristic, essential or rather schematic attitude, a form that 
appears to radiate over a whole period and so fill the time of the gallop…But instantaneous photography isolates any 
moment…the gallop of a horse spreads out for it as many successive attitudes as it wishes, instead of massing itself into 
a single attitude.’ Bergson, Creative Evolution, 333 
46 ‘For Bergson the key to reality is that all change (time and movement) should be treated as indivisible. Time broken 
down is spatialised time and not duration.’ Donato Totaro, ‘Time, Bergson, and the Cinematographical Mechanism’ in 
Offscreen (Volume 5, Issue 1 January 2001) http://offscreen.com/view/bergson1 (accessed 12th December 2017) 
47 Suzanne Guerlac puts it succinctly when she describes Bergson’s point that time is as materially real as space: ‘We 
consider that space holds things, whereas we are not willing to believe that time holds the psychological states that 
occur in succession there. When we reintroduce the perspective of action, however, space becomes a translation of 
time. We perceive at a distance what we will act upon, or what will act upon us in a particular interval of time.’ 
Suzanne Guerlac, Thinking in Time: An Introduction to Henri Bergson (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press. 
2006), 147  
48 ‘…each of the so called successive states of the external world exists alone; their multiplicity is real only for a 
consciousness that can first retain them and then set them side by side by externalising them in relation to one 
another…it perceives them under the form of a discrete multiplicity, which amounts to setting them out in a line, in the 
space in which each of them existed separately. The space employed for this purpose is just that which is called 
homogenous time.’ Bergson, Time and Free Will, 121 
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perception of moving images apprehended adjacently can be said to extend a spectator’s awareness I 
will next examine this idea in reference to selected examples in contemporary art practice and within 






























Chapter 2:  
The doubled image  
Here I examine examples of doubled and dual-form contemporary artworks in relation to difference 
between two points in time and two positions in space and use this to frame the perception of image phasing. I 
propose that real-time image phasing can engender an awareness of chance and therefore of possibility.  
 
The difference between two frames 
 
Cinema is the difference between two frames…if you take two frames, the difference between them 
defines the smallest unit of filmic language that is possible…this difference…is a construct of a 
time/space relation. 49  
  
With this statement film-maker Werner Nekes identifies the point at which the difference 
between two images, whether contiguous or discrete, is the means by which fundamental filmic 
information is imparted. Using benign examples such as the thaumatrope to illustrate his point he 
named the configuration kine, and considered it to be the fundamental aspect of filmic language.50 
Whist the kine may be related to Soviet montage theory whereby shots are edited in a manner that 
forges meaning – in this case ideological – through accumulated associations that might supersede the 
film’s content, it can also apply to the difference between two images in contiguous space that depict 
movement.51   
My intention regarding Nekes’s kine was to examine his notion of the difference between two 
film frames as points in time, and consider the means by which such a relationship might be mirrored 
                                                 
49 The full quote reads ‘…what is the smallest filmic element? I came up with the answer that cinema is the difference 
between two frames…the work the brain has to do to produce the fusion of the two frames. This small unit which I call 
kine is the smallest particle of film one can think of….if you take two frames, the difference between them defines the 
smallest unit of filmic language that is possible…. Every film can be regarded under the principal of this difference, 
which is a construct of a time/space relation.’ Werner Nekes ‘Whatever happens between the pictures, a lecture by 
Werner Nekes’ Afterimage November 1977 http://www.vasulka.org/ archive/4-30c/AfterImageNov77(3002).pdf  
(accessed 28th June 2012)  
50 Nekes’ gives an example of kine in his analysis of the Victorian children’s toy, the thaumatrope, in which an optical 
illusion is experienced via the rotating of a disc with a different image on each side. Spinning this disc on its axis 
caused the viewer to see the images fuse into a composite image. It is this repetition of difference that Nekes sees as 
fundamental to the cinematic process, a point of intersection that becomes more than the sum of two images. 
51 Filmic montage, developed by Soviet film maker Lev Kuleshov, was adopted to international acclaim by Sergei 
Eisenstein. Nekes states, ‘The associative montage principles of Eisenstein became well known as the montage of 
attractions... This question: What does this scene mean to the next scene? Or, what do they mean together? was the 
basis for all montage theories that followed.’ Ibid  
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concurrently as two positions in space. And whether my relating of temporal-spatial conditions could 
serve as an ontological model against which Bergsonian theories of the dividing and spatialisation of 
temporal flow might be made legible as the concurrent difference between related points in space. By 
this I do not mean the space depicted by the film images but the space of presentation in which the 
temporal difference between frames is witnessed. It is in response to the multi-screen installations of 
artists such as Gusmão and Paiva and Akerman, in combination with my exploring repeating images 
and their degrees of synchronisation in my studio practice, that I was able to refine my position in the 
research process; that the ‘difference between two frames’ might be extrapolated as an essential 
point of exchange between two units in a relationship of temporal and spatial equivalence. Nekes’s 
contextualising of two film frames enabled me to consider the possibility that such difference might 
be both continuous and contiguous, in interplays of movement and stasis, a doubled reading of the 
depiction of movement with the simultaneity of two images.  
To extrapolate from Nekes’ definition of a ‘filmic language’ of difference between two frames 
that the kine might be legible in wider fields of thought and activity that relate to the difference 
between two objects, two positions in space, two photographic images or two temporal phenomena 
such as pulses of light.52 I was aware that notions of reduced filmic content and apparatus are 
exemplified in the animated stereoscopic imagery of filmmaker Ken Jacobs in which he fuses elements 
of the filmic and the photographic in the extreme repetition of two images.    
Jacobs uses the term paracinema to denote his moving image works that omit certain 
material/mechanical elements of the filmic medium such as a traditional projector or film camera. He 
produced a series of these works under the title Nervous System that consist only of projected 
alternations of the dual images that comprise either a stereoscopic photograph, or two consective 
frames of a film.53 These related images appear in fast, layered repetitions whilst the projector’s light 
beam is dissected by a rotating blade to create a sequence of interstitial blanks that intersect the two 
alternating images.54 The persistence of each image on the retina results in a flickering illusion that 
appears to float above the surface of the screen as if activated at a point somewhere between a 2D 
                                                 
52 Film maker Guy Sherwin curated the Film in Space exhibition at Camden Arts Centre in 2012-13 presenting older 
medium-specific works alongside more recent takes on the moving image that operate beyond the use of celluloid or 
video by isolating elements such as light, space and/or time. 
53 Jacobs utilised Victorian stereoscopic photographs for his series called Child Labor (2006) and frames from the 
Lumière brothers early films viewed with 3D glasses in a projection work entitled The Guests (2013) 
54 The alternating back and fore (in fact left and right, between images recorded through two lateral lenses) has the 
effect of ‘fixing’ each iteration of the image in a similar manner to that of the gate of a film camera and projector. This 
ensures that each image is held as a static impression upon the retina for a fraction of a second before being replaced by 
its next/adjacent iteration. This can be compared with Neke’s example of the thaumatrope as there is in each an 
imperceptible point when the image disappears before being replaced by the next.  
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and a 3D image. The extreme alternation of adjacent images transposes the minute spatial difference 
in perspective between the dual lenses of the original stereoscopic camera into a temporal equivalent 
that yields the illusion of dimensionality. A spatial-temporal exchange might be said to take place that 
offers an illusion of spatial depth.55  
 
 
Seeing double: the dual image as extension in space  
 
                             
             Steven Scott, Situation #1, 2014. Giclée prints  
      
  Situation #1 is the first of a series of works I developed as part of this research that consist of 
two photographs presented side by side. An architectural subject has been photographed, printed, 
folded and re-photographed so that the images align to suggest a spatially inverted ‘echo’ or mirroring 
of the represented architectural form. The interior and exterior corners of a photograph of a building 
become both subject and backdrop, offering an image of an architectural feature that has been 
mediated and situated one within another. This series of dual photographs of corners was based on 
the familiar optical illusion in which two vertical lines seem to differ in length (see diagram below), 
                                                 
55 An illusion of depth was described by Peter Gidal as the result of repeating temporal and spatial difference between 
two concurrent images in his review of Malcolm Le Grice’s 1967 film Yes No Maybe Maybe Not. He referred to the 
‘effect of bas relief’ that resulted from the superimposed projection of positive and negative versions of the same film 
footage with a varying difference in synch of 5-8 frames. He acknowledged such comparable factors as repetition and 
how the effects of such a temporal-spatial exchange might supersede the image content in the work: ‘the repetition in 
this film points to an obsessiveness…is it similar, or is it the same? We become deeply involved in watching…the 
process-viewing itself is the content of this film.’ Peter Gidal, ‘Malcolm Le Grice, Yes No Maybe Maybe Not’ in 
Structural Film Anthology (London: BFI, 1978), 29 
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addressing in its doubled form a staged imagery and an implied reference to illusionary possibilities 
that are built upon a layer of visual falsehoods.   
 
      
 
As part of the process of considering temporal and spatial adjacency of two similar images I 
developed a series of prototypes that used variations on the format of the dual image in which 
photographs were extended in space by being doubled, mirrored or paired as allusions to stereoscopic 
photography. An example that addressed this overtly was titled The Constant Re-invention of 
Perspective, a work in which a single point perspective determines the composition of two 
photographs taken on adjacent railway platforms. The reference to stereoscopic vision is intentionally 
reinforced by the two eye-like speed limit signs displaying 20-20 at the centre of each photograph.  
 
     
     Steven Scott, The Constant Re-invention of Perspective, 2013. Screen print 
 
In developing these ideas to incorporate dual moving images I produced a piece titled 
Sequence and Stasis which consists of two adjacent versions of a real-time video of a thunderstorm at 
night. Each is identical but for a single video frame difference in time between one 30-minute video 
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loop and its neighbour. Such difference becomes discernible as the videos run simultaneously and 
gradual increments of separateness between points on the screens are revealed over the duration of 
the piece. Because each video consists of brief, brightly lit glimpses of an electricity pylon and cables 
that are lit and revealed out of darkness by the storms’ intermittent lightning flashes these brief flash 
frames become distinct points in time, which are seen to slowly slip out of synchronisation when 
presented next to each other. The difference of one frame in time is used to reveal the difference 
between two points in space so that an image ‘echo’ results between the videos to offer a subtle 
phasing of synchronisations. This difference between points in space begins to undermine the linearity 
of the original real-time recording and reveal the possibility of a more subjective, spatialised 








Steven Scott, Sequence and Stasis, 2013. Frames from dual video projection 
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These works result from the multiplying of repeating points in time or the conjuring of 
conceptual resonance out of two parts, out of a process of extruding contiguous space from 
discontinuous time. In considering the form of the work that results from the interrelationships of two 
images – be they concerned with perceptual issues or conceptual references – my intention is that the 
dual image is seen as an extension of an aspect of itself. This might be in terms of the work’s 
temporality, its form and materiality and/or what it might be acknowledging. It was my intention that 
this multiplying of one component against its adjacent other would form a reflexive or layered 
awareness in accordance with the notion of spectatorial doubleness. A work might be perceived in a 
process forming out of experiential conjunctions, as was my intention with Sequence and Stasis, by 
presenting dual flows of time in degrees of spatial simultaneity. 
Eisenstein made the point that one might read meaning in the association of two objects as 
the basis for his filmic montage, stating that ‘this…is not in the least a circumstance peculiar to the 
cinema, but is a phenomenon invariably met with in all cases where we have to deal with juxtaposition 
of two facts, two phenomena, two objects’56 Lev Kuleshov’s notion of the edited film as a montage of 
two or more scenes sequenced to forge new interpretations only supports this principal.57 It is at such 
points of intersection between two elements framed by the parameters of their medium, whether 
they are film shots, images or objects, that we might acknowledge the adaptivity of the notion of 
accumulative meaning and extend it from that of the cinematic montage towards different examples 
of concurrency.58           
It was my contention in making these works that doubling or repeating images, whether by 
mirroring in space or repeating over time, can both extend and confound the representation of 
movement in a process of separation and delay. As determined in the examples of the multi-screen 
installations examined in Chapter 1, the primary result is to spatialise movement in an array of 
concurrent images of difference. 
                                                 
56 Sergei Eisenstein, The Film Sense (London: Faber and Faber (1986), 4. Eisenstein contributed to the commonly held 
opinion in early communist Russia that montage was the essence of the film and form could be said to supersede the 
content of the juxtaposed sequence of film shots. He spoke of sequence as a construct made up of ‘independent’ shots 
and crucially that they are perceived as if layered on top of each other rather than to a more traditional metaphorical 
construct of a visual language that is linked in a linear format. 
57 Len Kuleshov, ‘The Principals of Montage’ in Critical Visions in Film Theory: Classic and Contemporary Readings, 
Timothy Corrigan (Ed) (Boston: Bedford, 2010), 137-144 
58 ‘This [associational montage] is not in the least a circumstance peculiar to the cinema, but is a phenomenon 
invariably met with in all cases where we have to deal with juxtaposition of two facts, two phenomena, two objects. We 
are accustomed to make, almost automatically, a definite and obvious deductive generalisation when any separate 
objects are placed before us side by side’ Eisenstein, The Film Sense, 4 
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 It may also be assumed that a dual image offers more than the sum of its parts, whether in a 
process of comparison that reveals accumulated meaning or concrete iteration.59 But in developing 
such dual image constructs it was not my intention to simply extend or reveal an element of the image 
to make new meaning as if by a process of enhancement of the original, but more pertinently to find a 
perceived point of separation between the otherwise unseen fusion of form and content, of material 
and subject, and so render a reading of the work somewhat unstable and open to change as an 
accumulation of possibilities. 
 
 
And/or: The accumulation of alternating images 
 
 
‘The interplay of same images creates the dialectic.’60 
 
 
Lisa Oppenheim, By Faith and Industry, 2006 
 
Artist Lisa Oppenheim’s double screen film By Faith and Industry (2006) forges a separation 
between text and image, adding a delay to the viewing of the work that requires a degree of mental 
retention in apprehending the two screens as a cohesive work. To achieve this she projected a series 
of archival images of the city of Liverpool onto one side of a screen and text commentary on its 
inverse. This text was set against footage of the sky above each of the locations referenced in the 
archive imagery. Oppenheim’s spatialisation of moving images requires the viewer to retain one and 
reposition themselves to see the other so as to forge links between each. Inevitably the film imagery 
will not always relate to each piece of text and a slippage of one against the other becomes an 
                                                 
59 In maintaining comparisons with Soviet film one might also acknowledge Vertov’s Theory of Intervals here. This 
was a structuring process in which two film images were edited for an intensifying rhythmic effect, juxtaposing their 
visual difference whilst maintaining the context of the film’s subject. Dziga Vertov, Kino-Eye: The Writings of Dziga 
Vertov (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 90-91 
60 Peter Gidal, ‘Malcolm Le Grice, Yes No Maybe Maybe Not’ in Structural Film Anthology (London: BFI, 1978), 28 
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analogue of the experience of subjective memory. Gaps and misalignments are experienced by the 
viewer that echo that of the archive and its inevitable limitations as a complete repository of history.61  
 
 
Ryan Gander, How the Present can Pierce the Past, 2013 
 
Examples of recent dual photographic works include Ryan Gander’s How the Present Can 
Pierce the Past (2013) which extends the visual content of a framed image to suggest spatial 
displacement and absence that, in correspondence with the title of the work, suggests events that 
might describe the immediacy of the memory of objects, or the world of physical matter and its 
eventual transmutation over time. By comparison Peter Liversidge’s ongoing series of dual 
photographs examine the temporal interstitials of the everyday world sequenced on a fractional, 
moment-by-moment basis. In these works a scene is photographed twice in quick succession and the 
images presented side-by-side as unique events.62 The viewer can scrutinise the minute differences 
between the movement of ripples on water, sunlight across an interior surface or the position of the 
hand-held camera. 
 
                                                 
61 This encapsulation of a spectator’s inability to see a work in its wholeness might be said to accord with Greenberg’s 
critique of the ‘theatricality’ of minimalism, a notion that might also be extended to works that foreground spatialised 
duration such as Douglas Gordon’s 24 Hour Psycho (1993). The idea that viewers may become aware of what is not 
present in a work and extend their awareness towards possible future states is a theme I will examine in Chapter 4. 
62 Peter Liversidge, Twofold (Berlin: Hatje Cantz, 2016) 
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       Peter Liversidge, Bedsheet, 2014  
 
Liversidge’s dual Polaroid photographs may resemble a child’s ‘spot the difference’ puzzle but 
as the shallow temporality of the work becomes discernible a more subtle set of considerations come 
to the fore. Liversidge is attempting to make an image and recreate an identical image immediately 
after, and so alluding to the futility of trying to hold onto a moment in time. We might consider such 
images to be closer to Nekes’ cinematic kine and the ‘difference between two frames’ as a time-space 
construct, but this series of works remains open-ended in that one may decide that Liversidge’s 
method is revealing this construct in terms of two successive frames in a film and at the same time see 




    Peter Liversidge, Cady's Hall, 2011  
 
 
                                                 
63 Further examples of dual imagery that function in different relations were considered as part of this research but for 
the sake of brevity are not addressed here, including: William Raban and Chris Welsby’s River Yar (1972) in which the 
flow of a river is presented in two timelines of different temporal resolution, and Amie Siegal’s Berlin Remake (2005) a 
dual screen film in which past and present coincide in the re-versioning of a previous film. 
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Wider references might emanate from readings of the dual image that evoke dichotomies of 
form and content, or material and representation. A doubled image can also carry allusions to the 
mirror, which in turn offers metaphorical references to the illusionary qualities of vision.64 In this way 
the dual image problematises the process of seeing so that a subject is not perceived at once, instead 
a delay is introduced in the accumulating of the components that is akin to a process of reading. I 
would claim that the doubling of a selected image or the intentional interplay of meaning between 
two parts has an effect upon awareness comparable to the repeating of language. If, to extend Paul 
Valery’s famous aphorism ‘to see is to forget the name of the thing one is seeing’, I suggest that to see 
an image twice is to be reminded of the fact that one is seeing.65  
Thus I propose the potential for a meta-awareness of the process of seeing is implied in the 
dual form and that this might ultimately be intended to take priority over any representational 
content. It is worth noting here Cerith Wyn Evan’s interest in what he terms ‘weak connections’ in 
which he acknowledges that the subtle shades of reference in a work have both a psychological 
distancing effect upon a viewer and a coming into being over time.66 Such a notion is pertinent if an 
element of a work remained in consciousness as an indeterminate idea, for example the awareness of 
possibility in the form of alternating dialogues that lie beyond the immediate experience of viewing. 
In examining the nature of the dual image and its references to the process of seeing, 
stereoscopic imagery, and the ‘persistence of vision’ I want to also acknowledge wider, less immediate 
contexts against which the doubled image might be perceived. In reference to Duchamp’s art co-
efficient – as the gap between the artist’s intention and the viewer’s awareness of that intention – I 
can consider the dual form as a model for a point of perceptual exchange between these 
coordinates.67 As a result of making and presenting works that in different ways foreground 
interrelationships between two points I began an examination of the nature of a perceived exchange 
                                                 
64 Martin Jay points to the states of illusion and delusion with which the mirrored image is associated in the thinking of 
both Sartre and Lacan, and emphasises their ‘deep distrust of the spatialised self created by the reifying look, a distrust 
traceable to the revaluation of temporality in Bergson and Heidiegger.’ Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of 
Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 347 
65 David Michael Levin, The Opening of Vision: Nihilism and the Postmodern Situation (London: Routledge, 1988), 65 
66 Hans Ulrich Obrist, The Conversation Series. Cerith Wyn Evans (Cologne: Walther Konig, 2010), 30 
67 I considered whether analogies might be made between this proposed binary interplay and Derrida’s word/idea 
‘Differance’, and in particular his notion of presence as a means of defining absence. Differance may speak of points in 
time that are determined by separateness and accord with his notion of Trace as a condition of what a sign differs from. 
Might the dual image be considered as a form that functions in numerous configurations? Perhaps this could be in 
terms of a sign and an element of trace that complements, opposes and extends the sign towards ‘another’ by its 
inherent misalignment. By this I refer to a trace that resonates with its sign while retaining an oblique relationship to it, 
as a deferral or extension of its measure rather than as a repeated copy of its form.  
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between two selected and/or recorded points in time and/or positions in space. In doing this I 
considered how such dualities of image or object can also represent a nominal matrix within which 
recorded time and recorded space are counterpoints out of which degrees of simultaneity might be 




Simultaneities: The dual moving image as space and sequence 
 
 
‘Take my eyes and through them see you…’:  Cerith Wyn Evans. ICA, London 2006 
 
Vestiges of debt to the work of Marcel Broodthaers formed the referential layers upon which 
Cerith Wyn Evans’s built his exhibition ‘Take my eyes and through them see you…’ at the ICA, London in 
2006. These references were codified as objects and strategies and revealed in accompanying texts as 
evocations of the Broodthaers 1975 exhibition in the same venue; an event that had a huge influence 
upon Wyn Evans at the time.68 In further reflexive layers Wyn Evans also used this exhibition to frame 
his own history of activity of film screenings at the gallery. But further, less immediate, influences 
were discernible in the exhibition than his arrangements of potted palms and use of particular 
typography.69 An unspoken reference to structural film can be determined in the presence of a large 
35mm cinema projector installed in an upper room of the gallery that formed the titular work, ‘Take 
my eyes and through them see you…’ This machine had an imposing physical presence in the space, a 
monolithic but ultimately futile object that projected just a loop of black film frames. The screen 
opposite remained blank and mute, and instead the obsolescence of the machine and its lost history 
of presenting audiences with transportative moving imagery became the subject of the work. Similarly 
obscured aspects of this piece included the use of two different film loops at alternate points 
throughout the exhibition, one consisting of black frames, the other clear, and each depicting an 
accumulated duration in the dust and scratches that appeared as fleeting specks and lines on the 
screen.70 
                                                 
68 ‘This was the first exhibition that made a real impression on me in terms of contemporary art practice.’ Cerith Wyn 
Evans, Hans Ulrich Obrist: The Conversation Series (Cologne: Walther Koenig, 2010), 8 
69 Broodthaers used potted palm trees as references to Belgium’s colonial history in Africa, the symbolism of 19th 
Century Palm Courts and their common use in 1970’s domestic décor. Wyn Evans employed them as ‘quotes’, whilst 
also adopting the same typographic font that Broodthaers used in the publicity for his exhibition in 1975.  
70 It is worth noting Wyn Evans thinking here in relation to difference between two states. He suggests meaning can be 
an ‘extrapolation’ of two minds that he compares with William Burroughs and Brion Gysins’ writings on the Third 
Mind. ‘In this kind of “third space” – the dialogue between one and two…there are conversations that happen… the 
dialogues appear to take the form of a conversation in that they’re happening at the same time, somehow they are 
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Wyn Evans presentation of two film loops as binary opposites that alternate over periods of 
time resembles a early projection piece by Takahiko Iimura called Loop Seen as a Line (1972), in which 
two looped film projections, one of black frames, the other clear, were set side by side in space. In 
each case the detritus of accumulated duration began to appear on the film screen in both positive 




Cerith Wyn Evans, ‘Take my eyes and through them see you…’  ICA, London, 2010   
 
Commenting upon his early dual film installations Iimura referred to his interest in both the 
transposing of states and dimensional collapse within the works, stating that ‘the loops (of film) are 
transformed into lines – three into two dimensions’ and between the two film images, dark and light, a 
condition of asymmetry is maintained over long durations as scratches and lines accrue on each film, 
reducing the already minimal imagery in a process of material entropy.72 
                                                                                                                                                 
eliding or slipping over each other, such that you could go in on many different levels.’ Wyn Evans, Hans Ulrich 
Obrist: The Conversation Series, 10 
71 In 1972 New York based film-maker Takahiko Iimura exhibited one of a series of film-based installations called 
Loop Seen as a Line. This used the accumulation of dust and scratches on dual film loops to spatialise the experience of 
time by utilising the image and the presence of the film to construct equivalences between temporal flow and 
movement through space. The work consisted of two 16mm film projectors running separate film loops, one of black 
frames, the other clear. A line was scratched along each film which ran vertically through the frame, and both positive 
and negative films were projected side by side.   
72 Takahiko Iimura, The Collected Writings of Takahiko Iimura (Rockville, Maryland: Wildside Press, 2007), 70 
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Wyn Evans makes no direct reference to the implications and resonances of ‘Take my eyes and 
through them see you…’, leaving only the ubiquitous presence of potted palm trees placed around the 
projector to function as an established reference to the work of Broodthaers. But it is difficult to 
imagine that with his association with film makers such as Peter Gidal and his meticulous knowledge of 
the methods and intentions of such artists that he would be unaware of the temporal-spatial film 
works of Takahiko Iimura. It is possible that Wyn Evans was acknowledging Iimura’s use of blank and 
light film projections as a method of inverting and extending time between two points in space.73   
What specifically interests me in the comparing of these two otherwise separate works is that they 
both consist of binary alternations, one in extended time, the other in adjacent space. And that the 
subject of the work is a process of change over a durational arc that extends beyond the moments of 
apprehension of the physical work towards its future states.  In such a process the imagination of the 
viewer is called upon to assume these future states of the work, the degree to which the film loops 
might degrade from endless repetition, that lie beyond the threshold of what they can witness. 74 Both 
the works thus address that which is inevitable but can be determined only out of assumptions based 
on current conditions and projected forward in the imagination as possibility, a condition of virtual 
engagement derived out of a construction of dual temporalities encountered in the present.  
Commenting on the dimensional qualities of his work Wyn Evans states that, ‘The intuition of 
space is over determined by the intuition of time. I think that’s a truism that we can agree to...What 
we know or experience of space is largely coloured by our temporality in relation to our perception of 
that space.’75 
                                                 
73 ‘…this concern with the experience of time, its measured passage and the analogy between time and space, has been 
the main reoccurring theme at the centre of his work.’ Le Grice, ‘Takahiko Iimura-Getting the Measure of Time’ in 
Experimental Cinema, 79 
74 Iimura makes reference to scratches that ‘…appear on the projected frame adding lines, and clear scratches…The 
contrast of positive and negative side by side becomes asymmetrical because of the scratches’, Iimura, The Collected 
Writings, 70. The slow degrading of both films operates in a meta-temporality that extends beyond the exhibition itself.  




Takahiko Iimura, Loop Seen as a Line, diagram  
 
In both films the dark or light images – whether projected concurrently or sequentially – exist 
in a binary inversion in which time is transposed between the screen and the material of the film in the 
exhibition space in a process of slow deterioration. Each work is predicated upon degrees of 
difference that span the binaries of image – object, 2D – 3D, time – space and illusion – apparatus.  
In considering these two film projections as a complementary array of dual alternations it is 
my intention to map the ground against which I will, in Chapter 3, examine the alternations of 
difference that constitute the perception of phasing. Additionally I will highlight from the operations 
of these two film projections the perceived element of change and decay that can raise an audience’s 









                                                 
76 I attended a one day workshop with Iimura at no.w.here production facilities in London in 2014 in which he screened 
a series of his videos and led a reconstruction of his video piece Observer/Observed (1975/1998). Afterwards I was 
able to discuss his work with him, focussing upon Loop seen as a Line, and its allusions to future states afforded by the 
degrading of the film loops over time.   
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Simultaneities: The dual moving image as repetition and delay 
 
H.M: Kerry Tribe Dead Star Light, Arnolfini Gallery, Bristol 2010 
 
As a means of extending comparisons between dual film projections I want to now refer to an 
exhibition of works by Kerry Tribe at the Arnolfini Gallery in 201o, and focus on a work entitled H.M. I 
have selected this piece not only for its structural similarity to the projections by Wyn Evans and Iimura 
– consisting of two 16mm film projectors and two projected images in an exhibition space – but 
because I propose that it also effectively initiates a doubling of viewer awareness, encouraging 
alternations between filmic content and the means by which it is being apprehended. In fact Tribe’s 
piece successfully maintains a balance between these two states, and foregrounds this as the method 
of the work by delaying the simultaneity of seeing and reading. From the outset this delay is both the 
primary form and the subject of the work.   
 
 
Kerry Tribe, HM, Arnolfini, Bristol, 2009 
 
Made in 2009 H.M. has a more cinematic remit than either Wyn Evan’s or Iimura’s projections 
as it maintains a representation of its subject that begins with its title and is maintained in its pictorial 
content. Additional background information to the exhibition enables us to approach the work with 
the knowledge that it addresses the experience of an anonymous psychiatric patient known only as 
H.M. who, after a brain operation to alleviate severe epilepsy, was left with only short-term memory 
recall of approximately twenty seconds. Tribe acknowledges that her film operates primarily as a form 
of documentary, but at the same time its dual presentation ensures the work maintains a strong 
material form that compounds a viewer’s experience of its subject with the experience of its 
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structure.77 To do this Tribe utilises two 16mm film projectors placed side by side in the viewing space, 
but in a departure from the separate film loops used by Wyn Evan or Iimura, H.M. consists of a single 
18-minute loop of film that runs through both film projectors, from left to right, with a delay of 20 
seconds between the appearance of an image and its re-appearance on the adjacent screen. 
 
 
Kerry Tribe, H.M. 2009 
 
In this dual image presentation of a looped film installation Tribe’s work has some similarities 
with Iimura’s concerns with filmic binaries, but ultimately it offers a very different experience. Both 
Wyns Evans’ and Iimura’s binary relationships between black and clear film loops construct 
relationships between temporal flow and spatial distance, whereas H.M.’s dual screen and projector 
configuration operates between the poles of pictorial representation and a reflexive awareness of the 
work’s use of actual time. This is delivered simultaneously in the tangible form of a 20-second delay 
that foregrounds the real-time of the film in a subjective experience of seeing an image twice in 
slightly differing configurations. As such she encourages the viewer to extend their focus between 
that of the subject H.M. whilst being given – if not a realistic experience of the patient’s condition – 
then an effective demonstration of the experience of déjà vu. New configurations of images and text, 
ambient sounds, voiceovers, actors and contemplative lingering shots of landscapes collide and 
correspond in the present. H.M. spans the restaged, the observational, the scientific and the poetic 
and fuses it with the reflexivity of its material presence as film moving through a projector.  
 
                                                 
77 ‘The roughly 18-minute loop weaves together re-enacted, documentary, found and animated elements and lies 
somewhere between an experimental documentary and an independent narrative film.’ Kerry Tribe, Projects, H.M. 
2009 http://www.kerrytribe.com/project/h-m/#text (Accessed 19th November 2014)  
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Kerry Tribe, H.M. 2009 
 
In describing H.M. Tribe writes that ‘the structure of the installation and the nature of the 




Kerry Tribe, H.M. 2009 
 
The dual image arrangement of H.M. is not so much a method of constructing new meanings 
out of the shifting alignments of two images as they repeat over time, but rather an attempt to open a 
perceptual gap between image and subject by presenting a facsimile of the experience of the film’s 
subject in a manner that transforms apprehension into an event in consciousness. H.M. highlights the 
temporal gap between the appearance and the re-appearance of an image sequence across the two 
adjacent screens.  
 
                                                 
78  Kerry Tribe, Projects, HM 2009 http://www.kerrytribe.com/ project/h-m/#text (Accessed 19th November 2014) 
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Kerry Tribe, H.M. 2009 
 
 
Win, Place or Show:  Stan Douglas Tate Britain, London, 1998 
  
Another example of a work predicated upon the flow of dual moving images (in this case 
more overtly foregrounding the element of chance), is Win, Place or Show by Stan Douglas. This two- 
screen installation from 1998 was constructed from different video shots of the same set of actions 
that cycle and realign in configurations that always lead to an altercation between two men in a 
domestic interior. The many versions of the same scenes describe this simple narrative in a cycle of 
slightly different computer-controlled configurations. Each time we never see quite the same set of 
shots, but the narrative flow and its culmination is always ultimately the same: first dialogue, then 
argument, finally conflict. Daniel Birnbaum frames the work as a Beckett-like allegory of existential 
struggle and daily repetition ‘…maybe this time the outcome will be different. It never is: the two guys 
always end up carrying out their hopeless wrestling match. They’re locked inside a machine that offers 
no escape.’ 79 Douglas’ incorporation of a limited form of chance in the structure of the work affords 
us an awareness of the possibility of change in the narrative’s outcome. But ultimately we realise that 
nothing of any significance will change and that the protagonist’s situation is hopeless. 
 
 
Stan Douglas, Win, Place or Show, 1998. Two channel video/audio  
                                                 
79 Daniel Birnbaum, Chronology (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2005), 49 
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The resultant balance of doubled imagery that is apprehended via a process of slippage and 
repetition is comparable to Tribe’s attainment of a balance in H.M. between documentary, poetics and 
the real-time experience of the process of retention of image and memory, in which the present and 
the recent past are framed within the scope of the work.  
 
 
Stan Douglas, Win, Place or Show, 1998. Two channel video/audio  
 
I want to highlight here the means by which a dual image format can function as a method in 
which time as repetition, and space as a mirrored image is key to otherwise different moving image 
works. Even a basic survey of the different utilisations of dual moving imagery begins to accord with 
some of the means by which I have utilised this format within my studio practice. At the core of these 
examples lie strategies of repetition, inversion or separation, each of which is seen to operate in time 
and between the spaces of the screens. In all these works degrees of difference are continually played 
out between relative positions and our memory of images sequenced in time.  
 
Stan Douglas, Win, Place or Show, 1998. Two channel video/audio  
 
In examples of the spatialising alternation of binaries that form Iimura’s Loop Seen as a Line, 
and the extended durations of Wyn Evans ‘Take me Eyes and through them see you…’, I propose that a 
simple matrix of two points in time and two positions in space can be visualised as a measure of the 
works’ dimensions, and defining this enables me to identify my intentions for the operations of the 
studio work that multiplies awareness of form alongside content. In addition I propose that these 
circumstances of concurrent awareness result from a viewer’s perception of instability or 
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incompleteness in the work, and that this perception extends from the current circumstances of the 
work towards an implicit awareness of the work’s continuing evolution.  
 
Chance, simultaneity and possibility 
 
Let’s turn to cinema’s conditions of possibility, repetition and stoppage. What is repetition? …repetition 
is not the return of the identical; it is not the same as such that returns. The force and grace of 
repetition, the novelty it brings us is the return as the possibility of what was. Repetition restores the 
possibility of what was, renders it possible anew; it’s almost a paradox. To repeat something is to make 
it possible anew. Here lies the proximity of repetition and memory…80   
 
From the chance configurations in the film works of Tribe and Douglas, and its presence in the 
form of material decay in film projections by Wyn Evans and Iimura, I next want to focus on the role of 
chance, and subsequent perceptions of possibility, as a basis of the experience of phasing.  
Incorporating a sense of the unpredictable or the performative into the presentation of film 
and video works are strategies that can instil a sense of uniqueness into watching a pre-recorded 
subject. Film maker Chris Welsby refers to the utilisation of the time differences between 
unsynchronised devices when he writes, ‘projectors do not run at a constant speed, multiple 
projectors never truly run “in sync”…and there are numerous examples of moving image installations 
and expanded cinema performance that make use of this unpredictability.’81 Meanwhile examples of 
artists performing live actions in relation to the moving image, exemplified by the likes of Malcolm Le 
Grice, indicate methodologies designed to extend the experience of the film, emphasising projection 
as a live event in which actual time took primacy over pre-recorded imagery.82 ‘Reminding the 
audience of their own location in the here and now’ as Lucy Reynolds describes Le Grice’s Horror Film 2 
(1972).83 But it is the means by which such real-time strategies encourage an awareness of chance and 
possibility that interests me; that the encounter is taking place exclusively in that moment and 
                                                 
80 Giorgio Agamben, ‘Difference and Repetition: On Guy Debord’s Films’ in Art and the Moving Image. A Critical 
Reader (London: Tate, 2008), 330 
81 Chris Welsby, ‘Cybernetics, Expanded Cinema and New Media’ in Expanded Cinema: Art, Performance, Film 
(London: Tate, 2011), 281 
82 Le Grice’s film-based performance Horror Film (1971) was both a key work and an effective illustration of an overt 
form of such performative activity in which he positioned himself between the projector and screen, interacting with 
the light beam and emphasising his presence in shadow and silhouette.  
83 Lucy Reynolds, ‘Magic Tricks? The Use of Shadow Play in Expanded Cinema’ Activating the Space of Reception, 
conference at Tate Modern. London April 17th-19th 2009 
http://www.rewind.ac.uk/expanded/Narrative/Tate_Doc_Session_3_-LR.html (accessed 23rd January 2018)  
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resolving in the actual time of the audience, which allows for the possibility of its existence being 
influenced by their presence.  
 
 
Malcolm Le Grice, Horror Film, 1971 
 
The exploitation of the live appearance of difference and de-synchronisation between moving 
images was the basis of a series of performance projections by film-maker Nicky Hamlyn that aimed to 
incorporate pre-recorded movement and simultaneities between images happening in real-time. The 
works in question X Fours Loops (1974), Rings (2012) and Quadrants (2016) are structured around a 
common principal: that four film projectors display multiples of the same moving monochrome 
geometric forms such as a large ‘X’, arrays of circles or quarter sections of the screen which, when 
projected in overlapping loops, form complex fluctuating patterns. A performative dimension is 
central to these film events that involve the moving of projectors throughout the screening to form 
layered images of pulsing light patterns, or adjacent configurations of moving images of synchronising 
and clashing repetitions.84 
The degree of uniqueness between each presentation may be negligible but what I suggest is 
key to these films, and the reason I am discussing them here, is the audience’s awareness that they are 
witnessing a live event that is somewhat predicated upon chance, albeit in the minute degrees of 
difference in time and space that the structure and technology of the work affords. And furthermore 
that such reflexive awareness of the live-ness of this process of film synchronising might correspond 
to the concurrent layers of viewer awareness described by Mondloch’s spectatorial doubleness in the 
witnessing of multi-screen works. 
 
                                                 
84 Mondloch, Screens, 9-10 
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Nicky Hamlyn, X Fours Loops, 1974 
 
Nicky Hamlyn, Quadrants, 2016 
 
Hamlyn refers to the appeal of visual imperfection in his projections, and I would emphasise 
that his use of simple shapes allows our attention to focus on the fluctuations of difference revealed in 
the gaps that the works form, and that this becomes in essence a simple temporal/spatial exchange 
between repetitions of form re-appearing on adjacent screens.85 Shifting, flickering light levels, 
afterimages, and undulating patterns result from chance alignments within set parameters, and the 
effectiveness of the work is only increased by the awareness of the ‘live-ness’ of its operations.86  
                                                 
85 ‘Four loops of rings (as the title indicates) interspersed with black frames make possible the strange magic that 
emanates from vision imperfections.’ Nicky Hamlyn, Nicky Hamlyn Film Performance, Fundación Luis Seoane, A 
Coruña Spain. 2016 http://www.s8cinema.com/portal/en/programacion/desbordamento/nicky-hamlyn-performance/ 
(accessed 25th August 2016)  
86 ‘I like the fact that the film image in itself is fixed, but when presented in a performance situation in which projectors 
are re-aligned and the images superimposed in various ways, a unique experience, in some ways the antithesis of film, 
is created. The lack of synchronisation between the projectors generates unexpected conjunctions and interactions 
between the loops, whether superimposed or adjacent to each other, recalling in some respects Steve Reich’s early 
phase pattern compositions. Potentially, flicker rates of higher than 24fps are also possible.’ Nicky Hamlyn 
https://nickyhamlyn.com/2016/06/ (accessed 25th August 2016)    
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The presence of the artist, the performance of the unexpected and an emphasis on the 
presence of the spectator may be some of the more explicit means of foregrounding the uniqueness 
of an encounter with the moving image, but ultimately I am more inclined to address pattern, 
repetition and degrees of simultaneity as a means by which chance and actuality can be foregrounded, 



































Chapter 3:  
This chapter consists of an analysis of image phasing as a perceptual process. Examples of studio works 
are analysed in relation to Bergson and Deleuzes’ ideas of temporal plurality and simultaneity. I propose that 
image phasing reveals a doubling of viewer awareness between current and possible future configurations. 
 
Phasing as cycling simultaneities 
 
I call two instantaneous perceptions ‘simultaneous’ that are apprehended in one and the same mental 
act, the attention here again being able to make one or two out of them at will.87  
 
The phasing or shifting relationship between events is a phenomenon most readily associated 
with sound qualities and musical composition. In the case of phasing as an electronic sound effect a 
sustained signal such as that from an electric guitar is split and layered and one signal channel altered 
slightly in pitch/tempo and recombined to result in a swirling, undulating sound. But phasing is more 
readily associated with formal techniques utilised by composer Steve Reich in which two or more 
instruments, voices or recordings are designed to shift in and out of unison to give the effect of 
echoing, doubling or reverberating the work as a whole. These qualities can introduce 
phenomenological associations of spatial depth to a sound as well as multiplying the rhythmic or tonal 
structure of a musical phrase. The effectiveness of phasing as a compositional technique relies on the 
shifting of a musical refrain’s structural elements as a process of repetitions that reveal fluctuating 
degrees of difference over the duration of the piece. 
Early tape-based phase works by Reich such as It’s Gonna Rain (1965) and Come Out (1966) 
consisted of pre-recorded sounds and voices, or electronic pulses that were multiplied and designed 
to slip out of synchronisation and result in patterns of sound that ranged from echo and repetition to 
rhythmic musical effect.88 Reich developed these early experiments with chance into complex 
multilayered, shifting works using live instrumentation such as pianos and percussion in repeating 
permutation cycles.  Although these pieces are very precisely written and played they are often 
described as textural, mesmerising and minimalist, due in part to their limited instrumentation and 
reliance on repetition and subtle fluctuation.   
                                                 
87 Bergson, Duration and Simultaneity, 51  
88 Reich wrote ‘…I had the idea that if a number of single tones were all pulsing at the same tempo but with gradually 
shifting phase relations, a great number of musical patterns would result. If the tones were all in phase (struck at the 
same instant), a pulsing chord would be heard. If the tones were slowly shifting just a bit out of phase, a sort of rippling 
broken chord would be heard that would gradually change into a melodic pattern, then another, and so on.’  
Steve Reich, ‘The Shifting Pulse Gate’ in Writings on Music 1965-2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 38 
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As an adjunct to his musical compositions Reich briefly explored image phasing in the early 
1970s with the use of video tapes of individuals speaking phrases that were copied and played back on 
three or more monitors so that the subtle differences between each recording and player were 
multiplied over time to result in the phasing of sounds with images.89  
Visual interpretations of Reich’s phasing compositions have been produced that attempt to 
accompany and expand upon his music. Choreographer Anne Teresa De Keersmaeker has developed 
numerous interpretations in which dancers repeat gestures and movements to recordings of Reich’s 
phasing pieces, moving precisely in time with one repeating loop against another in which the slipping 
between phases happens in live performance.90 Austrian filmmaker Norbert Pfaffenbichler has on the 
other hand produced video pieces in response to Reich’s Piano Phase in which images and music are 
edited so that the subsequent phasing effects of the images follow the music as a pre-recorded 
equivalent.91 Filmmaker Guy Sherwin made short film works that, whilst not so explicitly referencing 
Reich, explored a perceived slippage of synchronisation between images of holes punched into film 
frames and sound tracks of scratches on the film’s sound stripe.92 Such methods produce a form of 
phasing that consists of repetitions designed to draw attention to gaps between image and sound and 
reveal the process of making and watching a film as a co-constructed illusion.93 
In order to explore the experience of phasing as a visual phenomenon in which time is 
experienced in spatialised, synchronised movement I am framing the process of its perception as both 
a spatial and temporal concern by first outlining my consideration of phasing in relation to processes 
within my studio practice, and highlighting my point that such phasing operates as a matrix of 
differences between extensions in space and delay or repetition in time. I consider phasing as a 
phenomenon encountered primarily as a visual process rather than as a sonic phenomenon as this is 
the means by which it revealed itself in my studio work, and how I continue to explore its 
possibilities.94 But whether the experience of the phasing of synchronous events is visual or auditory, 
                                                 
89 Ibid, 82 
90 http://www.rosas.be/en/productions/361-fase-four-movements-to-the-music-of-steve-reich (accessed 8th March 
2016) 
91 Norbert Pfaffenbichler, Images 4 Music (Ars Electronica, 2004), DVD 
92 Guy Sherwin, Optical Sound Films 1971-2007 (LUX, 2007), DVD 
93 Aimee Mollaghan states ‘Sherwin…often subverts this illusory perceptual effect by playing not only with points of 
synchronization but with the temporality and duration of the audio-visual content in order to draw attention to, both the 
construction and materiality of the film and the relationship between sound and image.’ Aimee Mollaghan, ‘Audio-
visual moiré patterns: Phasing in Guy Sherwin’s Optical Sound films’ in The Soundtrack 7 (Bristol: Intellect, 2014), 
47-57 
94 I acknowledge the importance of the vast array of research conducted into the phasing of sound by a range of 
musicians and artists, and the relatively advanced range of projects that utilise the properties of the phasing of sound. It 
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the fundamental principles of the encounter can be established first in general terms as the ongoing 
difference of degrees of concurrency between repeating events in time emanating as a perceived 
interaction between two comparable points in space.95 Thus phasing is a perceptual phenomenon 
formed of a recognition of relatedness over time and within space that is not beyond the thresholds of 
either the temporal field: not too fast or too slow to be illegible as change, and close enough and of a 
scale that can be perceived and categorised as being related in their proximity. Examples of simple 
visual two-point phasing are observable in such scenarios as the flashing yellow globes of the Belisha 
beacons that mark pedestrian crossings slipping in and out of synchronisation with each other, or the 
flashing indicator lights of a queue of vehicles waiting to turn at a road junction that present a phasing 
of synchronisations in their different timings. Thus phasing as a perceptual phenomenon is determined 
both over time and within space as a series of fluctuating and synchronous operations. 
Notwithstanding that schematic equivalences to phasing might be seen to exist in the static 
images formed of 2D interference patterns and moiré, a deeper exploration of such ideas lies outside 
the scope of this text.  With such comparisons acknowledged the emphasis of this research remains 
upon the perception of temporal and spatial separations and interrelationships of difference.  
If an experience of the phasing of rhythms, be they visual or auditory, is made up of adjacent 
temporalities then the condition for the perception of phasing can be said to be difference as an 
indicator of change over time. In such a case the term difference must refer to a difference of degree 
not a difference of kind. Therefore difference as change over time must be between two, or more, 
similar or associated phenomena such as two waveforms or two pulses, perhaps two variations on the 
same subject, or even two separate objects ‘composed’ so as to be read as in some way bound 
together a relationship that is formal and/or conceptual. Such differences of degree may be seen as 
the inverse of similarity, repetition and alternation being a means of underlining both the 
commonalities and the points of departure between two or more images, objects, sounds or tracts.96              
Revisiting Werner Nekes’ claim that ‘cinema is the difference between two frames’ we are 
reminded that he was determining that that film functions as the difference between two points in 
recorded time. This can be graphically different as that between two scenes and remain a difference 
of degree. In the case of the distributed moving images of Gusmão and Paiva, and Akerman continuity 
of pace and image quality ensures that each installation is perceived holistically even while different 
                                                                                                                                                 
is also partly because of the fact that phasing is more established as an audio phenomenon that I will, for the purposes 
of this research project, remain focussed upon exploring the possibilities of its visual properties in my practice. 
95 Here ‘points in space’ refers to visual display devices such as video screens, projectors or digital clocks, whereas the 
auditory phasing of Steve Reich used two or more tape recorders, performers or instruments.  
96 One example being image differencing as used in Astronomy to detect minute changes in position or fluctuations of 
brightness of distant stars through pixel-level photometric comparisons of two images of sections of the sky.   
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scenes play out between the screens. Our reading of these recorded events, related by degrees of 
consistency, allows formal difference to become the means by which each piece is comprehended. 
Thus Papagaio and D’Est are constructed out of concurrencies and simultaneities between the spatial 
presentation of recorded imagery and our active apprehension of their presence. In extrapolating 
from this I propose that it is such circumstances of difference in degree, adjacency and repetition that 
enable phasing to be apprehended as a phenomenon that is present in the otherwise separate 
operations of two or more objects or images.  
 
 
Phase difference and frequency difference  
If an alternation between two points in time describes difference in a linear exchange, such as 
the switching between binary states of on and off of a light at a set rate of one second, then such 
difference can be visualised and drawn as a simple waveform diagram.  
 
   
 
   Diagram 1 
 
The amplitude of the waves in Diagram 1 would represent the degrees of difference between 
each of the two states on/off or black/white, between two shades of grey, two images of greater or 
lesser degrees of difference, or two sounds such as musical notes on a scale. This waveform can be 
assumed to continue to emanate ad infinitum in a perpetual binary state.  
If another identical set of switching/alternating forms with the same set rate of one second 
per state is triggered at exactly the same time alongside the first then no difference will be 










But if this second otherwise identical waveform begins a fraction after the first a doubling or 
echoing of one against the other will be witnessed as the two states of switching will be permanently 
out of synchronisation with each other. This would be represented by identical waveforms with peaks 






This is known in physics as ‘phase difference’ and is witnessed as a complicated set of 
waveforms that are multiplied but remain fixed in relation to each other over time and so experienced 





                                                 
97 An example of this form of phasing will be examined in the next chapter in relation to Brion Gysin’s Dreamachine in 
which a more complicated version of this form of phasing is experienced as greater and lesser degrees of light and 
shadow alternating across each eye. The effect results from a combination of phase difference and syncopation of direct 






Diagram 5 illustrates the type of phasing I am exploring, as a condition of perpetual shift 
between two points or waveforms that is witnessed when the frequency of one set of successive 












When difference is spatialised between two separate components these will still contain a 
greater degree of similarity than difference, so that they are perceived as related. It is out of frequency 
difference that phasing becomes perceived as a phenomenon that has proved of interest to 
composers such as Steve Reich as the two or more components of a work (be it musical or visual) 
consist of waveforms of different length. The ‘peaks’ and ‘troughs’ of each waveform are continually 
slipping out of synchronisation with each other in ongoing cycles of degrees of concurrence and 
opposition, as in Diagram 6. Factors such as amplitude, for example the degree of graphic difference 
between film frames or volume between musical notes, and the regularity of the visual or audio 
repetitions allow for greater or lesser degrees of what we might determine to be harmony or 
dissonance, mesmerising undulation or irritating repetition.   
 
Forms of phasing  
If phasing can be described as the perception of ongoing difference between adjacent points 
in time and space then it becomes necessary to determine the forms in which such an experience 
might manifest and align with the operation of certain studio works. Phasing as a shifting array of 
concurrencies and delays over time might be encountered in different circumstances, from a pre-
recorded set of movements, in a predetermined set of operations between events, or as chance 
fluctuations between separate systems. In each case reoccurrence and adjacency are fundamental to 
the perception of phasing. But a consideration that I want to address is how the means by which they 
are presented has bearing upon how they are perceived.98 
As stated in the introduction to this text the development of studio work from which this 
project is derived is rooted in a phenomenological approach to visuality; beginning with explorations 
of afterimages resulting from video projections, and the means by which representation might be 
                                                 
98 Fixed phasing: can be determined when phasing is presented as a pre-recorded phenomenon. An example would be a 
recording of a piece of music such as Variations by composer Steven Reich (or, in the case of the initial test versions of 
Edge of Motion in which two video recordings running at slightly differencing rates were rendered together into a 
single channel video). This results in an image of phasing which is ‘locked’ into one timeline. In such instances the pre-
recorded events, be they sound or moving images, are identical each time the recording is played.  
Syncopated phasing: this form of phasing is an interference pattern of interactions born out of two or more identical 
rhythm cycles operating in unison to form the perception of ongoing syncopation. It may be happening ‘live’ as the 
result of separate timelines, but the repetition of fixed frequencies does not result in fluctuation over time.  
Fluctuating phasing: a form of phasing perceived as the result of separate systems consisting of patterns of shifting 
frequency that slip in and out of synchronisation in real time. Examples include the live performance of musical 
phasing between instruments in a concert, the choreographed dances of Anne Teresa De Keersmaeker performed live to 
the recorded music of Steve Reich, or more prosaically the aforementioned indicator lights of vehicles in the street. 
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constructed over time in the viewer’s perception.99 My subsequent considerations of difference in the 
form of image phasing continues this focus on the visual/perceptual process, and so for the purposes 
of this text I am electing to acknowledge, but set aside, the array of examples of phasing that can be 
encountered within audio and musical realms, citing them only as a means of comparison with that of 
the visual phenomena. I am primarily considering phasing between two or more repeating cycles of 
visual events such as light and its absence or the alternation of images, positions, forms or objects that 
in different ways shift and slip in and out of synchronisation over time in the perception of the viewer. 
With reference to examples taken from the studio practice I am also examining how repetition in 
adjacent space is fundamental to the perception of phasing, and to what extent is it possible to reduce 
the complexity of such temporal and spatial cycles and still maintain a perception of perpetual 
slippage?  
It was out of these considerations that the studio work entitled Edge of Motion developed, as 
a moving image dual video that was constructed in such a way as to exploit the perception of phasing 
between two repeated events and the difference between two separate systems of presentation. It is 
the interference patterns of ongoing difference between two or more systems in ‘live’ interactions 
that form the basis of this work.  
 
 
‘This is the time, and this is the record of the time’100 
You’re seeing two temporal moments at the same time, and you’re hopefully able to think of those two 
moments at the same time, just as one is able to look at the present and understand how the past lived 
the way it did.101 
 
Edge of Motion began as series of experiments with pre-recorded videos of repeating 
phenomena such as camera movement and edited loops that were multiplied and played back in 
unison. My initial motivation was to examine whether at a certain point the work could be 
experienced as a suspension between movement and stasis that resulted from the cycling and slipping 
of synchronous images. The most effective recordings I made in this respect were of subjects that 
formed a natural cycle that began and ended in the same position, rather than the more obvious 
method of repeatedly editing the same video clip to unnatural effect. The imagery used in these initial 
explorations of multiple video loops included lateral camera pans, clock pendulums or the on-off 
cycles of flashing indicators and warning lights.  
                                                 
99 See initial reference in the Introduction to this text to Duration Reveals Extension, a video installation that utilised 
deconstructed drawings to interrogate aspects of representation. 
100 Lyric from Laurie Anderson’s ‘From the Air’ from the album Big Science (Warner Bros, 1982) 
101 Stan Douglas describing the layered temporalities that underpin his dual screen installation Der Sandmann. 
Birnbaum, Chronology, 91 
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Steven Scott, Edge of Motion, 2013. Frame from single channel video version.  
 
In developing these video loops I produced a version consisting of two recordings of an un-
programmed LED clock displaying flashing digits ‘00:00’. Shot in close-up, these digital zeros appear 
for one second then disappear to leave an empty screen for one second, on and off, ad infinitum. Two 
such videos were looped to repeat seamlessly and presented side by side, identical but for a single 
frame difference: one recording had been reduced by a single video frame.102 A gradual accumulation 
of difference between the two videos became discernible as the flashing digits slipped between 
degrees of synchronisation. Initial test versions of these dual recordings were rendered as a single 
digital video, but a video made up of two recordings on the same screen was perceived as simply 
illustrating the effect of phasing. It was only when the work was presented via separate video 
projectors and separate players that the idea of accumulative difference and phasing was perceived as 
actual, and importantly, as a ‘live’ experience of chance simultaneities taking place in real time.103   
I began to consider this dual work in terms of its degrees of difference between time lines 
that are dissipating across space, and questions around the relationship between temporal flow and 
its presence in space became a focus of the research. From initial experiments with alternating images 
on dual screens I examined the perception of ‘live-ness’ as a reflexive experience of moving images 
arranged in a space. This method was intended to foreground a viewer’s awareness of the 
separateness of systems of presentation – two projectors or two actual clocks – and enhance the 
perception of the phasing of images as patterns of chance and the work as an event in real-time.   
Subsequent exhibitions and discussions around versions of Edge of Motion underpinned this 
stage of the research and helped clarify how the operation of the work might be perceived once I 
                                                 
102 European video format (PAL) frame rates are 25 frames per second. Each video frame constitutes 1/25th of a second 
103 This work was presented using separate projectors was to the RCA Fine Art Research Processes group in February 
2015. After much discussion it was agreed that the perceived ‘liveness’ of the phasing images resulting from visibly 
separate projectors contributed to the experience of phasing as ‘actual’ rather than a visual effect. Subsequent 
exhibitions have extended this idea with the use of multiple, visibly separate projection systems.  
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began to foreground this element of chance in the work. Research group discussions and the wider 
exhibiting of Edge of Motion as a series of LED clocks often resulted in feedback of subjective 
perceptions that included references to a ‘mesmerising’ effect of the digits’ synchronisations, or to a 
visual appeal that ‘keeps drawing the eye towards the flashing digits’. A sense of ‘tension’ within the 
work has most often been described, with perceived references to electrical faults, power cuts or 
computer crashes. Comparisons to a countdown to catastrophic events such as in Hollywood movie 
depictions of ticking time bombs or missile launches were also acknowledged. Whilst the flashing 
clock digits do not actually count down, and such specific references to danger are unintended, a 
sense of tension – that something is about to happen – does not undermine the initial idea of making a 
moving image work that is perceived to exist in a state of suspension between movement and stasis.   
           
  
Steven Scott, Edge of Motion, 2016. Dual-LED clocks 
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Steven Scott, Edge of Motion, 2016. Multi-LED clocks 
 
 
Steven Scott, Edge of Motion, Multi video projections. ‘Phase Shift’, Deptford X, London 2015 
 
My focus upon real-time image phasing led to widening definitions of the phenomena as 
constantly changing configurations that result from the latency and difference that accumulates over 
time between two or more temporal flows. I determined that the perception of the synchronisation of 
images in this work can be recognised as a result of the separateness of the work’s display apparatus 
and that this is most effective when seen to be happening live, out of chance visual interactions.  
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Subsequent versions of Edge of Motion have been produced and exhibited using two or more 
LED clocks presented side by side. In this case I commissioned a fabricator to alter the digital chip in 
each clock so that each one-second-on, one-second-off, pulse of the 00:00 digits runs at a fractionally 
different speed to its neighbour.  
 
 
Steven Scott, Edge of Motion, 2016. Close view of altered LED clock 
 
Both versions – video recordings or actual clocks – give rise to questions about the nature of 
what is being perceived in the concurrencies between two image cycles. Whilst references to recorded 
time and actual time may underpin each version what is of greater interest to me is the perception 
that the phasing of the clock digits is happening live as a result of the temporal / spatial separateness 
of each component and that this is an ongoing process.104 
The repetitions of the clocks’ digits present time as a measurable phenomenon whilst 
ensuring that a sense of separation remains between temporal units and numbers. An attempt to 
apprehend a linear flow of moments in time slips away as points that might otherwise succeed one 
another dissipate in the space between each clock. This absence of accumulated clock time frustrates 
the experience of succession and can result in a reflexive framing of awareness that reminds me of 
Lyotard’s impossibility of now:  
 
                                                 
104 Takahiko Iimura’s 1973 film Minutes and Seconds operates in a manner comparable with these aspects of Edge of 
Motion in that his piece presents time as both non-accumulative and diffused across space by using precise markers on 
16mm film divided into units of dark and light frames to evidence time flow without quantification. The piece consists 
of two film projectors and two film loops, one presenting alternations of dark and clear frames of a minute in length, 
the other presenting intervals of one second alternations between dark and clear frames. Both loops are two minutes 
long but present time as a subjective experience of alternating and interrelated markers in space. In both works dual 
temporalities dissipate chronological time into space as binary units that alternate in cycles of phasing. 
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The distinguishing limit between before and after, or the zone of contact between the anterior and the 
posterior, is itself affected by the before/after: the now is not now, it is not yet or already no longer, one 
cannot say now now: its already too early (before) or too late (after)…The now is precisely what is not 
maintained.105  
 
Bergson’s position on the matter of apprehending the present as that which has passed 
emphasises that such successions accumulate not as moments in pure time but as points attributable 
to space in that they will have already become simultaneous and therefore multiple. In his 
cinematographic model of time temporal units appear and then disappear as the pulse of the clock 
digits become layered in consciousness as indeterminable and ‘as one’ in space. ‘If we count them, the 
intervals must remain…how could these intervals remain, if they were pure duration and not space? It 
is in space, therefore, that the operation takes place’106 
The phasing of difference between the clocks’ binary pulses culminates in cycles of longer 
waveforms that coalesce and dissipate in patterns of synchronisation. The lesser the fraction of 
difference in the frequency of alternations between the on-off switching of the clock digits the longer 
the time it takes for them to slip out of and back into synchronisation, and so the greater the 
amplitude of these virtual waveforms. In both versions of Edge of Motion the dual elements are 
displayed adjacently so one perceives their pulsing as a pattern of simultaneities. These fluctuations of 
difference can be seen as twofold: firstly as a binary switching between the alternating conditions of 
on and off in each display, and secondly as a continual shift in degrees of difference in a perceived 
interrelationship of time and space that alters the synchronisation of the flashing digits. The point at 
which the synchronisation of these virtual waveforms will occur makes a call upon the viewer’s 
anticipation, and it is via this perceiving of the work as a projection of future probability that I propose 
that chance enters the equation in the form of possibility.107   
 
                                                 
105 Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Differend: Phrases in Dispute (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 74 
106 Bergson, Time and Free Will, 87  
107 It is acknowledged that the lesser the difference in time between the two separate elements of the work the greater 
the duration between points of synchronisation. Recently exhibited versions of this work have consisted of numerous 
LED clocks, designed to multiply the complexity of synchronisations and ensure that the points at which they come 
back into alignment may be as long as many days or even many weeks.  
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Steven Scott, Edge of Motion, 2016 
 
As outlined in this analysis of Edge of Motion so far I have determined that phasing manifests 
out of the apprehension of adjacent successions that flow at different frequencies. In reference to my 
classification of forms of phasing outlined previously I am primarily concerned with ‘fluctuating 
phasing’ as the perception of a phenomenon that emanates from the real time interactions of 
separate successions of images. This point is important as it focuses the research on the separateness 
of two event sequences perceived as live patterns that are born of chance, and it is from such 
conditions that I make the claim that the perception of possibility is engendered. I will propose that 
this notion of possibility – of a tacit awareness of an array of future states – operates as a projection of 
current circumstances and is inherent in the experience of live phasing. I will then consider the 
perception of the studio work in terms of the thresholds of what we are able to perceive and what we 
are led to imagine or assume. But before that I intend to examine image phasing in relation to the 
means by which it is presented and apprehended, and support this with reference to Bergsonian 
considerations of perception and time consciousness.  
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Bergson’s temporal plurality  
 
My focus on image phasing grew out of developments with studio works that became central 
in my thinking about the nature of doubling, repeating or mirroring. The work Edge of Motion in 
particular presents multiples of events designed to explore the experience of simultaneity and 
repetition and fluctuating difference between two time flows with subtly different resolutions.108 This 
work, presented in various forms, frames image repetitions in a cycling phase pattern of expanding 
and compressing difference which, I argue results from the perception of the exchange of alternations 
between different temporal flows and their positions in space. 
 From this point I can consider the means by which such image phasing is perceived with 
reference to Bergsonian, and subsequent Deleuzian, perspectives, and examine whether the 
experience of phasing accords with spatialised temporality and simultaneousness in space. From this I 
will address my initial point that phasing is a temporal and spatial exchange, manifesting as the 
perception of the alternation between flow and division, and determined as units of time that have 
concurrent dimension in space. Of this Bergson states that ‘…the connecting link between these two 
terms, space and duration, is simultaneity, which might be defined as the intersection of time and 
space.’109 In the case of the flashing digital clocks used in Edge of Motion units of time are indicated 
and mapped between two points in space as alternations between on and off. I can begin to 
determine that Bergson’s notions of duration and simultaneity afford clues as to the means by which 
one perceives such synchronisations as simultaneous stages of differing between the clocks in their 
alternating of awareness between succession and concurrency. With regard to his perceptual model 
of memory-image cycles and present perception Bergson writes,  
 
If…I retain the recollection of the previous oscillation with the image of the present oscillation, one of 
two things will happen. Either I shall set the two images side by side…or I shall perceive one in the 
other, each permeating the other and organising themselves like the notes of a tune, so as to form what 
we shall call a continuous or qualitative multiplicity with no resemblance to number. I shall thus get the 
image of pure duration; but I shall have entirely got rid of the idea of a homogeneous medium or a 
measurable quality.110 
 
 If we accept that image phasing is apprehended as a ‘continuous multiplicity’ then I suggest 
that we experience it in the first instance in terms of its overall undulating momentum rather than as 
                                                 
108 The use of LED clocks developed far in advance of my reading Bergson’s texts in which he uses the examples of 
two adjacent clocks to illuminate his ideas regarding the perception of spatialised time. Bergson, Duration and 
Simultaneity, 55  
109 Bergson, Time and Free Will, 110 
110 Ibid, 104 
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an arrangement of separate and quantifiable elements; a holistic system in which the clock’s doubled 
unitisation of time is dissipated in the slippage between their positions in space. This accords with 
Bergson’s model of temporal perception whereby we attend to the ‘attitude’ of a phenomenon rather 
that each individual point in time, until such time that we can discern a difference between these such 
that time divides into equivalent positions in space. I will also argue that the means by which we 
anticipate the interactions of the work’s future synchronisations takes a concurrent complementary 
form; as a perceived array of static positions in space that are drawn from the experience of observing 
visual phasing as a flowing systemic process.   
In Time and Free Will Bergson posits a temporal plurality that exists as both subjective and 
non-divisible time-consciousness in continuous duration, and, at the same time as successions of 
temporal events that unfold in conjunction with the objects and spaces of the external world. He 
writes, ‘There are, indeed…two possible conceptions of time, the one free from all alloy, the other 
surreptitiously bringing the idea of space.’111 He suggests that such dimensions function in 
concurrence, but take the form of subjective transitions from one state to another, revealing layers of 
internal consciousness by dividing it into the quantifiable phenomena of space. With this he describes 
a process of internal durational flow becoming spatialised or simultaneous with the world to equate to 
perception and actuality. By way of illustration Bergson examines simultaneity and succession in 
relation to the example of a musical phrase that might be reversed in memory so as to suggest 
succession, but argues that it is also simultaneous in that if the quality of any individual note is changed 
the musical phrase is altered as an entity. He suggests that whilst we can attend to the different 
elements of the experience we also determine that the flow of notes remains a cohesive whole. ‘We 
must perceive them as multiple, simultaneous and distinct; in a word we set them side by side, and we 
introduce an order in what is successive, the reason is that succession is converted into simultaneity 
and is projected into space.’112 With regard to the perception of spatialised time he states in Duration 
and Simultaneity that we do not experience time as separate events at a subjective level; for example, 
we cannot determine exactly when we began thinking or feeling something such as hunger or doubt, 
but instead we measure these flows in internal duration as events concurrent to the physical world.113 
Such events are sequences of divisible moments brought about in their simultaneity with external 
objects that might include clocks, the position of the sun or the coincidental coming together of 
phenomena that become significant in the form of synchronisation. Bergson suggests that 
                                                 
111 Ibid, 100 
112 Ibid, 101 
113 ‘It is the simultaneity between two instants of two motions outside of us that enables us to measure time; but it is the 
simultaneity of these moments with moments pricked by them along our inner duration that makes the measurement 
one of time.’ Bergson, Duration and Simultaneity, 54 
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consciousness is constituted in time but cannot divide time and locate specific points; instead it subtly 
blurs over and within space to arise in awareness as a point in time that has been consolidated or 
spatialised in its concurrency as an event in space.  
In writing about the means by which we witness time in the world Bergson suggests that we 
must process it as simultaneous space, and thus determine it in the form of measurable change. In 
Time and Free Will he uses examples of an analogue clock and a pendulum to describe his proposed 
relationship between internal time flow – pure-duration – and the perception of spatialised events 
that constitute the external world in its conjunctions with consciousness. ‘When I follow my eyes on 
the dial of a clock the movement of the hand which corresponds to the oscillations of the pendulum, I 
do not measure duration…I merely count simultaneities, which is very different.’114 In this example he 
illustrates his theory of what he calls the memory-image as it fuses immediate past in oscillations that 
are the perception of the present. ‘Outside of me, in space, there is never more than a single position 
of the hand and the pendulum, for nothing is left of the past positions. Within myself a process of 
organisation or interpretation of conscious states is going on, which constitutes true duration. It is 
because I endure this way that I picture to myself what I call the past oscillations of the pendulum at 
the same time that I perceive the present oscillation’115 It is this doubled awareness, of the present and 
its immediate and persisting past, that I will consider in relation to phasing as a process that also 
projects awareness, as expectation, towards possible future configurations.   
Bergson first presented his theory of time perception in Matter and Memory, describing what 
amounts to a temporal/spatial matrix within which the body is a site of exchange between a cycle of 
images of the persisting past that form experience of the present. He describes perception not as ‘a 
mere contact of the mind with the object present’ but states that such objects/images are 
‘impregnated with memory-images which complete it as they interpret it.’116 The memory-image, he 
suggests, is not a memory of something that has materially passed and is being recalled, but a 
constant phenomenon that is taking place in the present as the persistence of the immediate past 
flowing in consciousness and forming the present as perception. In this model the memory-image 
might be deemed to have an internal, temporal function that feeds perception as a process of 
interpretative flow, continually ‘oscillating’ in the present with its persisting past.  
By contrast pure-memory, for Bergson, is that aspect of memory that is of the past; remaining 
available but no longer actual or present in consciousness. He writes that the memory-image ‘partakes 
of the “pure-memory” which it begins to materialise and of the perception in which it tends to 
                                                 
114 Bergson, Time and Free Will, 107-108 
115 Ibid, 108 
116 Bergson, Matter and Memory, 170 
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embody itself…it might be defined as nascent perception.’117 For Bergson perception is the point of 
interaction with the world of objects in space as the cycling function of memory-images against a 
ground of pure-memory. In attempting to outline Bergson’s ideas of perception and temporal flow I 
am exploring a means of examining the experience of visual phasing as perceptive processes rooted in 
slippage of simultaneities. With regard to this I highlight Bergson’s suggestion that we cannot identify 
divisions between pure-memory, memory-images and perception as they constitute the flow of 
consciousness itself, both its engaging with, and its completing of the world. This flow of 
consciousness will continue to oscillate even as the objective consciousness that is required in any 
attempt to make such divisions disappears back into perception, or to return to Bergson’s point ‘… 
each permeating the other…so as to form what we shall call a continuous or qualitative multiplicity 
with no resemblance to number.’118 
The iterations of clock digits in Edge of Motion might demark units of time but these temporal 
indicators are difficult to assimilate consistently as one’s attention to difference is shifting between 
the clocks’ repetitions and their positions. The numbers synchronise and alternate in a fluctuating 
pattern between the space of the displays and accumulate unevenly in memory as degrees of 
synchronisation, so that any points of future realignment lie beyond the scope of accurate 
predictability. Instead the work may become imbued with a sense of instability as one’s awareness 
remains subject to the clock’s shifting alternations between time and space that both remain visually 
separate and at the same time fuse into the overall experience of phasing as a phenomenon in 
consciousness. We see both the clocks and their interactions at once, enabled by their proximity in the 
form of the installed work. In reference to theories of relativity and perception Bergson makes the 
point regarding the adjacency of two temporal flows upon simultaneity by asking ‘How can we 
prevent our imagination, and even our understanding, from treating the simultaneity of reading of 
two very widely separated clocks like the simultaneity of two clocks slightly separated, that is situated 
‘at the same place’? 119 He suggests that we might measure time by two or more flows in spaces of 
greater and lesser proximity and therefore as different types of time line as long as they are in some 
way conflated by the consciousness of the viewer.  
The proposed layering of awareness from conflations of time in space allows for comparisons 
between Bergson’s point that ‘…the attention here again being able to make one or two out of them 
at will’120 and the model of spectatorial doubleness described by Kate Mondloch. To revisit her 
                                                 
117 Ibid, 170 
118 Bergson, Time and Free Will, 104 
119 ‘More Einsteinian than Einstein’ Bergson suggests that imagination is a factor that has some bearing upon 
perception and relativity. Bergson, Duration and Simultaneity, 55 
120 Ibid, 51 
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proposed divergence of form and content in a viewer’s engagement with moving image installations 
one can also recognise correlations between dual images and the experience of image phasing.  When 
witnessing the studio work Edge of Motion a viewer might not only see simultaneities between its 
alternating binaries, but recognise implied future configurations. Thus in the absence of further visual 
information a reflexive awareness of that which is yet to happen ultimately becomes the subject of 
the work. 
 
Perception and prediction  
If the experience of image phasing can be said to accord with notions of a doubling of 
consciousness this condition might derive from a perception of the misalignment of successive images 
over time and the subsequent dividing of durational flow to fuse in concurrent space. Such perception 
would accumulate images as simultaneities between two or more positions rather than discharging 
them over two, or more, separate time flows. Bergson’s proposition of memory-image as the situated 
perception of temporality and the complement to the space in which it is experienced might therefore 
enable us to compare the operations of phasing to that of the layering of misalignments that form 
interference patterns, doubling and intermittently corresponding to the oscillation of memory image. 
As a thought exercise responding to Bergson’s model of memory-images and perception in the 
present I considered whether the perceived cycles of phasing clocks might contain a reflexive 
awareness of time playing out in space, in which the maintaining of an immediate past as cycles of 
present consciousness remains neither fully temporal in their repeating binaries, or totally present and 
resolved in the space in which they are apprehended. It is as if the immediate past repeats and returns 
from a shifting position so as to alter its alignment with the present and appear in an ongoing 
condition of becoming something other than what it appears to be. A dual layering of awareness 
might be said to form in this fluctuating state that is the immediate and persisting past dissolving at 
the point of actuality in the form of simultaneity giving way to possibility. My intention is to examine 
how we apprehend image phasing as that from which we might project assumptions about future 
configurations of synchronicity. In short, how might the dynamic process that is phasing allude to its 
own future concurrencies?   
Bergson claims that time experienced in the world is measurable in its relationship to how we 
experience space in that we are able to count such externalised time as a succession of separated 
units.121 It is this state of divisibility and unitisation that differentiates external time from his proposed 
pure internal duration. The experience of time in terms of its separateness makes it possible to 
                                                 
121 ‘Inner duration exteriorises itself as spatialised time and…space rather than time, is measurable. It is henceforth 
through the intermediary of space that we shall measure every interval of time.’ Bergson, Duration and Simultaneity, 
57  
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consider the doubled awareness that fuses these in the experience of place as an event, or to put it 
another way, an event being a moment that ‘takes place’ at a point in space that is locatable. In 
utilising a form of Bergson’s idea of internal and external time – of lived, ‘pure’ duration and time 
divided into space – I can reflect upon the process of perceiving visual phasing in the studio work. And 
in the process of examining this I am able to extend such thoughts to incorporate the points that 
Deleuze makes in this regard, acknowledging the commonalities between his ideas on time 
consciousness and that of Bergson. 
As part of this interrogation of the process by which image phasing is perceived I want to 
acknowledge aspects of Gilles Deleuze’s thinking that resonate with the influence of Bergson’s 
writings on time, memory and duration. In Bergsonism Deleuze addresses Bergson’s reliance upon the 
memory as synonymous with duration and therefore as virtual, stating that ‘Duration is essentially 
memory, consciousness and freedom.’122 And it is in relation to Deleuze’s notion of the actual and the 
virtual that one might find correlations with Bergson’s hypothesis of a process whereby the present is 
perceived out of the dynamic oscillation with memory-images of the immediate past.123 This process 
being the determining of perception of the present and what divides to become pure memory. For 
Bergson, that which remains present in conscious perception relates to the world in its actuality and all 
else passes to the virtual in its coexisting with the present as durational flow. As Deleuze emphasises, 
‘It is clear that memory is identical to duration, that it is coextensive with duration…this proposition is 
valid in principal.’124 Pure memory correlates to the virtual as that which is not present in 
consciousness, but such memory remains available and so capable of effecting actuality.125  
In considering the actual and the virtual questions arise for me as to the awareness of 
potential. If the virtual is that which is not present but available to affect consciousness might this 
apply, not just to memory, but to forms of awareness that rely upon assumption? In short, does 
                                                 
122 Deleuze, Bergsonism, 51 
123 In defining the term virtual and actual I refer to Bergson’s model of temporal perception whereby that which is 
present in conscious perception can be said to be actual and that which is no longer, such as pure memory, is virtual. 
The virtual might be that which is available to consciousness but not present in the world and would therefore also 
include imagination in the form of awareness of future possibilities. Deleuze describes the crystal image as a fusion 
within the cinematic of the actual and the virtual; as a conflation of the present and that which is remembered or 
imagined. He suggests that the purest form of the crystal image is that in which ‘The actual optical image crystallizes 
with its own virtual image.’ Deleuze, Cinema 2: the Time Image, 67 
124 Deleuze, Bergsonism, 52 
125 Deleuze states that ‘The appeal to recollection is this jump by which I place myself in the virtual, in the past, in a 
particular region of the past…once we have put ourselves on a particular level where recollections lie, then, and only 
then, do they tend to be actualised.’ Ibid, 63 
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expectation of an outcome correlate with the virtual in a manner comparable to that of memory? 
Deleuze is clear on this, stating: 
 
The subjective or duration, is the virtual. To be more precise, it is the virtual insofar as it is actualised, in 
the course of being actualised, it is inseparable from the movement of its actualisation. For actualisation 
comes through differentiation, through divergent lines, and creates so many differences in kind by 
virtue of its own movement.126 
 
Accordingly the virtual can include the projections of imagination that one might devise out of 
present circumstance towards that which can be expected – ‘in the course of being actualised’ – 
towards possibility. This awareness of possibility is awareness that is coextensive and so 
contemporaneous with the actual.  
In considering the spatial, external world one might determine the process by which phasing 
is apprehended in Bergsonian terms, as the interplay of perceptual processes that in their dual form 
are perceived as spatialised at differing points in time, and that phasing is in this case the 
simultaneousness and alternation between change in one and location in the other. I suggest 
therefore that phasing reveals a state of in-between-ness in which Bergsonian pure-duration is split via 
dual points in space and mirrored in the slipping synchronisations that hinges between external 
succession and the flow of temporal perception. My interest lies in the means by which Bergson, and 
Deleuze in his interpretations of Bergson, considered time perception as a method for reflecting upon 
the experience by which phasing is apprehended. The repeated misalignments of temporal units 
described by the binary switches of the repeated LED clock images might initially be seen to unsettle 
the means by which we determine time as succession in memory, in that our focus upon the one and 
then the other in this cycle is continually shifting from time to space. We may witness the doubled 
succession of images whilst our attention is drawn to a switching that is taking place, not just between 
two consecutive flows in time, but also between two contiguous positions in adjacent space; unitising  
and thus spatialising duration whilst seemingly maintaining it in a meta-flow of cycling 
synchronisations. And it is out of this interchange of misalignments that this meta-pattern can begin to 
impose itself upon our awareness as cycles that, once witnessed, are assumed to return in future 
configurations. This, I argue, is how image phasing as an alternation between space and in time begins 
to extend or double our awareness between the perception of that which is happening now and that 




                                                 
126 Ibid, 42, 43    
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Phasing as a vector of exchange  
 
A vector is a contradictory creature. In physics, a vector is the result of multiplying forces together; in 
digital graphics, it describes software that draws a continuous line…in both cases, the vector describes 
movement.127 
 
If phasing is apprehended as fluctuating difference between spatialised points in time, and might 
thus accord with Bergson’s ideas of time and memory-image, I want to consider the phenomenon as 
an experience of a dual-dimensional movement in which the minimum difference perceivable between 
points in time and points in space can result in a phenomenon of self-cancelling movement/stasis. For 
the purpose of considering phasing from a schematic viewpoint I use the term ‘vector of exchange’.   
Sean Cubitt describes notional forms of drawing as a means by which time and the process of 
the representation of events intersect as vectors. In The Practice of Light he explores ideas of the 
vector in terms of rendering visible the video image out of mathematical codecs and considers the act 
of drawing on an historical continuum that is also a description of the development of a series of 
otherwise disparate technologies.128   
If a vector is commonly defined in terms of a multiplication or intersection of forces or flows 
of information, and for mathematical purposes is described in terms of its extension and direction, 
then I suggest phasing, as a phenomenon reduced to the perceived interactions of adjacent events at 
different frequencies, might also be described by a vector of operations in accordance with its 
temporal and spatial parameters.129 I have been considering how the perception of the phasing of 
visual phenomena might be addressed as the apprehension of a system of differences and whether a 
focus on the minimum units of two iterations in time and in two positions in space might be 
considered in a constant state of multiplying in time and dividing between space, to achieve the 
perception of movement and stasis in concurrency, and whether this can be considered in terms of  a 
three dimensional ‘mathematical’ exchange of co-ordinates between space-space, time-time to space-
time, time-space. The possibility is that time frequency and number of positions in space conflated into 
                                                 
127 Sean Cubitt, The Practice of Light (Cambridge: MIT Press 2014), 258 
128 ‘A vector becomes in time. And its becoming asserts the continuum of time. The gesture of the drawing arm, 
whether that of Durer or of Verostko’s plotter printer; a rhythm, whether that of Hogarth’s line of beauty or of Susan 
Collin’s phenomenology of duration: the engagement of the body in perception and the principal of the autonomy of 
the line of the mutual production of space as relational: all are examples of the vector’s principal of continuous and 
open-ended movement‘ Ibid 260 
129 Definitions of a vector include, ‘A variable quantity, such as force, that has magnitude and direction, and can be 
resolved into components that are odd functions of the co ordinates’ and ‘Any behavioural influence, force or drive.’ 
Collins English Dictionary (London: HarperCollins, 1992)  
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the form of a vector might reveal patterns that describe phasing in terms of layered and staggered 
temporalities.130   
Edmund Husserl’s writings on phenomenology suggest that we do not so much synthesise 
the multilayered events that constitute our experience of the world into a single flow between 
protention and memory but that we instead operate a form of staggered simultaneity in which the 
elements of an experience, be it seeing or hearing, remain separately available to us in hindsight.131 
With regard to this I want to consider the possibility that the experience of multiplicities of movement 
in space, such as the phasing in Edge of Motion, is constituted in consciousness as simultaneous. This in 
turn offers the possibility that degrees of difference may, in the case of phasing, be a layering of 
memory in the present and expectation of the immediate future. Whilst simultaneity might suggest 
possible future concurrencies it is actually in delay that past, present and future are witnessed, in such 
a subjective accumulation of the concurrency of events. 
Bergson’s notion of a dual consciousness in which an ‘internal’ pure-time can become 
spatialised as consciousness in the form of simultaneity with the world, has echoes in the mirrored and 
doubled temporalities of Deleuze’s crystal image.132 Deleuze described what can be deemed a model 
of dual consciousness in terms of its fusion of the actual and virtual, in which successive moments in 
the present become conflated with memory or extended out of the cycle of Bergsonian pure 
perception to reflect events concurrent with memory and subjectivity.  
 
The actual image and its virtual image thus constitute the smallest internal circuit, ultimately a peak or a 
point, but a physical point which has distinct elements…Distinct, but indiscernible, such are the actual 
and virtual which are in continual exchange.133   
 
In exploring Bergsonian or Deleuzian models of layered consciousness and time perception I 
am looking for equivalences with the expanding and compressing undulations of image 
                                                 
130 Jay Lampert conducts a close analysis of time consciousness from Bergsonian and Deleuzian perspectives and 
considers whether that which constitutes the perception of concurrence may not be as continuous in essence as it may 
seem, but staggered between events and reactions: ‘In its simplest form simultaneity consists of two or more events at 
one time, and delay consists of one event at two or more times.’ Lampert, Simultaneity and Delay, 227 
131 Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, 44-49 
132 Deleuze describes the crystal image as that which cannot be reduced or separated into constituent parts as it exists at 
a theoretical point at which the virtual becomes akin to the actual and the actual virtual. The crystal image might be 
determined as that which consists of enfolded dimensions, ‘Of two mirrors face to face.’ Deleuze, Cinema 2: the Time 
Image, 68. Such a description accords with Bergson’s simultaneity as spatialised multiplicity. In such a configuration 
the present and its contemporaneous past complement each other as an image in which time and space alternate in 
reversible difference; as concurrent temporalities in a process of becoming spatialised.  
133 Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time Image, 68  
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synchronisations that characterise the experience of phasing rhythms.  As a means of comparison the 
notion of a vector is presented as a schematic means of identifying and articulating possible 
equivalences. 
 Sean Cubitt writes of the vector in terms of the temporal characteristics that extend from its 
diagrammatical remit, and it is from such schematic forms of representation that the phasing 
movements of Edge of Motion might be visualised as the mapping over time of the multiplication of 
the forces from which it is constituted.134 It follows that by extrapolating from such a diagram of 
temporal-spatial relationships it might also be possible to anticipate the potential conditions of the 
work as a map of projected future states. The resultant vector would function as an abstraction of 
temporal experience of a Deleuzian actual and the virtual, manifest in this case as the shape of the 
alternating binaries of two digital clocks. The undulating patterns of two timelines ‘drawn’ over time 
and space by the alternating clock displays would weave diagrammatical waveforms into a vector of 
exchange, not as an image of a succession of moments but as a layered diagram of actuality and 
possibility, projected from a Bergsonian cycle of memory and perception towards the virtual of 
expectation. Cubitt asserts that ‘the vector belongs to this transition from actual to virtual. It emerges 
from the past, from the situation, from the multiple forces operating on it at a moment in time and 
space, unleashing the potentials hidden in the moment.’135 This perception of phasing as an inter-
dimensional layering might be accompanied by a schematic mapping of possibility as an adjunct to the 
work: a vector that describes its own future, the work’s spatial-temporal possibilities being the virtual 
extended from the actual. This notional meta-position is an indication that phasing alludes to a 
temporal, spatial transition that spans our perception of the actual and makes a call to the virtual 
realm of the imagination as expectation. And it is this span of the thresholds of the actual and the 
virtual that I will return to in Chapter 6 in a comparison with Duchamp’s notion of Infrathin: as 










                                                 
134 ‘A vector becomes in time. And its becoming asserts the continuum of time…’ Sean Cubitt, The Practice of Light 
(MIT Press, 2014), 258  
135 Ibid 260 
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Chapter 4:  
Phasing as alternation and delay 
In this chapter I consider image phasing in terms of duration and alternation. Particular studio works are 
examined in relation to spatialisation and duration and the writing of Bergson and Deleuze. Selected 
contemporary artists’ works are used to reflect upon ideas of delay and repetition. 
 
An Extension of Circumstance 
 
The mind’s eye too has its blind spot, but, because it is of the mind, cannot be unaware of it, nor treat as 
a simple state of non-vision, which requires no particular mention, the very act of reflection which is 
quoad nos its act of birth.136 
 
The studio works that form the basis of this thesis function as a means of identifying and 
thinking through ideas that began from interrogations of perception, visuality and proposed 
relationships between the temporal and the spatial in the form of image phasing. In turn this thinking 
has generated not only methods of repetition and image concurrency, but also notions of difference 
between the physiological and the psychological, cognition and assumption and the perception of 
dual image configurations. I will examine here a composite work that utilises notions of difference 
between two elements, whilst considering the wider implications of such perceptual thresholds.  
Addressing perceptions of visual and conceptual interactions between two specific images 
was my intention in developing the work entitled Occlusion.137 The two images that initiated my 
thinking behind this work are visual illusions that consist of circles and grid-like forms. One, is 
commonly known as a ‘scintillating grid’ of black squares and white circles against a grey background, 
the other is the image of a cross and a dot that can be used to reveal the presence of the ‘blind spot’ 
on the retina.138 They form the basis of a series of works that utilise components that extend or 
subvert what I propose is both a corporeal and a conceptual relationship between each.   
 
                                                 
136 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968), 33 
137 Occlusion has numerous definitions relating to obstruction. In Psychology, specifically depth perception, it refers to 
an object that is partially hidden by another, and in memory research it is used to describe the phenomena of associated 
memories obstructing access to the target memory, in short, the distracting effect of one subject by another.  
138 In bringing these two images together I was conscious of the point Duchamp famously made about ‘the retinal’ 
qualities of art that appeals only to the visual senses. These two images convey an illusionary experience that is purely 
of the retina, but when considered in unison offer dialogical possibilities that may appeal to the imagination and to 
notions of visibility, presence and image interpretation.  
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Occlusion (2016) began with these two illusions presented in a perceived alternation of 
appearance and disappearance. The scintillating grid offers the illusion of scattering black dots across 
the image, seemingly appearing briefly in the white circles of its surface.139 When placed next to the 
image of the black cross and dot these illusionary dots may be seen as being counteracted by the 
temporary invisibility of the single black dot of the blind spot test image.  
It might not be stretching one’s comparative abilities too far to consider whether such a 
phenomenological experience, between illusion and imagination, is also comparable with the notion 
of spectatorial doubleness. In both images one is afforded a glimpse of the physicality of one’s visual 
processes whilst inhabiting a meta-position of the awareness of an ‘exchange’ of appearing and 
disappearing dots that are designed to alternate between both images.140 Thus a concurrent 
awareness may be engendered between what the viewer sees and what they actually know to exist. 
In making these two images the focus of Occlusion I was also exploring how one might address 
something of the elusiveness of temporality between points in space in that my initial intention with 




                                                 
139 This is caused by interference between the retinas’ light sensitive cells and the edges of contrasting images in what 
is thought to be an example of lateral inhibition; a neurobiological phenomenon resulting from a process in the retina’s 
photoreceptor cells that aid the brain’s perception of high contrast images by inhibiting the activity of photosensitive 
cells adjacent to those that are stimulated by intense light. In some ways this is the inverse of the blind spot test that 
reveals the part of the retina where there are fewer photoreceptor cells.  
140 As introduced in chapter 1. Mondloch, Screens, 62 
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Occlusion: the grid 
To examine the operations and implications of Occlusion I will focus on a version of the work 
exhibited in November 2016 in a solo exhibition at the Delta House Gallery in London titled An 
Extension of Circumstance. 
This exhibition consisted of a total of four works interrelated by common features of dual 
forms that were intended to appeal to the presence of the viewer and operate at the thresholds of 
temporal perception. Each work was installed in a counterbalance of movement and stasis to 
foreground the perception of repetition, temporal resolution and visual phasing. The pieces presented 
were; Signs, a digital photographic print; Edge of Motion, consisting of 6 wall-mounted digital clocks, 
dual Perspex panels entitled The Appearance of a Statement; and An Extension of Circumstance. 
Occlusion #3 which consisted of the core components of the scintillating grid and blind spot test, in 










Steven Scott, The Appearance of a Statement, 2016. Two sheets of laser-cut Perspex 
 
In this manifestation of Occlusion the scintillating grid was presented on two HD flat-screen TV 
monitors lying face-up on the floor. Each screen displayed the same image moving imperceptibly 
slowly across each screen in opposite directions. This invisible movement of the grid is calculated to 
match that of the real-time movement of the sun, a recording of which appears in another component 
of this work as a video projection. Over time the positions of the grid images move out of alignment as 
each HD screen is laid together across their top edges so that the images are ‘mirrored’. The image on 
each screen appears to be static but for the retinal illusion of the scattering of black dots that seem to 







Steven Scott, Occlusion #3, 2016. Scintillating grid displayed on adjacent monitors. 
 
I intended that this dual screen durational presentation of the grid offered a paradoxical 
interplay between seeing and not seeing. The appearance of black dots is an illusion of movement 
borne out of the combination of a neural process and the physicality of the eye, whilst what appears 
to be an otherwise static image is in fact very slowly traversing the screen in a movement that is 
beyond direct perception and can only be determined in the relative alignments of one image to its 
double over an extended period of time.  
The scintillating grid is itself key as an intersection between stasis and random movement that 
is activated by the viewer’s gaze. It is this experience of illusionary and invisible movements that gives 
Rosalind Krauss’s point that  ‘a grid…is what art looks like when it turns away from nature’,  a 
particular pertinence and imbues this optically-activated image with an uneasy theatricality.141    
 
                                                 




Steven Scott, Occlusion #3, 2016. Detail of scintillating grid on adjacent monitors.  
 
Occlusion: the blind spot 
Operating in a bilateral relationship with the scintillating grid is the sight test that is designed 
to reveal the blind spot, or ‘scotoma’, in the retina where the optic nerve meets the back of the eye.142 
This simple test can be made up of any two shapes or images presented laterally adjacent, but 
commonly consists of a black dot and a cross printed side by side onto a white surface. The image of 
the black dot will seem to ‘disappear’ as the viewer stares at the cross and moves their viewpoint in 
relation to the two images in such a way that their retina’s ‘blind spot’ coincides with the position of 
the dot. This means of revealing the scotoma was utilised in this work as it offers an illusion of 
disappearance borne of two image shapes in relation to the dual operation of the eyes and so offered 
an example of a simple dual image interaction in itself.  
In presenting the scintillating grid and the blind spot test in an oblique manner in this 
exhibition I intended that a relationship between knowing the intended function of these images and 
witnessing their effect accords with the relationship between intention and experience.143 As a means 
of examining such distance between knowing and experiencing (as Duchamp described it ‘between 
intention and realisation’) within this work I explored different means of presenting the cross and dot 
that undermined its experiential function as a sight test, presenting it instead as an appeal to a 
viewer’s understanding that this image configuration addresses vision and illusion. In the exhibited 
                                                 
142 There are no light sensitive cells in a small patch of the retina at the point at which the optic nerve passes out of the 
eye. This results in a blind spot in each eye that we remain largely unaware of as each is compensated for by the dual 
operations of the eyes and the interpretive processes of the brain.  
143 This is at the heart of Duchamp’s notion of the art coefficient, a term he used to describe the difference between an 
artist’s intention in making a piece of work and the audience’s experience of that work.  
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manifestation of this work the cross and dot shapes took the form of laser cut holes in a sheet of 
Perspex cut to the exact dimensions of the HDTV screens that present the scintillating grid. This sheet 
was placed against a rectangle of chromakey blue photo backdrop material cut to the same 16:9 
proportions. Together the transparent Perspex with its holes and the particular blue backdrop – a 
colour designed to be substituted by an image and therefore a colour intended to disappear as if it 
were a proxy for an image – coincide to make further oblique references to notions of vision and 
blindness, appearance and disappearance, presence and representation.   
 
 
Steven Scott, Occlusion #3, 2016. Laser-cut Perspex blind spot test, Chromakey backdrop 
 
 




Steven Scott, Occlusion #3, 2016. Video frame depicting trace left by the trajectory of the sun 
 
Occlusion: in/di/visible time 
The third component of Occlusion is intended to function as a subtle temporal framing device, 
and takes the form of a projection of a low-resolution video recording of the sun moving in real-time 
across the sky. The video used is one of a series of such works that began as an attempt to make a 
recording of ‘pure’ time which contained as few pictorial indicators of movement and space as 
possible. The intention was to produce an image of something whilst offering minimal information 
about its subject, so that the image becomes its own subject. The resultant video was seemingly static 
as its depiction of emptiness existed outside of a perceivable representation of time flow.  
In accordance with the extended movement of the scintillating grids on the video monitors 
the temporal resolution of the subject is beyond direct perception and requires the viewer to return to 
the image to determine change. An obsolete monochrome 1970s video tube camera was used for 
these recordings, on which the direct light of the sun leaves a permanent black trace on the vidicon 
camera tube as it moves imperceptibly slowly across the frame. This component of the work does not 
form part of the perceived alternations of appearance and disappearance that can accumulate 
between the grid and the sight test illusions. Instead it is intended to set this exchange against an 
extended temporal context that operates as a ground against which the dual image illusions may be 
seen to take effect. The progress of the sun ‘burning’ a line across the screen is so subtle that the 
projection might at first be assumed to be an indeterminate static image. The lack of spatial 
information in the video image, recording nothing but the sun against a clear sky in static 
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monochrome, ensures that all the usual indicators of image-space and the flow of time are reduced to 
imperceptibility and a viewer might struggle to determine the nature of what is being depicted. 
 
seen – unseen 
These three components that constitute Occlusion have been developed and presented 
previously in various forms, including the projecting or screening of the video recording adjacent to 
the sight test and the scintillating grid as either suspended digital prints, a large-format slide 
projection, theatrical gobo lights, shadows and reflections, printed text and light boxes. The 
components are altered in each case to layer the visual experience of the work with a conscious 
interaction and awareness of the visible and invisible, the representation of time and actual time. 
The notional gap between the intention of the artist and the degree to which this is perceived 
by an audience is something I have attempted to make more discernible in the variations of Occlusion. 
Maintained within all versions of this work is the potential to recognise a relationship between the 
scintillating grid and the sight test. This relationship may begin with the viewer’s awareness that the 
illusionary appearance of black dots within the rigid forms of the grid is complemented by the 
potential ‘disappearance’ of the circular dot of the sight-test as it reveals the retina’s blind spot. But 
this relationship may be presented in a visible form or simply alluded to as possibility in less material 
versions of Occlusion.  
Marcel Duchamp famously rejected making art that appealed only to the visual sense, or as he 
put it ‘the retinal’, in favour of an art of ideas. The images of the scintillating grid and the blind spot 
test used here convey an illusionary experience that is initially of the retina, but when taken in 
conjunction offer wider possibilities that may multiply in the imagination as allusions to visibility, 
presence and interpretation. Duchamp was referring to visual art that offers pleasure and satisfaction 
in the means by which it depicts a subject whilst conforming to preconceptions of that subject and the 
medium in which it is rendered, whereas the scintillating grid and the blind spot test are not images of 
something in any representational sense; they do not attempt to direct consciousness towards a 
remote subject via pictorial means but instead reveal something of the nature of vision, and might be 
said to refer to the condition of seeing in the process of being looked at.  
Any perceivable difference between the presence of the observer and their experience of 
seeing either of these two images is liminal, at least until the observer recognises an interrelationship 
between the images. The interstitial space into which awareness of the process of seeing might begin 
to take place is extended with the self-referential interplay of appearance and disappearance in the 
viewer’s experience and their awareness of that experience.  
Rosalind Krauss refers to a doubling of awareness in the context of display devices when she 
writes of ‘…an experience that not only conjures up the effects of a given illusion but also reveals the 
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means of this illusion’s production…the spectator will occupy two places simultaneously. One is the 
imaginary identification or closure with the illusion…The second position is a connection to the optical 
machine in question, an insistent reminder of its presence, of its mechanism…’144 I suggest that the 
dual images in question, the grid and the blind spot test, operate as such a ‘mechanism’, as a means of 
display that draws attentions to form so as to remain present in the process of apprehension.  
Fundamental to this work in whatever form it is presented is the spatial arrangement of the 
two core components, one of illusionary appearance in an alternating dialogue with the other of 
illusionary disappearance. A relationship between visual legibility and referential appearance is 
intended to engender an alternation of awareness that accumulates between the foregrounded 
components against the imperceptible movement of a third. A viewer is encouraged to identify 
resonances in the form of an intersection of visual experience, form and reference, and an active 
montaging of fields of legible and inferred associations. As with the illusionary characteristics of the 
scintillating grid and the blind spot test these are intended to impact upon the viewer first physically, 
via the mechanisms of the eye, and then conceptually as binary possibilities that exist between left 
and right, forward and back, visible and invisible. In both cases an alternation of degrees of possibility 
are set up as each state exists concurrently as an inverse of the other.  
The iterations of Occlusion rely upon these components being presented spatially in 
arrangements in which two illusions are foregrounded against the liminal temporality of the recording 
of the sun. As such they may be experienced as unified in references to visibility, liminal perception 
and temporality between the physicality of the visual process and the subjectivity of the individual 
viewer. This staged relationship between invisible temporal flows and visible illusions of movement 
address perceptual thresholds of what can be seen and known empirically and what must be assumed 
or rejected as false. A cyclical interrelationship exists in this reappearance/disappearance of the real 
and the illusionary in an ebb and flow of tautological interactions and iterations between the objects, 










                                                 












Steven Scott, An Extension of Circumstance #4, Dyson Gallery, London 2017 
 
 
Phasing as divisible duration and spatialised time 
In considering the means by which we might engage with Occlusion’s visual illusions and 
invisible movement I refer again to Bergson’s ideas on perception and time. In Duration and 
Simultaneity Bergson outlines his theory of the difference between pure duration as a state of internal 
flow of consciousness which does not divide in response to the external world. Instead he argues that 
our perception of the external world is formed of engagement with space and objects which we 
apprehend in the form of a successive flow of memory images.145 As discussed in the previous chapter, 
Bergson’s ideas of time and perception are heterogeneous in nature, describing the perception of 
time in the physical world as separated and unitised, as intersections in space that are apprehended as 
events. This spatialising of time, he suggests, co-exists with an inner consciousness of what he termed 
duration or ‘pure’ time that is independent of the world and unassociated with the physical world of 
objects and actions in space. ‘We call two external flows that occupy the same duration ‘simultaneous’ 
                                                 
145 ‘If time, as the reflective consciousness represents it, is a medium in which our conscious states form a discrete 
series so as to admit of being counted, and if on the other hand our completion of number ends in spreading out in 
space everything which can be directly counted, it is to be presumed that time, understood in the sense of a medium in 
which we make distinctions and count, is nothing more than space.’ Bergson, Time and Free Will, 91 
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because they both depend upon the duration of a like third, our own; this duration is ours only when 
our consciousness is concerned with us alone, but it becomes equally theirs when our attention 
embraces the three flows in a single indivisible act.’146   
If the temporalities that form Occlusion – of the recording of the sun’s movement and the 
subtle shifting of the grid images – are so slow as to reside below the threshold of direct perception, 
then questions of accordance might arise in response as to the nature of time and duration as a 
phenomenon of the work. As a thought exercise in comprehending Bergson’s model of a state of 
inner consciousness that flows without reference to the external world this might be compared to the 
conditions in which recorded time remains outside perceptual awareness, only to be revealed out of a 
process of comparing relative positions in space of the recorded subject over extended periods of 
time. As a model for considering the relationships between states of conscious and awareness that 
arrive through such a process of comparisons between spatial positions, Bergson’s theory of such 
layered states of consciousness might also offer a framework for outlining the operations of Occlusion.  
In Time and Free Will Bergson asserts that ‘pure duration is the form which the succession of 
our conscious state assumes when…it refrains from separating its present state from its former 
state.’147 I have compared the perception of simultaneity and the spatialising of time to the experience 
of phasing as it layers units of time, demarked by binary images, between positions in space. I am now 
attempting to reflect upon some of the means by which Bergson’s writings might afford clues to the 
process by which one perceives the interactions of Occlusion. If, as suggested, this work encourages 
multiple readings of the illusionary and sub-visible effects of its components then I suggest the means 
by which this work might be navigated requires that its durational content remain indivisible by 
immediate physical means. In this case one may not be able to see progress taking place in the video 
recordings used in Occlusion in the form of succession, but instead one must return to the work after a 
period of time (itself a means of spatialising time, in this case through the movement of the viewer), 
having memorised its position to obtain evidence of its change in space and so prove its function as a 
moving image. I am reminded, in the light of the extended durations inherent in Occlusion, of 
Bergson’s point that ‘Without an elementary memory that connects (the) two moments, there will be 
only one or the other, consequently a single instance, no before or after, no succession, no time.’148 
And that in the first instance I proposed to make Occlusion from components that have minimal 
temporal or spatial indicators as a method of presenting stillness and timelessness within a recording 
of real time. It is such a stillness that I was aiming to achieve by using a subject that was framed so as 
to move both indivisibly and invisibly in tandem with the experience of movement as an illusion.   
                                                 
146 Bergson, Duration and Simultaneity, 52 
147 Bergson, Time and Free Will, 100 
148 Bergson, Duration and Simultaneity, 48 
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Without the ability to discern difference from one moment to the next as is the case with the 
videos in Occlusion, do we see a static image? Paradoxically, one that we might come to ‘know’ is of 
movement? And in such a case do we not so much experience time flow but, instead find our 
awareness dividing between the absence of visible succession and our knowledge of its condition of 
hidden temporality? In other words do we ultimately find in the apprehension of this work another 
variation on the doubling or layering of consciousness considered in Chapter 1 in relation to 
Mondloch’s spectatorial doubleness? If, as I argue, one’s attention is shifted/split so as to alternate 
between looking and trying to see the evidence of what is believed to be present in Occlusion, then it 
would be possible to make that claim. This might in turn be compared to Bergson’s notions of the 
actual and the virtual in terms of that which is present for consciousness and that which remains 
outside of, but available to, perception. We look for the effect of change by looking at form, and from 
this a reflexive loop is derived in response to the invisible succession of image frames that display no 
difference. We see illusionary dots before our eyes whilst overlooking the slow sequence of minute 
changes in the image of the sun. In other words Bergsonian inner duration and the perception of 
external, spatial difference fail to become simultaneous as points in time and positions in space. Time 
as a sequence of spatialised events fails to materialise in consciousness; and evidence of succession is 
accessed only by our becoming aware of the functions of the work over an extended period of time.  
These are points at which difference is seen to resonate with potential and it can therefore be 
said to follow that – considering Deleuze’s Image Crystal as a fusion of movement and stasis, the actual 
and the virtual – the repetition of difference offers more than just the sum of two images. On 
repetition Deleuze wrote that ‘…one can speak of repetition only by virtue of the change or difference 
that it introduces into the mind which contemplates it’, and change as determined by the conscious 
presence in time of the viewer is evidence of time of that viewer as well as time for that viewer.149 
Phasing, with its layering of successive difference, seems to operate at a level upon which the 
sequential building blocks of recorded time are reconfigured as equivalents in the form of positions in 
space. Such equivalents were indicated by Bergson who suggested that unlike points in time that are 
continuous, points in space are indifferent to each other and so occur separately rather than 
successively, and that one is not tied to another.150 This describes a freedom for consciousness, as well 
as the body, to move through space, and time flow is present only at points that arise as fusions of 
time in space in the form of events.151 What might be called an authoring of a space with such events in 
                                                 
149 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 93    
150 Jay Lampert condenses Bergson point by stating that ‘…time consists of flow without divisions. Space consists of 
divisions without flow.’ Lampert, Simultaneity and Delay, 125 
151 ‘There is no doubt that our consciousness feels itself enduring, that our perception plays a part in our consciousness, 
and that something of our body and our environing matter enters into our perception. Thus, our duration and a certain 
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the controlled environment of an exhibition space renders such points in space within a subjective 
temporal context.’152 To extend this Bergsonian view one might also deem that an aspect of durational 
flow, once repeated, becomes separated and attributable to a point in space as an experience; as an 
event revealed as a rupture in the otherwise sub-liminal flow of subjective time. Therefore if an image 
is doubled in space, and our alternation of attention between each foregrounds its presence 
concurrent with its pictorial content, I suggest that this is a result of its condition of delay, its 
simultaneity in adjacent space causing awareness of both the difference and any accumulated 
meaning between each.  
As is the case with the phasing of Edge of Motion, we see what is present whilst being 
encouraged to attend to what is not yet there, what might happen next, and what is implied out of the 
consequences by which the work must be apprehended. This requires that a viewer allow the 
perception of the work’s operations to project a level of awareness from current circumstance 
towards future possible states. I would argue that the combination of elements that constitute 
Occlusion also utilises a form of phasing, in an alternation between seeing and knowing that results 
from the instability of its dual form, and, comparable to that on the image phasing of Edge of Motion, 
engender an awareness of possibility of future configurations and concurrencies.   
 
Delay and alternation  
 
Permit yourself to drift from what you are reading at this very moment into another situation…imagine 
a situation that, in all likelihood, you’ve never been in.153 
 
A distillation of the references used to describe the work of artist Cerith Wyn Evans might 
result in a list of keywords that include such epithets as: encryption, translation, language, vision, text, 
cinematic, polyphony, (in)visibility, time, stillness, light, dialogue. These would represent a sufficient 
sample of the commonly used descriptors applied as a measure of the span and depth of his practice 
over the last twenty years. To apply a further combining and filtering of these references might next 
                                                                                                                                                 
felt, lived participation of our physical surroundings in this inner duration are facts of experience.’ Bergson, Duration 
and Simultaneity, 45-46 
152 This spatial-temporal model accords with Lampert’s interpretation of Bergsonian thought when he states that ‘time 
is the negative character of space. That character of the point that negates the spatial continuum in favour of a particular 
location that makes a difference…time can be divided, just because time is that which divisible space becomes.’ 
Lampert, Simultaneity and Delay, 86 
153 Taken from a review by Stephan Pfohl of Guy Debord’s book ‘In Girum Imus Nocte Et Consumimurm Igni: a Film’ 
(Pelagian Press, London. 1991) Stephan Pfohl, We Go Round and Round in the Night and Are Consumed by Fire 
http://library.nothingness.org/articles/SI/en/display/87 (accessed 3rd January 2014) 
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result in the essential denominators: time, light, language, visuality. Despite having diverse roots these 
few words, when taken in combination, can suggest notions of image and textual interactions 
between seeing and reading.  
The quote above is taken from a review by Stephen Pfohl of Guy Debord’s 1978 film In Girum 
Imus Nocte Et Consumimurm Igni. This was the last film Debord published in his lifetime, and one that 
ended with the subtitle ‘To be begun again from the beginning’. A reference to a loop or repeat is 
inherent both in the film as a defining element within Debord’s life, and constructed out of the 
relationship between a Nietzschian ‘eternal return’ of its palindrome-as-title and its interaction 
between the self-referential text of the title, the subtitles within the film image, and the sub-text of 
the film itself. Time as a cycle of progression and return is an element of the work that, by 
foregrounding the presence of the text as text for film, by implication also offers the possibility of the 
film as text.  
It is likely that Wyn Evans had such notions in mind when he chose to use this quote as both 
the subject and the form of his book ‘‘…’’ Delay, published to accompany his 2009 exhibition of the 
same name at the deSingel in Antwerp. This 25 cm x 33 cm book of fifteen bound 300gsm pages 
presents Pfohl’s text in a difficult-to-read, block-like font, each letter laser cut through the page in 
visual compositions of two or three words at a time.    
The combination of stylised font and word sequences are presented as a series of laser cut 
holes across a succession of pages that separates and reveals the process of reading as an otherwise 
invisible fusion of sign, memory and connotation. The reader must initiate this process in the role of 
viewer as they are initially prevented from receiving the meaning of the shaped holes. They must first 
perform the reading of the text as a process of conscious translation, turning language from a means 
of invisible representation towards the physical form of the book. Such a performed reading involves 
the adoption of external mechanisms; in this case I found the utilisation of a strong light source useful 
to project the text shapes forward onto the page ahead as legible text fragments, so that they 
become words made up of light. Fittingly, writer and critic Juliane Rebentisch observes that Wyn 
Evans work has an: ‘...indistinguishable double presence as thing and sign…’154 
 
                                                 
154 Juliane Rebentisch, ‘Decolonised Theatre’ in Cerith Wyn Evans (Berlin: Lucas and Sternberg, 2004), 93 
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Cerith Wyn Evans, ‘’…’’  Delay, 2009 Front cover 
 
 
Cerith Wyn Evans, ‘’…’’ Delay, 2009   ‘...into another…’ 
 
 
Cerith Wyn Evans, ‘’…’’ Delay, 2009   ‘...you are reading…’ 
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Reading the delayed text from a series of cut-out shapes requires conscious mental retention 
and construction that results from an interaction with the physicality of each page, reassembling the 
disjointed word-shapes to write the text into consciousness. Above all it requires a repetition of the 
action of reading as a means of translating the text, so that words are eventually revealed out of 
iteration and accumulation; a process by which spatiality separate and simultaneous images are 
reconfigured in a temporal flow. This process moves awareness from image to letter to word until it 
reveals a semblance of meaning that is translated from materiality to language, yielding meaning and 
reflexive references out of light, space and in time.  
In reference to the relationship between spoken words and visual text Derrida introduces a 
comparable experience of what might be termed the unstable word – the word that in various ways 
draws our attention from its content towards its condition – when he substitutes a letter A for an E in 
the word differance.155 Once switched the visual word takes an inaudible step away from the familiar 
and purely indicative, toward the poetic, even beginning to take on a certain visual/pictographic 
quality akin to concrete poetry in the ideas he suggests are forming around this destabilising act.  
When faced with such structural interventions into visual language we don’t so much ‘drift’ 
out of the text we are reading and into our own imaginations as Pfohl suggests but, as a result of Wyn 
Evans’ interventions, meaning is withheld so that we must approach his text in the form of visual 
objects to be decoded. We can only return to the role of reader having first enacted that of explorer 
and rebuilder of disassembled shapes. These letterforms, having been rendered as objects in a page 
are remade as an image in light before they can be read as words on a page. Such interventions are 
intended to disrupt seeing/reading as a necessarily invisible experience and prevent an immersion into 
a nominal now by directing consciousness toward a reflexive awareness of the material and structure 
of language as a process of spatialised temporal events. In a Bergsonian sense the words shift from 
their invisible flow as internal duration towards external points in space as measures of time in their 
separateness. The text is not apprehended in time but present in space and thus framed and re-
presented in consciousness as a sequence of events.  
It is worth noting that the separation of the subject and its form again divides awareness 
between meaning and its means of presentation. In this case, such doubling ultimately arrives back at 
a point of assimilation that results from the self-referential nature of the work as a whole.  
Further loops exist in the voice of Pfohl’s text as reworked by Wyn Evans. As the text is 
decoded it is revealed that the author is imploring the reader to shift from a state of immersion in this 
text as a representational device and, in a plea to the imagination, to project their consciousness to an 
                                                 
155 Jacques Derrida, ‘Difference’ in Margins of Philosophy (Hemel Hempstead: The Harvester Press, 1982), 3-27 
 99 
unspecified place/time: to ‘a situation that in all likelihood, you’ve never been in.’156 This allusion of a 
non-situation as possibility solidifies the spatial presentness of the text and its function becomes one 
of diversion rather than description. The reader is paradoxically required to cast their imagination 
towards a subject-in-absence to which the text has no connotative link.  It is this delaying, doubling or 
spatialisation of the otherwise invisible flow of apprehension that I propose here as an adjunct to the 
extension and repetition of temporal images into spatial arrangements. The commonality between 
these forms is revealed as an interchangeability between temporal and spatial adjacency as the means 
by which disrupted or delayed presentations of text and image necessitate a shift in the requirements 
placed upon the viewer. This includes the adoption of an active role that can involve the movement of 
the viewer and a focussing upon retention as a means of reading the work’s codified forms. A deferral 
of meaning through strategies that direct attention toward form over content may also result in an 
awareness of the presence of one’s self as a factor within the resultant spatialised, delayed event of 
apprehension.157 
In Chronology Daniel Birnbaum describes his thoughts as they return to Nietzsche’s notion of 
‘Eternal Return’ as if this repetition is in itself indicative of a wider cycle of universal repetition. ‘Since 
everything is bound to return, nothing is unique, not even these lines…’158 He implies that such 
temporal cycles-within-cycles accord with Derrida’s idea of differance as that which perpetually 
returns, ‘…difference which is Chronos, or time itself.’159 This is a notion that allows for a more 
immediate return within the subject of this text, bringing its focus back to the work of Cerith Wyn 
Evans only to consider another repeating cycle within a cycle, an example of cyclical language from the 
range of his neon text pieces: the 2006 cylindrical light sculpture entitled In Girium Imus Nocte et 
Consumimur Igni.  
 
                                                 
156 Stephan Pfohl. We Go Round and Round in the Night and Are Consumed by Fire. 2000. 
http://library.nothingness.org/ articles/all/all/display/87  (accessed 3rd January 2014) 
157 Wyn Evans has produced numerous sculptural works that incorporate forms of textual delay and flicker such as a 
series of chandeliers that flash translations of text in Morse code. 
158 Birnbaum, Chronology, 47 
159 Ibid, 57 
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Cerith Wyn Evans, In Girum Imus Nocte et Consumimur Igni, 2006 
 
This work has a layered and hidden dual form of ‘a double presence as thing and sign’, 
operating out of a process of translation between image and text by using words rendered in neon as 
both a visual subject and palindromic structural presence. This suspended sculpture takes the form of 
a spectacle, a play of words in neon light that have a layer of dialogical reference for those aware of 
Guy Debord’s 1978 film of the same name. As such it demonstrates in its material presence the 
palindromic structure of its title, whilst alluding to the artist’s use of the film loop, the scripted 
narrative loop and – another ‘weak link’ – the self-referential nature of concrete text on a page.160 This 
textual reference to what was Debord’s last film forms a meta-loop of association that returns us to 
the quote by Stephen Pfohl in which difference as a delay in time is considered in relation to 







                                                 
160 Wyn Evans refers to subtle resonances between images or objects that form associations in the imagination as ‘weak 
links’ Wyn Evans, Hans Ulrich Obrist: The Conversation Series, 22   
161 Giorgio Agamben writes of Debord’s use of cinematic repetition as ‘the force and grace of repetition…the return as 
the possibility of what was. Repetition restores the possibility of what was, renders it possible anew.’ Giorgio 
Agamben, ‘Difference and Repetition: on Guy Debord’s Films’ in Art and the Moving Image, Leighton (Ed), 330 
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Chapter 5:   
This chapter addresses visual phasing and the phenomenology of patterns of light. I describe Brion 
Gysin’s Dreamachine, analysing its form and the subjective effects of flickering light. I propose a form of phasing 
takes place between the closed eyes of the user of the Dreamachine.    
 
The Dreamachine: A phenomenology of interference patterns 
Had a transcendental storm of colour visions today in the bus going to Marseilles. We ran through a long 
avenue of trees and I closed my eyes against the setting sun. An overwhelming flood of intensely bright 
patterns in supernatural colors exploded behind my eyelids: a multidimensional kaleidoscope whirling 
out through space. I was swept out of time. I was in a world of infinite number. The vision stopped 
abruptly as we left the trees.... (BG. Journal entry 21st December, 1958)162 
 
Artist Brion Gysin (1916-1986) referred to this chance experience of low sunlight flickering 
through rows of trees as the catalyst for his invention of the ‘vision machine’, a device that he later 
named the Dreamachine due to its propensity to cause subjective visions of patterns and images.  
Since its initial development, leading to a patent in 1961 for a ‘procedure and apparatus for the 
production of artistic visual sensations’, Gysin’s Dreamachine has remained a source of intrigue for 
artists, writers and commentators. Examples of its continued presence within contemporary art can 
be found not just in books such as Brion Gysin Dream Machine by Laura Hoptman,163 or copies of plans 
to construct a Dreamachine disseminated freely across the internet, but in major gallery exhibitions 
such as Susan Hiller’s curated show, Dream Machines;164 in Cerith Wyn Evans commissioning of 
Dreamachines for numerous international exhibitions;165 Shezad Dawood’s New Dream Machine project 
at the Parasol Unit in London 2013;166 Euphoria Now, a show by the Danish artist group Superflex at the 
Gallery Von Bartha, Basel in 2015, and at the Bartha Contemporary Gallery, London in 2016.167 
                                                 
162 Brion Gysin/Terry Wilson, Here to Go: Planet R-101 (London: Quartet Books, 1985), 240 
163 Laura Hoptmann, Brion Gysin Dream Machine (New York: New Museum Merrell, 2010) 
164 Exhibition toured Dundee Contemporary Art, Mappin Art Gallery, Sheffield, and Camden Arts Centre, London in 
2000 and consisted of nearly 50 artworks by artists including Dan Graham, Glenn Ligon and James Turrell selected to 
reflect upon Gysin’s Dreamachine.  
165 In 1998 Wyn Evans commissioned a number of Dreamachines to be built in tribute to Gysin, his friend and mentor, 
including them in exhibitions in Tokyo, Paris and Cologne.   
166 A version that was larger in scale than most such machines but suffered from a lower level light source and was, in 
my experience, underpowered and far less effective than Gysin’s original.  
167 This was one of four Dreamachines constructed with Gysin and Swiss gallerist Miklos von Bartha between 1976 
and 1979. (Interview with Niklas von Bartha, Bartha Contemporary, London 16th March 2018) 
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Brion Gysin spent his life exploring all that he determined was occluded from everyday 
experience, using painting, collage, text, sound and writing. Some of his most well-received work 
operated within his primary field of interest as fusions of image and language with which he explored 
calligraphic glyphs discovered whilst living in Morocco. 
 
         
                  Brion Gysin, Calligraphie, 1960     Brion Gysin, Roller Poem III, 1977 
 
 His paintings, along with numerous text cut-ups and permutation poems, are examples of 
work by otherwise very different artists that utilise methods of ‘textual delay’.168 Such shifts in 
awareness between reading and seeing can be witnessed in works by artists such as Cerith Wyn Evans, 
an associate of Gysin’s, exemplified by the book Delay as discussed previously.   
By using textual interventions that included the repetition and permutation of pictographic 
forms, Gysin explored methods of interrupting the assimilation of visual or spoken language to 
enhance awareness of its form.169 He invariably aimed to make work that would have a discernible 
effect upon a viewer’s perception of themselves and their relation to the world, often beginning with 
himself as subject.170 His intentions were not so much to traverse the interfaces between the visible 
                                                 
168 The cutting and reassembling of pages of printed texts to produce semi-random sentences, a method adopted by 
writer William S Burroughs. ‘Cut ups allowed writers to use words in the manner that painters used paint, as raw 
material.’ John Geiger, Nothing is True Everything is Permitted: The Life of Brion Gysin (New York: Disinformation, 
2005), 125  
169 Much of Gysin’s work combined text/image fusions, and word repetition such as the permutation poem ‘I Am That I 
Am’, broadcast on BBC Radio in 1960.  
170 Gysin, with life long friend and collaborator William S Burroughs, used many different means of exploring altered 
states of consciousness, from meditation and sleep deprivation to drugs and forms of self hypnotism. RE/Search 4/5. 
(San Francisco, RE/Search, 1982), 40 
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text and legible image as an artistic or literary conceit, so much as to deconstruct and reveal the 
workings of language modes as social, cultural and psychological phenomena.171 
At the time of his revelatory bus trip Gysin would have been aware of the published theories 
of Dr William Grey Walter, having been given a copy of his 1952 book The Living Brain by William 
Burroughs.172 Walter’s book documents the years of clinical research he had conducted into the effects 
of flicker and stroboscopic lighting in his psychophysical experiments with volunteer psychiatric 
patients and members of his medical team. In these experiments he devised trigger feedback 
techniques whereby the flashing of light was synchronised with the measured activity of a subject’s 
brain. Experimenting with flicker rates up to the point at which the separate pulses of light appear to 
merge into a steady light stream he began to record that ‘strange patterns, new and significant 
emerged’.173 But when synchronised with the brain’s rhythmic pulses, known as the ‘alpha’ bandwidth 
of between 8 to 12 pulses per second, he recorded patients’ reports of hallucinations of a more 
tangible nature: ‘Colour developed in magnitude and complexity of pattern as long as the stimulation 
lasted’.174 ‘Some subjects saw whirling spirals, whirlpools, explosions, Catherine wheels.’ Thus he 
concluded that ‘flicker proved to be a key to many doors.’175 
Gysin was also aware of the writings of Aldous Huxley on the subject of flickering light and its 
effects upon consciousness. In his essay Heaven and Hell (1952) Huxley describes the flickering of the 
stroboscopic light as ‘an aid to visionary experience’ and an effective adjunct to his experiments with 
mescaline. The studies of stroboscopic light experiments conducted by researchers such as Humphrey 
Osmond at the National Institute for Mental Health recorded correlations between the flicker rate of 
the stroboscope and the brain’s alpha rhythms. In response to this Huxley posited the question, ‘how 
on earth can the interference of two rhythms produce an arrangement of electrical impulses 
interpretable as …preternatural light and colour, and charged with preternatural significance?’176 To 
                                                 
171 Burroughs took a characteristically more extreme position on such activities, stating his intention was to ‘destroy all 
rational thought’ by undermining received language and its relationship to meaning and causality which he saw as a 
tool of ‘Control’, his term for Western society’s methods of socialisation. William S. Burroughs, ‘The Limits of 
Control’ in The Adding Machine: Collected Essays (London: John Calder, 1985), 116-120 
172 Geiger, Chapel of Extreme Experience. 48 
173 Ibid, 21 
174 The measuring of the brain’s electrical activity, known as electroencephalograph (EEG), was invented in 1924 by 
German psychiatrist Hans Berger (1873 – 1941). He observed links between reflective thought and states between 
wakefulness and sleep and the alpha brain rhythm of between 8 and 12 pulses per second. This subsequently became 
known as ‘Berger’s Wave’. 
175 Walter W. Grey, The Living Brain (New York: WW Norton & Company, 1963) 
176 John Geiger, Chapel of Extreme Experience: A Short History of Stroboscopic Light and the Dream Machine, (Soft 
Skull Press, 2003), 38 
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Huxley such visions, otherwise associated with episodes of induced hallucination, suggested a 
decoupling of the link between vision and the world.  
By traversing scientific, psychological, philosophical, and neurological considerations, Gysin 
set out to develop a means of experiencing visualisations of what might be termed ‘images without a 
source’, brought about by retinal stimulation that conjures visual form out of consciousness with no 
direct referent or index. In conjunction with mathematician Ian Sommerville he designed a device 
made up of a large rotating metal cylinder cut with precisely shaped and calibrated holes that allowed 
a bright light suspended at its centre to emanate flashes of moving light and shadow across the closed 
eyelids of a participant.177 Intended by Gysin to exist as a limited edition fine art object, the 
Dreamachine was designed to function as a device to ‘paint pictures in the head’ and as such was ‘the 
first art object designed to be viewed with the eyes closed.’178 In creating it he severed the causal link 
between the material world and the retina. Seeing this as an extended form of artistic image-making 




Dreamachine plan diagram http://www.bluestwave.com/toolbox_dreammachine.php  
(accessed 18th June 2013) 
                                                 
177 Importance was also attached to this light filling a space in a manner akin to a kinetic light sculpture. Antje Von 
Graevenitz, ‘The Dream Goes on’ in Von Bartha Quarterly Report 02/09, (Basel: Von Bartha, 2009), 9   
178 Ibid, 54 
179 Brion Gysin, ‘Unpublished Notes on Painting’ in Back in No Time: The Brion Gysin Reader, Jason Weiss (Ed.) 




Brion Gysin, Dreamachine, 1976. Acrylic glass, card, light bulb, electric motor. Height: 120.5 cm, diameter: 29.5 cm  





Gysin and Burroughs using the Dreamachine 
 
 
Flickering images, flickering light  
 
Rosalind Krauss, in writing about the flickering image loop of a zoetrope – a spinning cylinder 
with holes alternating with a succession of images of movement on its inner surface – describes an 
experience of a movement-stasis impasse as the concurrency of seeing the illusion of a moving subject 
and its means of presentation. The illusion of a moving subject is witnessed at the same time as ones 
awareness of experiencing a visual effect: ‘…uniting the experience of both inside and outside is the 
beat or pulse that courses through the zootropic field…both constructing the gestalt and undoing it 
at the same time – both positioning us within the scene of its active viewer and outside as its passive 
witness.’180 Such a doubling of consciousness, seeing the moving image as effect and ourselves as 
witness to this effect, might result in the perception of such repetitions as time divided into units in 
space and held in a deadlock by the static counterpoint of meta-awareness, as a series of images that 
are both points in time and positions in space, according to their velocity. This condition of awareness 
– seeing an illusion as an illusion – maintains two opposing positions, in this case offering the 
awareness of the phenomenology of perception as a process of embodied consciousness.  
The reflexive experience of being ‘present’ in perception can also be deduced from comments 
made by Peter Kubelka regarding his intentions behind his seminal flicker film Arnulf Rainer (1960), 
which he has stated were, ‘To perceive film not as motion but as a quick succession of static units. 
Arnulf Rainer developed out of a longing for the ‘now’-experience.’181 Arnulf Rainer consisted of six and 
                                                 
180 Rosalind Krauss, ‘The Im/pulse to See’ in Vision and Visuality, Hal Foster (Ed.) (Bay Press, 1988), 59-60 
181 Peter Kubelka, ‘Frame by Frame: Peter Kubelka’ Interview with Stephan Grissemann Film Comment, Sept/Oct 
2012  www.filmcomment.com/article/peter-kubelka-frame-by-frame-antiphon-adebar-arnulf-rainer/   
(accessed Dec 2017) 
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a half minutes of modulated flickering light, with accompanying sections of abstract sound, made 
from arrangements of clear and black film frames that were intended to highlight awareness of being 
in the moment rather than of a represented subject. Whether film frames or strobing light, such 
intense flickering may be seen by some as a mesmerising fusion of temporality and stasis, but just as 
often it can be deemed an abrasive experience that demarks the edge of our capability for 
assimilation, forcing an awareness of the threshold of what we can separate and recognise as 
meaningful difference between visual events.182   
Although it is unlikely that Kubelka had an interest in the Dreamachine it is known that Tony 
Conrad, the maker of the notorious film Flicker (1966), was intrigued by the reputation of Gysin’s 
invention. Writer John Geiger suggests that this awareness encouraged his use of flickering light to 
deliver perceptual and optical experiences in film.183  
Gysin’s intention that the Dreamachine was received as a sculptural object situates the device 
in a fine art context at a time immediately prior to the emergence of what film-maker Malcolm Le Grice 
later termed ‘perceptual film’.184 Le Grice applied this term to films such as Arnulf Rainer that primarily 
addressed the viewer’s perception and cites Conrad’s Flicker as the first to consist exclusively of 
intense flickering frames that were designed to explore stroboscopic optical effects.185 Whereas Peter 
                                                 
182 Flickering light is perceived as a visible phenomenon below what is know in the field of Psychophysics (the branch 
of Psychology concerned with the effects of physical stimulation and the sensory thresholds of the body) as the ‘flicker 
fusion threshold’ determined to be approximately 16 frames per second (or 6.25 milliseconds). Rates above 16fps are 
perceived as fusing into a continuous image of movement or colour as a result of the phenomenon commonly known as 
persistence of vision. This particular threshold of human perception is subject to the degrees of difference between each 
individual frame image, how each differs in brightness and contrast, colour and contents of image, and the 
environmental conditions in which it is viewed. The lower frames rates of what we might conceivably call flicker are 
more subjective but rates slower than 4 to 5 frames per second begin to be perceived as a series of individual moments 
in time. George A. Gescheider, Psychophysics: The Fundamentals (London: Psychology Press, 1997), 19 
183 ‘Conrad had heard of Brion Gysin’s Dreamachine, and although he never met Gysin, he was impressed with the 
idea that a process with such a daunting aura could arise from the simplest and most easily constructed mechanisms. 
Conrad had the idea to make a film, The Flicker, based entirely on such effects, basically by “turning off” frames in an 
organised sequence.’ Geiger, Chapel of Extreme Experience, 74 
184 In his book Experimental Cinema in the Digital Age Le Grice introduced the term ‘perceptual film’ stating that: 
‘The term normally used is the ‘flicker film’ though it is too specific to define it by a single characteristic rather than its 
region of function. This area of cinema attempts to examine, or create experience through devices which work on the 
autonomic nervous system.’ Le Grice, Experimental Cinema in the Digital Age, 50 
185 ‘The (hallucinatory) sensations to which Conrad refers are caused by “harmonic frequency relationships” (Tony 
Conrad, Letter to Henry Romney, (Film Culture 41, 1966),153) created by rapidly strobing black and white frames that 
trick the eye into seeing meshing, overlapping, or mixing images.’ Michael Joshua Rowan ‘Flashes of Brilliance: A 
Brief History of the Flicker Film’ in Museum of the Moving Image, June 2009, 
www.movingimagesource.us/articles/flashes-of-brilliance-20090611 (accessed 10th August 2014)    
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Kubelka’s use of flicker predated that of Conrad’s by six years, Kubelka’s primary concern was with the 
exploration of the frame as a basic rhythmic unit of film, a concern that aligns him with structuralist 
notions of the form of film over that of visual perception or the subjective psychological experience of 
the viewer.186 Gysin’s invention can with hindsight be said to exist within a procession of ideas that 
included optical artworks, expanded perception and what became known as psychedelia from sources 
such as experimental psychology and interests in altered consciousness.187 As such Gysin’s work 
spanned areas of activity common to both experimental film-making and fine art practice as well as 
contributing indirectly to cultural and counter-cultural ideas.188  
Having spent many hours using different Dreamachines over a number of years, first an 
original machine built by Gysin for artist/musician Genesis P Orridge in the mid-1980s, and versions 
built from original plans by myself and others over subsequent years, I found the effects of the device 
to be far more subtle and its efficacy more complex than the after-images and optical effects of any 
stroboscopic light or ‘perceptual film’.189 Initially I became aware of the Dreamachine through 
published interviews with Burroughs and P Orridge, whilst I attempted to explore flickering and 
pulsing images in a series of experiments conducted as an undergraduate student with stroboscopic-
style videos and Super 8 film.190 Subsequent opportunities to explore and consider the nature and use 
of the Dreamachine in comparison with my somewhat crude attempts at flicker film-making enabled 
me to isolate the fundamental differences in physicality and operation of each of these forms, and 
identify what I deduce to be key factors that contribute to the potency of the Dreamachine compared 
with that of the stroboscope or flicker film.  
                                                 
186 In reference to the film Arnulf Rainer (1960) Le Grice suggests that ‘…no stroboscopic rates are maintained in a 
sufficiently unbroken sequence to allow it to be described as concerned with optical factors.’ Ibid  
187 Other such perceptual film experiments of the time include Ray Gun Virus (1966) by Paul Sharits and Birgit and 
Wilhelm Hein’s film works such as 625 (1969) in which strobing effects were achieved using the visual interference 
produced by filming off a TV screen with a slow camera shutter speed. In 1969 Takahiko Iimura also made a series of 
loop flicker/perceptual films that had holes punched out of alternate frames, and Le Grice experimented with similar 
techniques in his 1970 film Spot the Microdot.  
188 Cerith Wyn Evans links the Dreamachine and Duchamp’s Rotoreliefs, acknowledging that they both problematise 
the retinal: ‘…I think there is a relationship to (Marcel) Duchamp and particularly the Rotoreleifs (1935) this playing of 
the conjecture between authorship and the lineage…is, I think, a stimulating one.’ Wyn Evans, Hans Ulrich Obrist: 
The Conversation Series, 36 
189 I found the Gysin/P Orridge Dreamachine particularly effective in evoking subjective experiences of geometric and 
cyclical patterns of intense colour and mutating shape, and occasionally lucid and immersive temporal imagery. The 
Dreamachine exhibited at Bartha Contemporary, London in 2016 had a similar efficacy.  
190 These consisted of simple attempts at exploring the form utilising alternating black, clear and/or colour frames and 
multiples of frames, interstitials and geometric shapes, sometimes interspersed with single frame imagery. Such 
experiments led to my exploring perceptions of subliminal imagery and text/image combinations in film and video.  
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Phasing as syncopated patterns of light 
 
Unlike a flat film screen of reflected light the Dreamachine consists of a cylinder with shaped 
holes spinning by mechanical means around a light source. It has an aesthetic sculptural quality and 
when activated has what might be termed a kinetic presence that fills a space with dancing patterns of 
light. Most significantly its rotation results in two interrelated factors: firstly the movement of light 
and shadow resulting from the holes in its cylindrical body is in a lateral direction, sweeping across the 
face, illuminating one eye a split second before the other. Secondly this lateral movement is two fold: 
alternations of shadow and direct light move in one direction, whilst at the same time, rotating in an 
opposite direction relative to the front surface of the cylinder is its back inner surface, off which light 
is reflected. This secondary movement of flickering light, at a lesser intensity, complements and 
opposes the direction of lateral movement of light emanating through the front surface. This 
particular physical characteristic of the Dreamachine results in a bi-directional flow of flickering light of 
greater and lesser degrees of intensity across the closed eyes of the participant. The ‘viewer’ receives 
a syncopated rhythm of differing pulses, rapidly repeating in cycles with subtle undulating shifts in 
accent. Importantly the Dreamachine is designed to be experienced with closed eyes, circumventing 
the stereoscopic operations of the eye/brain configuration that enables us to see the world in 
perspective and dimension. This factor I suggest exploits the spatial difference between each eye in a 
way that stroboscopic light cannot, ensuring that the eyes and brain receive each moving pulse of light 
separately and at fractionally different points in time. It is at the phenomenological level of our 
physicality that the difference between two images, with their propensity to make meaning, has 
become the difference between the position of our eyes, and in the case of the Dreamachine this 
difference is exploited to trigger subjective visual sensations.   
As discussed, Ken Jacob’s stereoscopic photographs, animated by flicker, also operate as an 
implicit reference to the separateness of the eyes in their perception of space from two adjacent 
image positions that are designed to be viewed by each eye concurrently.191   
 
 
                                                 
191 In a 2014 essay Brooke Belisle wrote ‘… much of Jacobs’s work experiments with the production of cinematic 
space and time, exploring how the perceptions of spatial depth and temporal continuity may overlap, intersect with, or 
overwrite one another.’ Brooke Belisle, ‘Depth Readings: Ken Jacobs’s Digital, Stereographic Films’ in Cinema 




Ken Jacobs, original stereoscopic image used in animation Capitalism: Child Labor, 2006 
 
A similarly bipartite example of the deconstruction of stereoscopic vision can be found in 
Robert Smithson’s Enantiomorphic Chambers whereby two adjacent steel structures housing mirrors at 
oblique angles display reflections, not of the viewer but of the opposite mirror.192 Each system of 
reflections dissipates vision into itself without external referent in a manner resonant of the 
Dreamachine’s ‘seeing’ images with closed eyes. Inversely, it might also suggest notions of a latent 




Robert Smithson, Enantiomorphic Chambers, 1965/2003 
 
                                                 
192 Smithson wrote about this work ‘the two separate “pictures” that are usually placed in a stereoscope have been 
replaced by mirrors…thus excluding any fused image’. Gary Shapiro, Earthwards: Robert Smithson and Art after 
Babel (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1995), 67 
193 In relation to repetition and reappearance Gysin wrote: ‘In the Dream Machine nothing would seem to be unique. 
Rather, the elements seen in endless repetition, looping out from numbers beyond numbers and back, show themselves 
to be thereby part of the whole.’ Gysin Back in No Time: The Brion Gysin Reader, 115 
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I therefore suggest that it is not simply the flicker rate of the Dreamachine that is important to 
its functioning, as most commentators indicate, but the fact that the machine in effect spatialises its 
light emissions and exploits the distance between the eyes by ‘temporalising’ this gap as a phasing of 
the flicker between each eye.194 By requiring the user to close their eyes the light pulses reaching the 
retinas are divided into two bi-lateral, interlinked ‘channels’ of reception, between which a 
complicated syncopation of undulating brightness and shadow is produced. It is this, combined with 
the bi-lateral flow of the flickering light, that results in the viewer experiencing a form of phasing of 
the patterns of light between each eye in real time that makes Gysin’s invention unique.  
If the Dreamachine delivers a form of phasing of light rhythms between the stereoscopic 
operations of both eyes then it should be acknowledged that the pattern that results from its 
mechanical movement will be fixed and repeated in a predictable manner. Such patterns are a 
complicated syncopated rhythm of phasing as separate from a slipping of concurrent events in time. 
The only variable that can affect the experience of this fixed pattern of undulation is the distance that 
the user is positioned from the spinning machine, as this will fractionally alter the triangulation 
between the single light source and the two closed eyes, resulting in subtle changes to the time 
difference of light pulses across the eyes. Such a variable in the syncopation is limited as there is a slim 
margin within which the flickering of the device is maximised; take too close or too distant a position 
and the optical efficacy is reduced or lost altogether.   
With these defining characteristics outlined as fundamental to the Dreamachine I suggest one 
further consideration: that of its physical scale, as this factor has bearing on both the size and distance 
between the holes in the machine’s body. The dimensions of these holes need to be calculated 
carefully so as to cause a flicker at the required rate, and in my admittedly subjective and non-scientific 
observation of the efficacy of different machines, I determined that a device with too small an overall 
diameter and subsequent greater curve to its surface is less effective in instilling complex optical 
illusions than a larger scale device with a greater circumference and relatively larger holes. I am 
suggesting that there is ultimately an optimum scale for the device that, in conjunction with the 
stereoscopic flicker, functions in relation to, and offers a phenomenological experience with, the 
physicality of the viewer. All factors such as syncopated rhythms or phasing of moving light and 
shadow and surface curvature thus combine to determine the optimum position for the viewer to 
                                                 
194 In most articles and essays the Dreamachine’s flicker rate of 8-12 flashes per second, being the same frequency as 
that of the alpha rhythms of the brain, is presented as the total explanation for is efficacy in stimulating visual 
phenomena. In the light of my research using various versions of this device I am suggesting that there are other 
important factors in addition to this.   
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place themselves so as to maximise the effect of the light flickering onto closed eyelids.195 I believe 
that this symbiotic mirroring of the eyes is where the Dreamachine’s unique advantage lies and the 
reason for the sophistication of its visual experience compared with that of the ‘flat’ pulsing of 
perceptual film and stroboscopic light. The impression on the user’s closed eyes is comparable to 
Gysin’s original experience of being in a moving vehicle and passing a row of trees that caused the low 


















                                                 
195 A study published in the Journal of Vision indicates that when each eye receives separate visual stimulus conscious 
perception will alternate unpredictably between each in a manner that is assumed to result from neural interactions 
from several parts of the brain. Giving one eye a greater level of stimulus than the other does not result in monocular 
vision but instead consciousness attempts to adapt in a process of alternating attention known as binocular rivalry. 
Andreas Bartels, Yuriria Vázquez, Andreas Schindler, Nikos K. Logothetis: ‘Rivalry between afterimages and real 
images: The influence of the percept and the eye’ in Journal of Vision, August 2011 
http://jov.arvojournals.org/article.aspx?articleid=2121310 (accessed 11th August 2014)       
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Chapter 6:  
Phasing and possibility 
I begin this chapter with an analysis of the photograph of Duchamp’s Door, 11 rue Larrey and examine 
how possible configurations implied by this image might resonate with Bergsonian notions of the virtual and 
relate this to phasing in the studio work. I propose that a means of considering such allusions to future possibility 
within a work and its image might be found in Duchamp’s Infrathin.   
 
 
Possibility as the projection of simultaneities  
I want to now subject Duchamp’s largely overlooked work, Door, 11 rue Larrey to examination 
in an attempt to identify and scrutinise what I deem to be certain liminal dynamics that are alluded to 
within the work. I will then correlate these observations and propose a means by which we might 
perceive possibility as inherent in the experience of phasing imagery.196  
I am employing the term liminal in both of its related definitions, as a reference to that which 
is barely perceptible and existing on a sensory threshold, and also as that which operates as a 
transitional or indeterminate state.197 Regarding previous examples of dual images I would consider 
the term liminal in relation to the transitioning of awareness between the possibilities that bind 
particular images, activating them in the imagination as both a notional moving image and an image of 
movement.198 This layered function enables the referents of a dual work to be perceived as alternating 
between the pictorially representational and the schematic array of its future states, or positions in 
space over time.   
 
                                                 
196 Originally installed in Duchamp’s Paris apartment in 1927, Door, 11 rue Larrey was bought and moved to the 
collection of Fabio Sargentini in Rome. This analysis is based on the one photograph of the original taken by Arturo 
Schwarz. Francis M. Naumann, ‘Marcel Duchamp: A Reconciliation of Opposites’ in Marcel Duchamp Artist of the 
Century, Rudolf E. Kuenzli and Francis M. Naumann (Eds) (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990), 35 
197 The noun ‘limen’ refers to the point at which a perceived physiological or psychological effect begins, and ‘liminal’ 
is the adjective used to describe associations with that point as existing on a threshold. (Subliminal refers to that which 
is below a threshold). 
198 Henri Bergson’s notion of the moving image was based largely upon the filmic metaphor of a succession of 
positions or frames, whereas Deleuze suggests that movement does not define something as separate from other things 
in this way but that movement and image are equivalents in that image can be defined as that which appears, thus 
including movement. The movement of an object is only really understood in relation to its movement-image: as that 




Marcel Duchamp, Door, 11 rue Larrey, 1927. In situ photograph by Arturo Schwarz 
 
 
Marcel Duchamp’s Door, 11 rue Larrey consisted of a standard wooden door fixed into an 
interior corner of a room, hung and hinged to swing both left or right so as to fit either of the two 
doorways that are situated as if mirroring each other at 90 degrees. This door/doorway configuration 
was designed by Duchamp and installed in his apartment, allegedly for practical purposes – each 
doorway leading to the bedroom or the bathroom – but also for the pleasure of refuting an old French 
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proverb that ‘a door must be either open or closed’.199 His door both opened and closed two 
doorways simultaneously in an alternation of complementary positions.200  
Unlike a traditional door which is experienced in degrees of one or the other, either open or 
closed according to the combination of its position and the user’s intention, Duchamp’s door is both 
positive and negative simultaneously, being always both one and its other: opening – closing, revealing 
– concealing, allowing – preventing. With this seemingly simple work Duchamp might place a visitor in 
a state of arrested action, suspended between options of similarity and difference.201 
By doubling the aperture into which it can fit the hinged door also becomes a metaphorical 
‘hinge’ that describes degrees between binary states of open and closed, and from this one might 
read subtle implications of the actual and the virtual in a state of balance. As such the door’s bipartite 
flow resists both a point of division and any default position. The work has a fundamentally dual 
structure, but unlike a cast object that emanates from a mould there is no primary point from which a 
second has been extruded, just an alternation of possible states that remain mutually inclusive. As 
such Door, 11 rue Larrey is perpetuated in the imagination in one state and the other, fused in an 
alternating recto-verso that might seem to accord with the pages of a book with its hiding and 
revealing of next and previous, but can also be associated with Werner Nekes’ references to the 
thaumatrope and its alternation of two images on opposite sides of a disc demonstrating 
correspondences and differences between two image frames.  
I suggest that such transitioning awareness between what is ultimately an interplay between 
the actual and the possible is not only comparable to Kate Mondloch’s spectatorial doubleness but also 
analogous to Duchamp’s notion of Infrathin, a neologism that he introduced in his writing but 
purposefully left open-ended. Duchamp’s term Infrathin (or Inframince) is often taken on a literal level 
as a reference to that which is extremely thin or so diaphanous as to exist on the cusp of perception, 
and this may begin to approach the notion from a material perspective. But it was Duchamp himself 
who noted that the meaning of Infrathin cannot be determined exactly but that ‘one can only give 
examples of it’, offering just a few such examples, each of which situating the term in relation to a 
more psychological or sensorial dimension.202  
                                                 
199 Ibid, 34-35 
200 A single image exists of Door, 11 rue Larrey and it is to this that I have addressed much of this analysis.   
201 Door, 11 rue Larrey was not exhibited and would have only been encountered by visitors to his apartment. The 
photograph of the door in its situated form is the only means by which one might now witness the construction. 
202 Such examples often addressed subtle sensorial transitions for example, ‘The warmth of a seat that has just been 
vacated.’, ‘When the fumes of tobacco also smell of the mouth that exhales it, the two merge by way of infrathin.’ 
Marcel Duchamp, Marcel Duchamp, Notes, Paul Matisse (Ed.) (Paris: Flammarion, 1999), 33  
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It is in terms of the perception of liminal difference and transitions towards future states that 
Infrathin is useful as a means of surveying the subtle inferences implicit in Duchamp’s Door, 11 rue 
Larrey. I suggest that these manifestations of Duchamp’s thinking might coincide at the point that one 
considers Door, 11 rue Larrey as existing in concurrent states of being both more and less open and 
closed by degrees of difference, and that inherent in the construction of the original object lies the 
ongoing possibility of it shifting between these perceived states. It is this perception of the potential 
for a piece of visual work to inhabit an array of degrees of difference between two binaries that I am 
making such a comparison of Duchamp’s Door, 11 rue Larrey with that of the perception of phasing 
between degrees of synchronisation between two repeating binary images, and propose that these 
states of difference can be apprehended as a mapping of the work’s future, visualised as all its 
possible positions.    
When considered in such terms it might be of value to consider the apprehension of such 
degrees of difference in that there is a cognitive engagement with the image of the door that can 
transpose and measure its function, signified by its open and closed states, against its possible 
configurations between these states. The door’s concurrent states of open and closed reveal a latent 
temporality in our burgeoning awareness of its possible configurations, as points of entry/exit over 
time. It is as a result of the accumulation of such configurations that I argue a commonality can be 
determined between the subtle awareness of unresolved possibility and that of Duchamp’s Infrathin. 
If the Infrathin can most effectively be defined through recourse to examples of its manifestation, how 
might we experience such liminal difference between the configurations of two states? Duchamp 
proffered a specific example of the perceived relationship between two separate objects cast from 
the same mould, but also indicated that such liminality might be encapsulated in multiple elements 
that are perceived as a single entity, for which he noted the examples of exhaled breath and cigar 
smoke and the warmth of a vacated seat.203 In such cases a difference between states might exist 
within, or more precisely beyond that of a singular form that is imbued with the implied temporality of 
a before and an after. The very process of transiting from one state to another, in which two 
conditions fuse to become indistinguishable, would be transmitted in and of the Infrathin.204   
                                                 
203 ‘The separating value of two shapes pressed from the same mould.’ Duchamp, Marcel Duchamp, Notes, 33. 
Difference is readily determined between two moulds as they are separated by time (one begets the other) and become 
separated physically to remain linked via their similarity, one as a spatial inversion of the other. Whereas the smoke 
and breath and warmth of a seat consist of two separate phenomena that have become fused over time and experienced 
sensorially as a single entity.   
204 Caitlin Murray, in her blog Impossible Objects, suggests that ‘sensitivity to difference’ is central to what the 
Infrathin might allude to. She suggests that this difference is linked to Duchamp’s wider concerns with what he called 
the art coefficient: that an artwork describes the difference between an artist’s intention and the degree to which this is 
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In a continuation of Duchamp’s examples of mundane situations and materials in which the 
Infrathin might be located I return to Door, 11 rue Larrey, an everyday object which, when considered in 
its transitional state between open and closed, might be deemed to reveal a similarly perceived liminal 
transitioning. But when as object is extended or mirrored, as with Duchamp’s door, there exists a 
compelling loop of self-referentiality in the enfolding of the artist’s intentions within the experience of 
the everyday.     
When is a door not a door?  
In Chapter 2 I proposed that the coinciding of the spatial extension of the dual image and the 
temporal delay of repetition describe a dimensional matrix within which the spatial and temporal 
transpositions of image phasing can be located. Similarly I posit the notional operations of Duchamp’s 
Door, 11 rue Larrey describe a movement between two points in space as degrees of open-closed and 
closed-open in corresponding units of spatialised time. Furthermore the degrees of difference 
generated by this work between its concurrent states of open and closed is maintained as potential, 
firstly in regard of its possible positions between one state and its other, but also in regard of its 
positioning a viewer at a threshold of two options – two possible narratives represented by the two 
doorways. Door, 11 rue Larrey allows for a shift in perception from the mundane – whether the door 
exists to protect our privacy or entrap us in a room – to a metaphorical level of circumstance and 
choice. Viewed from the position from which the sole photograph of this work was taken we are 
placed outside of the two thresholds in a position that seems to allow us an existential choice. To pass 
through either doorway would be to enact a binary choice that would alter our experience of the work 
from being at a point that is prior to (this and that) to a point after (this or that). Our viewpoint is 
frozen prior to making a binary choice and effectively suspended in a state between stasis and 
movement. In this condition possibility is maintained in the form of the two doorways and a door that 
alternates between revealing and concealing.   
Despite such allusions to existential choice it is the perception of instability and subsequent 
implication of possibility that I am highlighting in Duchamp’s Door, 11 rue Larrey. In a fusion of the 
quotidian and the unfamiliar I suggest that the work gives rise to the awareness of a set of possibilities 
inherent in its form that might occur out of its concurrent states of open and closed. The relationship 
between the door’s alternating points in space can be imagined in the form of the repetition of the 
positions in space described by the door’s movement between its poles. One might imagine a 
schematic ‘mapping’ of transitions of the dimensions in space and units of time revealing a vector of 
                                                                                                                                                 
realised for the audience. Caitlin Murray, How to Isolate the Infrathin: Marcel Duchamp, Raymond Roussel and the 
Infrathin  http://www.impossibleobjectsmarfa.com/isolating-the-infrathin/ (accessed 23rd March 2016)  
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the exchanges between time/space that Door, 11 rue Larrey describes, as a diagrammatical layering of 
the door’s possible states between two poles.  
Derrida’s notion of the Trace provides a foundation to this analysis, initially in relation to a 
mapping of possibility (in the form of spatial and temporal flows or paths as equivalent to the traces 
of meaning within language), but in particular the notion that a sign contains within its existence the 
trace of that which it is not: its obverse and its inverse.205 To extend one of Duchamp’s examples for 
considering the Infrathin – ‘as the cast object relates to its mould’ – this extension of an object accords 
with Derrida’s sign as one form existing as an inversion of, and complement to, its other but without 
any of the temporal primacy that such a comparison may carry.206 Door, 11 rue Larrey in its variances of 
open and closed implies an aspect of Derrida’s Sign as that which contains an element of what it does 
not mean. The door’s state of being ‘open’ cannot be perceived and therefore cannot exist here 
without its inverse, in this case its concurrent state of being ‘closed’, also being present. Such 
difference in the case of Duchamp’s door exists simultaneously in the consciousness as both one and 
the other. Empirically the experience of Door, 11 rue Larrey continues to be both at the same time, 
ensuring that any such attribution given the work must pre-empt an awareness of the metaphor of 
existential choice. As such the idea of Derrida’s Trace resonates in this case as both the door’s function 
and our idea of its potential as multiple points across the span of a doorway, each complimented by an 
inverse.  
Successive differences between the components of the work do not replace each other as a 
sequence of film frames might. Instead each can be perceived as an extension and accumulation of 
positions in space. The awareness of the latent vector that describes this process of multiplying can be 
apprehended diagrammatically as a meta-image of the accumulation of positions of in-between-ness. 
A vector of movement between such states would describe the temporal possibilities of the door, 
made separate in space, such a notional exchange operating as a ‘hinge’ between its obverse and 
inverse conditions simultaneously. This imagining of Duchamp’s doubled door in terms of its 
possibilities involves the mapping of its virtual states by unfolding its future/past simultaneities in 
inter-dimensional layers that are at once open and closed, of the future and of the past, and 
descriptive of time as a series of spatialised points.207 This can be seen to accord with Bergsonian 
                                                 
205 Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, 9 
206 Duchamp, Marcel Duchamp, Notes, 33 
207 With regard to a shift between what is seen and what might be understood Dr. Uršula Berlot underlines the 
relationship between the actual and the imaginary that the Infrathin might be said to span, writing that ‘Duchamp’s 
neologism Infrathin can be understood as the “elucidation of the intelligible embodied in the sensible”, establishing 
thus a particular connection of cerebral/mental and visceral/sensual qualities.’ Dr. Uršula Berlot, ‘Duchamp and the 
Notion of Optical Tactility’ Art, Emotion and Value, 5th Mediterranean Congress of Aesthetics (Ljubljana: University 
of Ljubljana, 2011), 473 https://www.um.es/vmca/proceedings/docs/41.Ursula-Berlot.pdf (accessed 14th June 2015) 
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principals of spatialised time such an awareness of the possible states of either and neither inherent in 
the subject as an array of static positions in concurrent time. The door’s limited temporality as an arc 
of movement between open and closed is, as described, doubled by our seeing it as both closing one 
doorway whilst opening its adjacent. We see its function as doubled as a result of the binary 
alternation of its form, a doubling of awareness that differs from the awareness we may have of the 
array of possible future states of the dual film projections of Cerith Wyn Evans and Takahiko Iimura, or 
the dual screen scenes of Stan Douglas and Kerry Tribe. The fact that we apprehend Door, 11 rue Larrey 
as a static image and imagine the multiplication of it positions between two limited points brings it 
closer to the experience of the image phasing of Edge of Motion with its predictable alternating 
pattern of binary switching that slowly allows for an awareness of possibility to arise from the ebb and 
flow of simultaneities between each. And that this is achieved in consciousness as an array of images 
of relative positions in space rather than as a flowing portion of time.  
A version of Duchamp’s Door, 11 rue Larrey was produced in 1992 by artist Sturtevant. Her 
notion of producing copies of certain artworks – or repetitions to use her term – is perhaps fitting in 
relation to this analysis of the nature of the original work in terms of the perceptible and 
imperceptible means by which the door offers itself. Having proposed a relationship between 
Duchamp’s Door, 11 rue Larrey and the idea of possibility, we might regard Sturtevant’s version as a 
manifestation of the original idea, carried in a photograph and reconstituted decades later.  This re-
versioning of key artworks is a strategy Sturtevant maintained throughout her career and is 
particularly effective in this case as a response to the historical narrative of a piece that is otherwise 
only maintained in the form of an image. Through her process of ‘repetition’ Sturtevant has conjured 
an echo of Duchamp’s original, for it also to be housed in a private collection and ‘disappear’, at least 
temporarily, from public view.208 This seems to compound the notion that the original may no longer 
exist and leaves the photograph to which I have addressed much of this chapter as its sole record.209 
 
                                                 
208  Sturtevant’s Duchamp, 11 rue Larrey was included in the exhibition The Russian Linesman, curated by Mark 
Wallinger at the Hayward Gallery, London in 2009 
209 Having requested information about Duchamp’s Door, 11 rue Larrey from the Fabio Sargentini Gallery in Rome 
with no success I contacted the Anthony Reynolds Gallery in London for information regarding Sturtevant’s version of 
the work. The gallery supplied images and confirmed that Sturtevant’s, version titled Duchamp 11 rue Larrey, is in a 
private collection in Switzerland.  
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Sturtevant, Duchamp 11 rue Larrey, 1992. Wooden door, two wooden door frames and metal handle, left- 
hand side door and frame 206 x 108 cm and right-hand side frame 206 x 98 cm (Copyright the estate of 
Sturtevant, courtesy Anthony Reynolds Gallery, London) 
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Degrees of possibility  
To consider potential outcomes as a finite number of separate timelines or points in space is 
to schematise the concept of possibility as a diagram of multi-layered abstractions derived from a 
situation of stasis. To be able to consider possibility as an ongoing condition would require the tacit 
acknowledgement of probability over time as a measure of potential being made discernible from the 
experience of spatial and temporal circumstances.210 
There is therefore a difference between the recognition of the possible degrees of 
separateness implied in the photograph of Duchamp’s Door, 11 rue Larrey as consciousness conjuring 
an array of images, and the experience of possibility as real-time processes of perception. Bergson 
alludes to an unstable aspect of duration in its alternating to become time perceived as points in space 
at any given moment.211 As Iimura indicated in relation to his dual film pieces, Bergson outlined a 
plurality of time that functions in both subjective and non-divisible time consciousness that is 
experienced as continuous duration, and the time-space events of the external world that he 
describes as instants.212 These dimensions, Bergson suggests, are interrelated as a series of subjective 
transitions from one state to another, proceeding in a cinematographic model of time that divides as 
quantifiable succession attributable to points in space.  
In Duration and Simultaneity Bergson determined that we do not experience time as separate 
events at a subjective level. For example, we cannot determine exactly when we began thinking or 
feeling something such as concern or joy, but instead we can only measure these flows over time 
against temporal events in the physical world, as a sequence of moments demarked by devices such as 
a clock, or the position of the sun, or as I have outlined in reference to dual moving images, the 
coincidental coming together of experiences that in time become significant to consciousness.213 That 
                                                 
210 Edmund Husserl posited a notion of protention as an extension of the immediate moment of an occurrent experience 
(such as the trajectory and velocity of a ball as it is caught) as being different from the notion of expectation of a future 
event that exists beyond the horizon of anticipation and, as such, as an abstraction of the conditions of the moment. 
Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time. 117-118, 159 
211 ‘It is the simultaneity between two instants of two motions outside us that enables us to measure time. It is the 
simultaneity of these moments with moments pricked by them along our inner duration that makes this measurement 
one of time.’ Bergson, Duration and Simultaneity, 54 
212 Iimura wrote: ‘In these films I was interested in realising Henri Bergson’s concept of the time of duration, called 
“durée”, in filmic time. I see Bergson’s “durée” as closer to the concept of time in the east, which regards time as a 
duration rather that a divisible unit. If one considers the concept of Japanese ‘MA’ as an indivisible state of time and 
space, there is a common ground with Bergson’s “durée”.’ Iimura, The Collected Writings, 97 
213 ‘Instantaneity involves two things, a continuity of real time, that is, duration, and a spatialised time, that is, a line 
which, described by a motion, has thereby become symbolic of time. This spatialised time, which admits of points, 
ricochets onto real time and there gives rise to the instant.’ Bergson, Duration and Simultaneity, 53 
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is to say for each such moment at which time is demarked by an external factor it is determined as a 
split between pure duration that becomes spatialised as an event. Bergson considers time to be 
constituted in and of consciousness and the latter cannot divide time and locate specific moments as 
separate from each other subjectively. He suggests that we become aware of time in its becoming 
succession in space, and this space consists of instants that correspond to time as events. In the 
process of perceiving phasing images we might therefore consider consciousness as consisting not of 
linear points in time but of layered rhythms that intersect and undulate, both through and between 
external instants and that phasing is an apprehension of the layering and re-layering of unitised time, 
as events that are alternating and fluctuating in space. 
Regarding the perception of phasing of simultaneities between separate undulating images 
an awareness of future possibility in the experience is maintained in the recognition of such 
simultaneities forming out of continuous patterns of chance, and this I have argued is the result of it 
happing live, in actual time. In referring to Bergsonian ideas of a spatio-temporal exchange at the point 
at which time divides in alliance with space Jay Lampert outlines the perception of possibility as a 
process of difference in its coming into being. This dividing of duration at the point of apprehension 
might take the form of awareness of the divergence between the before and the after as it unfolds, 
unstable but indivisible from its spatial components and its possible outcomes. 214 Thus possibility in 
such a scenario is the transposing of duration into divisible points in space as live experience, as events 
that are ‘taking place’, as opposed to the witnessing of a pre-recorded set of circumstances in which 
‘possibility’ is pre-determined and simply that which is unknown and yet to be revealed. In this live 
scenario the perception of possibility results from the awareness of instability, or unpredictability as 
ongoing and actual rather that of the imagining of all of the conditions – positions or configurations of 
space – that a subject might achieve if activated in a particular manner. Theorist Shaun Gallagher 
succeeds in defining something of what this may mean in The Inordinance of Time when he suggests 
that ‘…the present, in its presenting, happens, but cannot be grasped in its happening.’215  
The perception of phasing of either visual or audio media begins from the recognition of 
patterns of behaviour over time that form out of the slipping simultaneities between points on 
differing rhythms or temporal resolutions. 216 The temporal resolution of Edge of Motion is the pace and 
                                                 
214 ‘If reality consisted entirely of a succession of events, as one actual thing, and then another actual thing, there would 
be no concrete possibility, only reality. A real possibility cannot by definition be actual, but also cannot merely be the 
product of the imagination withdrawing from reality. It is the point of differing, not the point of difference between two 
things, but differing, where there is no answer to the question whether it is one or two.’ Lampert, Simultaneity and 
Delay, 130 
215 Shaun Gallagher, The Inordinance of Time (London, New York: Northwestern University Press,1998), 101  
216 This is supported by Jay Lampert, in considering the perception of time from both Bergsonian and Deleuzian 
perspectives, he states that: ‘Time is not just a continuous rhythm like the ticking of a clock, or the repetition of 
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rhythmic pattern of the binary states of its digits. Recognition of patterns of behaviour is fundamental 
to the perceiving of phasing as the difference between structurally similar, in this case repeating, 
sequences. The regular and rhythmic appearance and disappearance of the digital display of the LED 
clocks used in Edge of Motion is multiplied by its spatial dimensions to reveal a process of greater or 
lesser degrees of synchronisation between one clock digits and the other. This is perceived as the 
slipping into and back out of synchronisation and is in itself a meta-pattern of behaviour extended 
over time that is built upon the simple binary patterns of clock digits switching on and off. This phasing 
of visible states is perceived out of a cycling pattern of spatial and temporal appearances and 
disappearances, and having recognised this, a viewer might accept the possibility of future cycles of 
synchronisation between the same states of appearance aligning in adjacent space. But the 
predictability of exactly when these concurrencies of digits will arise remains very difficult to measure 
and determine precisely without external devices, and thus a degree of assumption and intuition 
might become the means by which a viewer can acknowledge an aspect of this work exists beyond a 
perceptual threshold.217 The finer the degrees of difference between each clock’s timing the greater 
amount of time it takes for the cycle of synchronisations to form alignments and the more difficult it 
becomes for a viewer to recognise a pattern of phasing and anticipate its points of concurrency.  
I argue therefore that the result of the dual independent time flows of Edge of Motion are 
such that phasing patterns are perceived in alternating suspension between the limited temporal flow 
of each and dividing at the point of difference between their spatialised repetitions. The experience of 
the work might therefore be of an undulating shift between its two (or more) components. Moreover, 
the viewer’s awareness that this undulating shift is playing out live as a result of separate systems of 
presentation incorporates an instability that is the key to the perception of the possibility of their 
future configurations, the apprehension of is therefore as a process of differing rather than an 
‘illustration’ of possibility derived from a pre-recorded sequence of differences.  
                                                                                                                                                 
physical events before and after. Time flow is both the piling up of, and the subsequent differentiation of one rhythm 
and the next…Non identity of time-flow, (i.e. constantly changing rhythms) constitutes simultaneity. It is easy to 
imagine simultaneity as two clocks on the same rhythm telling us which sets of events occur at the same time. Laying 
static photographs on top of one another, or flipping pairs of photographs on the same rhythm, no doubt produces that 
kind of simultaneity. But Bergsonian simultaneity depends on switching rhythms so that consciousness can add its own 
congealing simultaneously with the worlds.’ My claim is that such ‘switching rhythms’ is exemplified by the phasing 
images of Edge of Motion. Lampert, Simultaneity and Delay, 132 
217 Whilst materially very different, art works such as Douglas Gordon’s 24 Hour Psycho and Jem Finer’s sound piece 
Longplayer (2000) function in a durational manner so as to extend their operations beyond the physical circumstance in 
which they are witnessed. In the case of Longplayer self-generating, computer-based musical algorithms produce 
sounds patterns that are intended to continue for 1000 years.  
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Edge of Motion therefore engenders an awareness of possibility that extends beyond the 
horizon of anticipation and toward a virtual realm of pure assumption, and as such it is able to traverse 
the thresholds of everyday expectation that might otherwise be based upon the protention of current 















Possibility as Infrathin 
 
 
Infra-thin is Marcel Duchamp's word for measuring the almost imperceptible margins of difference 
between two seemingly identical items. Infra-thin measures the all but immeasurable interstice between 
two things or ideas as they transition into and between one to the other, the passage between sense 
and non-sense, and the delay or deferral of these passages between the senses themselves. 218 
 
I have conducted examinations of the hypothetical concurrencies of temporal flow and 
events in space in the studio works Edge of Motion and the Occlusion series. This has included different 
formats of the dual image that were considered as either an intersection of the moving and static 
image, as a point of exchange between the representation of the temporal and the spatial, or as a 
means by which a matrix of points in time and positions in space could be used to frame the 
perception of image phasing. From such considerations of what might be taking place between my 
intention for these works, their operation and the viewer’s perception I have reflected upon ideas 
derived primarily from Bergson and Deleuze, and referenced works and ideas from contemporary 
artists and film-makers. But by way of comparison I return to Duchamp’s proposition of Infrathin to 
determine whether it offers a pertinent means of questioning how possibility might be perceived in 
the experience of phasing.    
                                                 
218 www.infrathin.com (accessed 10th September 2015)   
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 I have argued that phasing allows for a perception of future possibilities continuing to form 
out of chance concurrencies. The notion of possibility would in these circumstances be determined as 
degrees of difference witnessed at predictable points in time of the relative positions of the 
components of, in this case, the dual moving image work Edge of Motion.   
At the start of this chapter I introduced Duchamp’s neologism Infrathin as a liminal exchange 
of difference between states of the actual and the perceptible that I proposed are implied in his work 
Door, 11 rue Larrey. My intention was to outline how the idea of Infrathin might coincide with a 
perception of inter-dimensional exchange or alternation and how this might be imagined within this 
work. This I indicated might be not so much a transitioning as a transposing; of becoming one and 
another within multiple states so that the temporal and spatial separateness of objects and our 
perception of them defy the everyday binary logic of this or that, here or there, and contain a 
perceived fluctuating fusion of both. My idea is that a movement between spatial-temporal poles can 
be depicted as an object divided in time across points in space, from its being now and now, and in 
space between its being there and here. The inverse of this might be said to be a nominal state of all 
such possible conditions, of ‘here’ and ‘there’ enfolded into a singular now, and it is this nominal state 
of what might be called multiple-dimensionality that I am adopting as a means of approaching the idea 
of Infrathin. Ultimately I am outlining the idea as a condition which is not directly perceivable by the 
senses but instead determined as layered possibility, as the virtual concurrency of all possibilities 
inhabited at once. In this model Infrathin would consist of a matrix of virtual exchanges and function 
beyond actuality as the co-ordinates of a vector that offers an indication of possibility.219 
  To do this I will refer again to the perception of differences determined in Edge of Motion as a 
pattern of cycles and alternations. The schematic vector that these perceived alternations describe 
would be a diagram of time doubling and enfolding as it become extended as space, and the meta-
position of this perception that a diagram affords us (the Duchampian co-efficient of the work) is a 
diagram of flow unitised as static positions. Such a diagram would operate as a virtual map of 
possibility that projected forward in time out of known conditions, being simultaneously mirrored by 
past patterns of counterpoint and concurrency. But this proposed means by which we might consider 
the perception of phasing is only hypothetical and, as Bergson suggests, the means by which the 
experience of temporal flow can be externalised and witnessed is as multiples, in this case multiple 
relative positions or degrees of difference in the form of an array of comparative points in space. The 
perceived phasing of two repeating images might be said to have Infrathin tendencies in accordance 
                                                 
219 Art Historian Antje Von Graevenitz describes Duchamp’s Infrathin as ‘The desert-like intermediate zone as interval 
in the interaction of two states.’ Antje Von Graevenitz, ‘Duchamp as a Scientist, Artifex, and Semiotic-Philosopher. 
His Notes of the “Infra-mince” (1934/35-1945)’ in Marcel Duchamp and the Forestay Waterfall, Stephan Banz (Ed.) 
(Zurich: JRP/Ringier, 2010), 216 
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with my hypothesis that an awareness of possible future configurations can be conjured from the 
regular ebb and flow of the simultaneities arriving in perception. It is a process of perception that 
arrives as an array of alternative configurations in the imagination, drawn from accumulated patterns 
of memory images. 
As a means of aligning such liminal aspects of the studio work I refer to the comparative 
investigation in which I considered Duchamp’s notion of the Infrathin in terms of its relationship to the 
temporal phenomena of that which is ‘becoming’ in consciousness. Avoiding the commonly applied 
definitions of the Infrathin that adopt a more literal and physical take on ideas of thinness or fusions of 
sensations I am instead concentrating on phenomena on the thresholds of temporal perception. I 
consider the term Infrathin to have equivalence to the elusiveness of ‘now’ and its call to the meta-
image and metaphor as descriptors of now as a simultaneous exchange. Duchamp left his term 
Infrathin open, as an idea without definition. To attribute literal interpretations would be to stifle the 
open-endedness of this idea by appealing to a spatial and static context. It is with this in mind that I 
consider the Infrathin an aspect of consciousness through which to consider the notions distilled from 
the examination of the research and determine whether the refractions and resonances that apply are 
in any way coincidental or meaningful. In the spirit of the Infrathin I would expect that one is 
ultimately the same as the other.  
I have determined the relevance of the liveness of the phasing between two separate time 
flows – its happing in the moment of its reception out of that process of reception – in terms of 
possibility as it is this factor that ensures the work is open to a process of active apprehension via the 
engagement of the viewer. It is the idea of possibility as a prerequisite to a viewer’s engagement that 
accords with the interpretations of the Infrathin that I want to foreground here, utilising Duchamp’s 
succinct definition that: ‘Possibility is infra-thin…possibility implying becoming – the passage from one 
to another takes place in the infra-thin…’220 
Possibility, I suggest, is derived from the accumulation of simultaneities, and the perception 
of this continuing in a liminal state of ongoing difference that is analogous to Infrathin, as a passage 
from one to another, at once arriving at the threshold of expectation and receding into the past.  
Cal Clements writes of Duchamp’s Infrathin in terms of difference that is no longer 
recognisable but perceived as being both in dual places and in dual time.221 Such a doubled condition is 
considered by Rosalind Kraus in terms of a refutal of the position of modernist art in its attempts to 
                                                 
220 Duchamp, Marcel Duchamp, Notes, 21 
221 ‘Far from embracing over-arching concepts of reason, Duchamp prefers the state of not being able to recognize 
similarity between two similar objects.’ Cal Clements, ‘Duchamp’s Infrathin’ in Pataphysica, Cal Clements (Ed.) (New 
York: Writers Club Press, 2002), 89 
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achieve purity of vision in a singular moment.222 But Duchamp made a point of offering Infrathin as the 
measure of the immeasurable interstice between states of awareness, be they actual or conceptual or 
inclusive of both. It is therefore possible to perceive that which can be Infrathin as a delay or deferral 
between the senses and the idea of something as it transitions perpetually between conditions. In the 
light of the examples of phasing examined in the studio works Edge of Motion and Occlusion this does 
not discount experience that is constituted in consciousness as ongoing possibility. I would therefore 
argue that this aligns affordances of Infrathin with the perception of concurrencies of temporal flow 




































                                                 





In the introduction to this text I identify the implicit subject of Douglas Gordon’s work 24 Hour 
Psycho as representing the viewer’s awareness of the limits of their physical presence, and claim that 
the work’s perpetuation is implicitly understood by the audience to extend in time beyond the 
threshold of their ability to witness its entirety. Whilst Gordon may have intended his reworking of 
Hitchcock’s most infamous film as an experience of cinematic suspense taken to its extreme, 24 Hour 
Psycho operates beyond a comment upon an iconographic movie to become a reflexive and 
metaphysical experience. The experience draws attention not only to the nature of watching moving 
images but ultimately to a tacit awareness of the extent of the viewer’s own physicality. But any 
inference that such durational excess – extending a work’s temporal boundaries beyond the point at 
which one can be present – is the only means by which moving imagery can be apprehended in terms 
of its presence in space is dispelled when I examine multi-screen installations by João Maria Gusmão 
and Pedro Paiva and Chantal Akerman. In the process of this analysis I reference Bergsonian 
spatialised time and propose that the means by which we alternate our attention between the 
presence of multiple image screens and the subject matter they depict requires that we adopt a dual 
and concurrent awareness of such work’s temporal operations in space. 
If one’s presence relative to the duration of 24 Hour Psycho is implied in the experience of the 
work then I suggest that this is complemented by the means by which one’s position in space – one’s 
viewpoint – is also a factor. As described, Gordon situates aspects of the piece outside of ones 
immediate visual field by projecting the film onto opposite sides of a screen suspended in space so 
that one’s position in relation to the screen in space (as distinct from in time) is always such that one 
image remains invisible. We are only able to see one version of the film or the other, the original or its 
inversion, in an alternation that requires us to move within the space of the work. In similar examples 
such as Lisa Oppenhiem’s By Faith and Industry duration is divided by projecting two different films, 
one on each side of a suspended screen, thus ensuring that a viewer’s capability to see the 
simultaneities between each becomes a spatial concern that is complemented by memory.  
Foregrounding an aspect of a work as being out of reach by extending it beyond the temporal 
or spatial threshold of the viewer’s presence is a method I identify in works that are predicated upon 
durational excess, simultaneity and the experience of temporality as inherently spatial. Hidden 
dimensions are implied in the works described here that appeal to a viewer’s awareness of what is not 
present at the point of apprehension, encouraging them to cast their attention towards either the 
assumption, or active imagination, of situations that may eventually arrive out of the work’s 
ponderous or alternating dynamic.   
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In Chapter 1 I cite Kate Mondloch’s spectatorial doubleness as an example of the means by 
which a proposed layering of consciousness of actuality and the perception of its potential outcomes 
have been theorised, and use this to frame the perception of alternating binaries of the studio work 
Edge of Motion. This work is foregrounded as an example of image phasing that I identify as 
fundamental to the experience of its dual repetitions. By highlighting interrelationships perceivable in 
this work between points in time and positions in space, indicated by its two separate components, I 
am able to outline the context of the research as the experience of forms of spatialised time that 
result from the application of repetition, delay and simultaneity as creative methods. It is from this 
point that I am able to approach the research question: What might the visual phasing perceived to be 
operating in the studio practice between moving and repeating images reveal about the nature of 
perception?  
In determining how to answer this I analysed the particular perceptual characteristics of 
studio works that function in comparable ways, as alternations of repeated and divided time between 
two components. I propose that in such cases a primary subject of the work is its extension in time 
beyond the immediate parameters of the encounter, and that this translates into a viewer’s twofold 
awareness of what is present in the process of the encounter with the work and what can be imagined 
or assumed may continue to take place beyond that encounter.  
In the case of the studio work Edge of Motion I propose that the cycle of simultaneities of the 
dual clock’s digits offer a subject that lies outside the actual and so encourages a viewer to consider it 
in terms of the thresholds of their temporal and spatial presence. I argue that we apprehend this work 
ultimately in terms of the possible configurations of its future states, and that these are apprehended 
– in a manner somewhat comparable to my analysis of the possible configurations of Duchamp’s Door, 
11 rue Larrey in Chapter 6 – as an array of separate degrees of difference and simultaneity. 
Having defined my interest in phasing as visual phenomenon perceived in the alternation of 
cycles of simultaneity and difference between repetitions of images in space, I am able to focus on 
how the perceived slippage between two or more successive alternations manifests in the experience 
of selected contemporary art works. I propose a key factor in the perception of phasing, referring to 
works that utilise separate film or video projectors, is the independently operating alternations that 
are seen to result in repeating patterns of chance alignments. The implication of this, I suggest, is that 
a viewer is aware that such synchronisations are happening in real time and these dynamic patterns 
result from the differences between separate systems. In short the viewer deciphers the work’s 
behaviour patterns and assumes an indefinite continuation of these cycles of simultaneity. I argue 
therefore that such projections arise from an awareness of the work as a non-resolving process, which 
allows me to describe its undulating dynamic as having ‘possibility’, albeit within the repeating binaries 
of the work’s form. I use the word possibility as opposed to probability as the re-appearance over time 
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of the image synchronisations can be assumed, but without an accurate means of measurement and 
calculation it cannot be precisely forecast as to when each cycle will reoccur. Because the process of 
apprehending the work will not easily reveal the timing of the pattern’s future cycles, the phasing of 
simultaneities between images remains unpredictable beyond that of general assumption. In short the 
work’s concurrent flows of looping over time also alternate in space, which can give rise in 
consciousness to a multiplicity of comparative reoccurring moments. The binary switching between 
image repetition and spatial alternation divides duration into points of relative difference which, when 
seen as a continuous process, offer a mix of instability and probability that I term possibility.  
If, as Bergson states, we apprehend image succession as separate points, and therefore 
numerical and adjacent, then it follows that the perceived possibility that patterns of simultaneity will 
reoccur over time are conceived of as separate images of difference in the work.223 Thus my claim is 
that the phasing of image successions concurs with Bergsonian ideas of time as the retained memory 
of differences, each separate from the next. A subjective impression of the phenomenon of the 
phasing of the digits of Edge of Motion is thus apprehended as an accumulation of static points.  
I argue therefore that when recognising phasing as a series of repeating simultaneities the 
factors that are seen to constitute change over time are the waxing and waning of the discernible 
points of difference between each image, and that we retain our awareness of these points of 
graduated differentiation as a series of vignettes, of separated moments described by their position 
relative to each other. Furthermore, in interpreting a Bergsonian notion of divided duration, I argue 
that this array of different configurations is apprehended and maintained in consciousness as assumed 
possibilities for future configurations in what might be termed ‘image arrays’, and not as comparative 
temporalities replayed in memory as portions of imagined time. Such presumptions of a work’s future 
state are therefore spatially privileged in their multiplicity of positions, while the points in time at 
which one might assume future synchronisations will appear remains unclear.  
It is with this proposal that I claim the contribution to knowledge that constitutes this thesis. 
And it is with this construction of a model of a perceptual process, rooted in spatio-temporal 
relationships, that I formulate an answer to the research question that I posed at the start of this 
thesis: What might the visual phasing perceived to be operating in the studio practice between 
moving and repeating images reveal about the nature of perception?  
In proposing this response in the form of a set of perceptual circumstance I am composing 
this model of the perception of phasing as a state of concurrent awareness of the real-time 
simultaneities between adjacent moving images and their future alignments as a set of probable 
                                                 
223 In describing his thoughts on the perception of successive points in spatialised time Bergson states, ‘We are 
compelled to borrow from space the images by which we describe what the reflective consciousness feels about time 
and…succession.’ Bergson, Time and Free Will, 91 
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states. I am suggesting that in the process of apprehending the phasing of the studio work and 
imagining their possible future states, space is privileged in a process of visualisation that takes the 
form of relative positions rather than of such events happening over time. These, in the case of Edge 
of Motion, are derived from the patterns of simultaneity perceived to have taken place in the work, 
and, to borrow once more from Bergsonian thinking, such ‘memory images’ of a piece of work that is 
designed around patterns of repetition represent the sum of the layered circumstances that the work 
might inhabit in the future.  
Following the pattern upon which this thesis has been developed, as alternations between an 
experiential studio practice and a process of responsive dialogues and textual enquiries, this proposed 
model of the perception of image phasing in turn gives rise to further questions. Such questions are a 
continuation of an established method of generating thought, and arise at this point as an extension 
of the initial research question by asking how such information might next be utilised. And as an 
adjunct to this, whether the proposed retention of simultaneities represented by separate images 
might suggest a means of exploring how else we perceive representations of space out of successive 
vignettes.  
The process of inverting an initial proposition can be useful in testing the logic of ones 
thought processes and orienting ones ideas. In this case an exercise of examining my thinking in 
reverse – successive images used to describe space rather than temporal simultaneities apprehended 
as points in space – leads me back to the studio work entitled Extension Reveals Duration, a work that 
was described in the introduction as having generated some of the questions that initiated this 
research.224 This site-specific installation presented a series of images of lines derived from a diagram 
of an interior. These lines were projected over extended periods of time as a sequence that described 
a meta-image of the architectural space hidden behind a screen on which they appeared. My intention 
for this work was that the separate images of relative points in space were to coalesce in a viewer’s 
awareness as an image of space, a process that can at this point be said to indicate a proportional 
inverse to the array of separate positions by which I propose the possible future configurations of the 
phasing images of Edge of Motion can be acknowledged. Such dichotomies will continue to evolve as 
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